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The bitter aftermath of World War II brought to
Eastern Europe a new order—an order marked by the red
star of the Soviet Army and the growth of political control
oy Moscow. As the first postwar decade wore on, Soviet
political, economic, and military hegemony over most of
the area became entrenched. and the ideological map of
Europe became somewhat stabilized. Events beginning in
the 1950's, however
—
probably not initiated but certainly
accelerated by the death of Stalin—revealed that the
Soviet Union's hold on its client states was not total.
The suppression by force of Hungary's attempt in 1 956 to
establish her independence followed other difficulties
within the bloc and indicated a bankruptcy of Soviet
policies toxvard Eastern Europe. Since 196^ there have
been determined moves by Rumania to extricate herself
from Soviet entanglements. Again, in I.968 the Soviet
Union felt it necessary to suppress with force the acti-
vities of an ally—the increasingly liberal regime of
Czechoslovakia. Since its inception in 1955. the Warsaw
Pact has played a significant role in the political
maturation, diplomatic strategy, and military development




istern Europe Is a difficult region to characterize.
Though the term could be used to include such countries as
Greece, Finland, and European Turkey, it has since World
War II come to mean Albania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, East
Germany, Hungary, Poland, Rumania, and Yugoslavia, states
which after World War II became dominated—or in the case
of Yugoslavia, strongly influenced—by the Soviet Union.
Encompassing over 600,000 square miles and over one hundred
millions of population, the region is divided by intense
ethnic and language differences and by geographic, social,
and economic diversity. Nationalism has been and continues
to be a strong force in the political life of the area,
posing problems for the minorities which exist within
each country. Having at various times In history fallen
under Turkish, Austrian, German, and Russian influences.
Eastern Europe has during this century constituted a buffer
zone between Germany and Imperial Russia and today consti-
tutes such a buffer between Western Europe and the Soviet
Union.
While the military might of the Soviet Union did
not play a crucial part in the post-World War II takeover
of every East European country, its role was significant
in most. Between December 12, 19^3. and April 6, 19^8,
the Soviet Union signed treaties of "friendship, coopera-
tion and mutual assistance" with each of hex present
allies and with Yugoslavia, then a close ally. Each




In coalitions against the Soviet Union. The armistice
reements signed with the defeated powers of Bulgaria,
Hungary, and Rumania provided the Soviets with a superior
position to that of the other Allies in administration
of each country during the period of armistice implemen-
tation. The peace treaties signed with each of these
countries confirmed the superior position of the Soviets
on the respective Allied Control Commissions. ^ An even
more powerful position accrued to the Soviet Union in its
zone o£ occupation of Germany, now the German Democratic
Republic (East Germany). Predominantly Soviet liberation
of Czechoslovakia and Poland endowed the Soviet Union with
privileged status in their postwar development. Only in
Yugoslavia and Albania, liberated primarily through indi-
genous partisan movements (though Yugoslavia was assisted
by Soviet troops), did the Soviet Army fail to become an
important factor.
While the presence of the Red Army was important,
other elements contributed to the Soviet position of
strength in postwar Eastern Europe. Among these was the
interpretation of Western actions by many East Europeans
as apparent indifference to the area. Historical ties
to Russia remained in the legacies of some states. Poland
desired a guarantor of her western border, of the territory
given her (oy the Soviets) from the Soviet zone of Germany,
and Czechoslovakia similarly needed protection from German
claims to the Sudetenland. In Yugoslavia, Tito's partisans
were committed to Communist ideology and desired close

alliance with the Soviet Union. Further, in the postwar
coalition cabinets Communist Parties—banned in each of
the East European countries except Czechoslovakia prior
to the war—held strong positions; many of the incumbents
had been trained in Moscow during the war.
Prior to 1 9^-8 it was not certain that the East
* JLEuropean Communists would follow the Soviet model. As
the political development in the area moved from true
coalitions toward Communist "peopled democracies" (though
with puppet coalitions in some instances), there were
strong indications that the East European countries would
adopt a form of socialism tailored to their own specific
needs and conditions. In the early postwar years
—
apparently at the initiation of Yugoslavia—Albania,
Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, Rumania, and
Yugoslavia were building an alliance system that was
oriented to Eastern Europe and not necessarily tied to
the Soviet Union. While probably not designed to be anti-
Soviet, it was possibly aimed at preventing further Soviet
penetration of their political integrity. -5 In January,
19^8, the Soviet Union intervened and reorganized the
East European treaty network to satisfy its own desires.
The folloicing month a Communist coup d'etat in Czecho-
slovakia completed the institution of political control
over Eastern Europe by the Soviet Union. In June of
that year Tito's Yugoslavia was expelled from the
Communist Information Bureau (Cominform) for "nationalist

deviations, " in effect removing Yugoslavia from the Soviet
bloc.
3y April, 19^9. the Soviet Union had completed its
Abilateral alliance structure in Eastern Europe. (The use \
of bilateral agreements represented a Communist continuation
of former Russian distrust of multilateral groupings along
her borders.') In September and October, 1 9^9 » the Soviet
Union and the other East European countries unilaterally
denounced their alliances with Yugoslavia. Albania, Bulgaria,
Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, Rumania, and the Soviet Union
continued to be tied together by various bilateral treaties,
though Albania was formally linked only to Bulgaria and, with
East Germany, remained without Soviet guarantees of assistance
in case of attack. It should be noted that the alliance
structure complemented other Soviet methods of political
domination, including penetration of the secret police and
Interior ministry organizations and utilization of the
Communist parties in each state.
From April, 19^9» until the creation of the Warsaw.
Pact in 1955 no further defense treaties were signed within
the Soviet bloc. Principal military activity concentrated
on development of the armed forces of the various states
Albania received modest Soviet military assistance." In
East Germany 7500 regular police were transferred to special
Alert Units in 19^8. By 1950 the strength of these Units
had grown to 50,000 and Sea and Air Police units had been
formed. These forces were renamed Garrisoned People f s
Police in 1952, with ground, sea, and air force sections,

id by 3 953 reache botal strength of 100,000 men. 10 ?or
the Soviet bloc to allow East Germany to form a Defense
:istry and designate its forces an Army remained l.\ the
future. The armed forces of the remainder of the East
European states, except Yugoslavia, were subjected to intense
Soviet izat ion. They were built up, reorganized, and re-
equipped with Soviet arms and equipment. Numerous Soviet
advisors assisted in indoctrination of armed forces personnel
along Soviet Army lines and, in some instances, Soviet mili-
tary regulations were adopted wholesale. Yugoslavia
recieved military aid and assistance from the United States
following her expulsion in 19^8 from the Soviet orbit. The
flow of military goods to Yugoslavia from the Soviet Union
did resume after the 1 955 Soviet-Yugoslav rapprochement
(though Yugoslavia has yet to return to a close military
affiliation with the Soviet Union).
In the fall of 1 95^ the Soviet Union became extremely
concerned over the drafting of the Paris accords which would
permit the rearming of West Germany and would allow for
its admission into the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. 3
In the official Soviet view, the Paris accords were seen
as the revival of a revenge-minded, Hitler-inspired West
German military machine instigated by American militarists
bent on new adventure, a combination of German imperialism
and American monopoly capital, and an obstruction to
German reunification. At a conference of the USSR and
her allies in Moscow in December, 195^» it was announced
that the bloc would take steps to unify their armed forces
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if the Paris accords were ratified. J on January 1$, 1 955
#
the Soviet Union demanded talks concerning reunification
of Germany--and on the condition that the West reject the
Paris accords. -0 Soviet Foreign Minister Kolotov, in a
speech in Moscow on February 8, re-emphasized the Soviet
contention that ratification of the Paris accords would
become a major obstacle to German reunification, ' and on
March 21 the Soviet news agency Tass announced that the
Communist bloc nations had completed negotiations and
reached agreement for "friendship, cooperation, and mutual
aid" and the organization of a unified military command
^^
,18
"in the event of the ratification of the Paris agreements.'
While declaring in a speech on April 21 that peaceful
coexistence was the only sensible direction for Communist-
capitalist international relations to take, Party Secretary
Khrushchev reiterated the intention of the East European
bloc to create a new military organization to oopose what
he termed "German militarism." " Although the Soviet and
East European fear of Germany as a military power is well
grounded in historical fact, it is perhaps difficult to
fully comprehend the extent to which this fear controls
the passions of the East European peoples. The destruction
and misery caused by, and suffered at the hands of,
Hitler's Germany will not be soon forgotten by Europe's
peoples. Nor will they be prepared to make again the
mistake of the 1930's when Germany was allowed to grow
militarily strong while the remainder of Europe remained

8weak. The fear that the Germans will seek revenge, as
they did after the First World War, has prevented other
Europeans from "being totally rational concerning Germany,
her freedom, or her sovereignty.

II
THE PACT IS FORKED
On Kay 1^, 1955. the Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation
and Mutual Assistance between Albania, Bulgaria, Czechoslova-
kia, East Germany, Hungary, Poland, Rumania, and the Union of
Soviet Socialist Republics was signed in Warsaw, Poland. The
Treaty and the accompanying declaration, Establishment of a
Joint Command, formed the text of the Warsaw Pact agreements.
The Warsaw Pact is significant for several reasons:
(1) it organized a unified military command to oppose the
North Atlantic Treaty Organization; (2) it provided justi-
fication for the presence of Soviet troops in East European
countries; (3) it marked the first time since World War II
that the Soviet Union had deviated from its policy of bi-
lateral military agreements and ventured into a multilateral
agreement with other socialist countries; and (^) it created
an institutional link in the integration of the Communist
bloc through which the Soviet Union could influence the
foreign policy of the East European countries.
The Pact was in part required by the power vacuum
left in the wake of Stalin's death. While Malenkov, Molotov,
and Khrushchev each had fought to establish his political
supremacy in j953» 195^. and j955» the European bloc
nations had suffered from the lack of political and economic
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direction from Moscow. 20 The extra-organizational and.
personal political ties that had served Stalin so well
required formalization. This v.ras also necessary because
the possibility of absorbing the East European countries
into the Soviet Union, if ever a Soviet objective, was
21gone. x
With the signing of the Austrian State Treaty on
Hay 1.5 1 1955t one day after the signing of the Warsaw
Treaty, the original justification for the presence of
Soviet troops in Hungary and Rumania no longer existed. 22
These troops had been stationed to protect the lines of
communication of the Red Army between the Soviet Union and
the Soviet troops stationed in eastern Austria. The
previously executed bilateral treaties of "friendship,
cooperation and mutual assistance" did not provide the
desired juridical basis for the presence of Soviet troops
in the East European states. 3
While the German question and the Paris accords
—
addressed by the East European-Soviet bloc in 195^ and
early 1955
—
provided the opportunity, the creation of the
Warsaw Pact appears to have been intended primarily as
a vehicle through which the Soviet Union could negotiate
9k.
with NATO. Just as the Soviet Union had attacked the
Marshall Plan, the concept of the European Defense Com-
munity, and the creation of the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization, the Soviets saw in the formation of a




Western unity through diplomatic and olitical maneuvers.
For the same purposes, the Soviet Union in 1 954 had asked
to join NATO. 2 ^
3y April, 1955* press reports indicated that the feel-
ing in Washington, D.C. , was that a unified East European
military command under Soviet leadership would be announced
at about the time the Austrian State Treaty was announced.
Analysts felt that the Soviet Union already had a unified
command of the armed forces of the satellite countries
through infiltration and mutual assistance treaties but
that the new treaty would clearly provide the right for
Soviet troops to be on satellite soil. At this time it
was estimated that approximately 1,120,000 Soviet troops
were in Hungary, Rumania, Poland, East Germany, and Austria.
The expected treaty was also seen as a method to keep East
26German military development under control.
On May 11 , 1 955 # the conference in Warsaw, termed by
the Soviets the "Second Conference of European Countries on
27Safeguarding Peace and Security in Europe," ' was convened.
Soviet Premier Bulganin opened the conference with a speech
in which he stated that the USSR's foreign policy was guided
by the "Leninist principle" of coexistence and that the
Soviet Union was struggling for peace and reduced interna-
tional tensions. He announced that on Kay ? the Supreme
Soviet had annulled the treaties of alliance made by the
Soviet Union with Britain and France during World War II
as a result of those countries' having entered into military
alliance with Germany contrary to the commitments of the
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aties. An attack on United States policies, a claim that
the Soviet Union had always stood against West German re-
armament and for German reunification, and mention of a
vague proposal for disarmament followed. 3ulganin then
appealed for joint East European defense, embodied in a
unified command, and called attention to the fact that the
treaty draft submitted to the conference was in complete
accord with the United Nations Charter. He suggested that
joint action by the East Europeans would be just retaliation
for the military bloc (NATO) set up against them. 2
°
The conference was concluded after three days. The
Treaty"* is composed of introductory paragraphs, eleven
articles, and the signatures and seals of the representa-
tives. An accompanying declaration established a joint
command of the armed forces.
The introductory paragraphs of the Treaty point to
the threat to peace caused by the ratification of the Paris
accords, the desire of the peaceful European states to
preserve peace, the need of the signatory states to take
measures for their own security, the principles of the
United Nations Charter, and the desire for closer ties of
cooperation as the bases upon which the Treaty is founded.
These principles are incorporated into articles One, Two,
and Sight in which the signatories obligate themselves to
refrain from using force or the threat of force in their




peace and to work toward disarmament, to base their rela-
tions with each other on a spirit of friendship and coopera-
tion, and to refrain from interfering in the internal
affairs of the others.
Articles Seven, Ten, and Eleven provide the adminis-
trative details of the Treaty. Each representative pledges
that his country will not participate, and is not partici-
pating, in any alliance inimical to the agreements of the
Treaty; the Treaty is made subject to the ratification of
the several states; and the operable period of the Treaty
is established as twenty years with provision for its
extension for an additional ten years if not denounced by
at least one signatory nation one year before its original
tenure expires, of particular interest, provision is made
for the Treaty to be made inoperative if a general European
collective security agreement is formed.
The really operative paragraphs of the Treaty are
found in articles Three, Pour, Five, and Six. Article
Three establishes that the participants will consult with
each other on all important international issues affecting
their common interests and further specifies that they will
immediately hold joint consultations in the event of threat
of armed attack to any member. Article Four provides for
collective defense in the event of armed attack on any
member and requires that the requisite reports be made
to the United Nations. Article Five makes provision for,
but does not establish, a joint command of the armed forces
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of the member states. (The actual establishment of the
command is made in the accompanying Declaration. ) Article
Six stipulates that a Political Consultative Committee be
established for the purpose of the joint consultations
envisioned by the Treaty and, additionally, for investi-
gation of any questions arising from the operation of the
Treaty.
Article Nine, which leaves the Treaty open to mem-
bership to any nation desiring to join, deserves special
mention. The Soviets viewed this article as demonstrating
the peace-loving nature of the participating nations and
the peaceful intent of the agreements. ° This was later
to provide considerable propaganda value.
The Warsaw Conference was attended by the top
leaders from each country. The representatives signing the
Treaty were: Premier Mehmet Shehu of Albania, Premier
Vylko Chervenkov of Bulgaria, Premier Viliam Siroky of
Czechoslovakia, Premier Otto Grotewohl of East Germany,
Premier Andras Hegedus of Hungary, premier Jozef Cyran-
kiewicz of Poland, Premier Georghe Georghiu-Dej of Rumania,
and Premier Nikolai Alexandrovich Bulganin of the USSR.
Attending also was General Peng Teh-huai, Defense Minister
of the Chinese People* s Republic who, though not signing,
fully supported the Treaty.
"Hhe declaration establishing the Joint Command of
the armed forces of the signatory states appointed Soviet
Marshal I. S. Konev, regarded at the time as the number
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three man In the Soviet Union's military organization, 30
Commander-in-Chief of the Joint Armed Forces. It provided
that the Minister of Defense or other military leader of
each state would serve as a Deputy Commander-in-Chief and
would be in command of the forces provided to the Joint
Command by his country. The question of military parti-
cipation oy East Germany was postponed. All questions
relating to the organization or strengthening of the Joint
Armed Forces were referred to the Political Consultative
Committee. Provision was made for the establishment of a
Staff of the Joint Armed Forces to be headquartered in
Moscow and to include representatives from the General
Staffs of the participating nations. The final paragraph
stipulated that the disposition of the Joint Armed Forces
would be subject to defense requirements and agreement
among the states.
The striking similarity between the North Atlantic
Treaty and the Warsaw ?act*s Treaty of Friendship, Coop-
eration and Mutual Assistance should be noted. It would
appear that the North Atlantic Treaty was deliberately
taken as the model for the alliance signed in Warsaw.
Though the wording differs and the participants are dif-
ferent, the principles espoused and objectives sought are,
on paper, the same. With the single exception of Article 5
o'f the Warsaw Treaty in which the parties agreed to estab-
lish a Joint Command, each article of the Pact has its
counterpart In the North Atlantic Treaty. It is significant
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that the Warsaw Pact's Joint Command was actually estab-
lished by an accompanying Declaration, not by the Treaty
itself.
The Communists were able to use the memories of
World War II and the prospect of German revanchism plus
the provision for Pact dissolution in the event that NATO
was also dissolved to: (1) demonstrate that Soviet mili-
tary relationships are defensive and peaceful; (2) show
that the USSR was protecting East Europe; and (3) gain
some support within the Warsaw Pact countries for local
Communists. 3 X i>he Treaty was portrayed as excluding the
domination of some countries by others and as giving the
Soviet bloc nations "greater resources than before for
defending their freedom and independence in case the im-
perialist seekers after the wealth of others make an
attempt upon them. "32 The possibility of conflict between
the signatory states was disregarded on the basis that the
ideology of socialism made their principles and objectives
identical. 33
The absence of contradictions between policy and
strategy in socialist coalitions assures the
harmonious correlation of the international and
national aspects of the military strategies of
the different countries. Ihe common interest in
the defense of the socialist camp from attacks
by imperialist aggressors not only assumes mili-
tary co-operation among the armies of the socialist
countries, but also a unity of strategic views. -^
With the depositing in Warsaw on June 2, 1 955 » by
the Soviet Union of its ratification papers of the Warsaw
Pact, the ratification by all eight signatory nations was
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completed.-'-' On June 5 Warsaw radio reported that the
Treaty had come into force.
^
The Political Consultative Committee was officially
organized at its first meeting in Prague, Czechoslovakia,
on January 27 and 28, 1 95^« It established two subordinate
bodies: (1) a Standing Commission whose task is to draft
recommendations on foreign policy problems, and (2) a Joint
Secretariat, composed of representatives from each signa-
tory state. Both are headquartered in Moscow.
In the analysis of at least one commentator, Hanson W.
Baldwin, in May, 1 955. the Conference in Warsaw appeared
more important politically and psychologically than mili-
tarily; solidarity was of internal importance, particularly
to Poland, Czechoslovakia, and East Germany, due to the
emergence of a rearmed West Germany. Its military value
was limited as the satellites had the same, rather than
complementing, strengths and weaknesses that the Soviet
Union had—strong in manpower and geographic position,
weak in sea power—and were dependent on the USSR for air
power and equipment. The satellite armies varied in size
and effectiveness but contributed approximately two million
men and two thousand tanks to the joint forces. The best
armed forces seemed to be the Bulgarian and Hungarian;
the Polish armed forces were the largest but the Soviets
apparently felt them to be politically unreliable. It
was felt that the Warsaw Treaty would formalize and tie





Despite the military overtones of the Warsaw Treaty,
its political significance is the greater. It is the
"single most important formal commitment" 3° binding the
East European countries to the Soviet Union. It repre-
sents a departure from bilateralism in that it requires
the joint consultation—and thus the possible Soviet
domination—of the members on foreign policy issues; in
so doing it limits independent action. 39
Nearly a year would elapse after the Warsaw Pact's
formation before Stalin would be denigrated by Khrushchev
at the Twentieth Congress of the Communist Party of the
Soviet Union. Until that time, the Warsaw Pact operated
in an atmosphere of uncertainty, a combination of: the
foreign policy inherited from Stalin and formalized at the
Nineteenth Party Congress in October, 1952; the attempts
to overcome that stagnant policy; the significant changes
in domestic policy taking place within the Soviet Union;
MalenkoVs conservative approach to foreign policy; and
the uncertainty caused by Malenkov's replacement in early
^955. In October, 1 952 , the Kremlin was still waiting
for economic crisis in the Western countries and planned
to continue its buildup of military potential while doing
so. ° In the Central Committee Report to the Nineteenth
Congress, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization was
presented as an agressive, not defensive, bloc and the
United States 1 ant i-Communist stance as a "smokescreen"
for imperialist designs. German reunification, speedy
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conclusion of a peace treaty with Germany, and the with-
drawal of all occupation forces from Germany were cited
as objectives;^" continued strengthening of the Soviet
Union's defensive capability was defined as one of the
Party's tasks •, and the USSR promised to continue render-
ing aid to the socialist countries and to strengthen and






On August j 2, 1955. Premier Georghiu-Dej of Rumania
announced that Soviet troops would remain in Rumania in
accordance with the Warsaw Pact to assure "Rumania's
security." This move was not surprising to Western
observers as such action had been expected from both
Rumania and Hungary. In reply to an inquiry, Georghiu-Dej
stated that these measures would not have been required
had foreign troops of Western nations been removed from
European states and Western military organizations liqui-
dated. 3y pursuing two of the Warsaw Pact's central
objectives—undermining of Western alliances and the
removal of United States' troops from Western Europe
—
Georghiu-Dej exhibited the adherence to Pact policy
expected of a member state in its foreign policy statements.
The Soviet Union on August 13 announced a 6^0,000-man
reduction of its armed forces, giving as the reason the
relaxation of international tensions. ^5 Between August 2^
and September 20 the remainder of the East European bloc
with the exception of East Germany announced armed forces
cuts: Czechoslovakia, 3^,000 raen;^ Poland, ^7,000 men;^ 7
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Albania, 9.000 men;^8 Hungary, 20,000 men; ^9 and Bulgaria,
18,000 men. -5° Prior to the effect of any cuts, Western
estimates of Communist bloc military strength placed the
total bloc strength at approximately 5.000,000 men divided
as follows"
:
Soviet Union: 1 75 divisions, not all at full
strength, totaling 3.500,000 men;
Poland: 16-20 divisions, totaling 400-600,000 men;
Albania: 2-3 divisions, totaling 50-60,000 men;
Czechoslovakia: 12-15 divisions, totaling
200-250,000 men;
Rumania: 15-20 divisions, totaling 250-300,000 men;
Hungary: 12 divisions, totaling 1 65-180,000 men;
Bulgaria: 11-1.6 divisions, totaling 165-195,000 men;
East Germany: the equivalent of 6-9 divisions,
totaling 150,000 men (East German forces were
not organized as an East German Army). -5 1
Interpretation of the announced cuts in armed force
Hstrength varied from the belief in Washington, D.C., that
reductions would cause no decrease in military might to
the views of some former residents of East European coun-
tries that the cuts would not take place. Consideration
was given to the fact that the reductions could be absorbed
by substituting civilians in staff and support units
thereby decreasing the number of men in uniform while
*All estimates of the strength of armed forces in-
clude Army, Ifevy, Air Force, and Marine (as applicable)
personnel unless otherwise specified,,

2?.
in no way reducing the number of personnel actually parti-
cipating- in the work of the armed forces. -52
During his brief tenure as Premier, Malenkov had
felt that possession by the United States coupled with
acquisition by the Soviet Union of the hydrogen bomb had ;-
provided a mutual deterrence between the East and West
which would prevent a world-wide holocaust and that the
major portion of military expenditures should be directed
toward further development of conventional forces. -53
Khrushchev, however, strongly disagreed with Malenkov 1 s
position and the direction of development of the Soviet
Union's military forces under Khrushchev was to be toward
nuclear weapons and strategic delivery systems, particu-
larly missiles. 5^ The reductions in conventional forces,
announced by the bloc in August and September, were con-
sistent with this change in tactical emphasis.
Soviet Foreign Minister Molotov addressed the
General Assembly of the United Nations on September 23.
In his speech he called for disarmament, citing Soviet
troop reductions as an initial contribution to such a
move, and pointed to foreign military bases as a main
cause of international tensions. After calling attention
to the Soviet withdrawal from Port Arthur, he stated that
once the pending withdrawal from Porkkala in Finland was
completed, the Soviet Union would have no military bases
on foreign soil. The presence of the Soviet Army in the
East European states was ignored. Molotov suggested an
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all-European collective security organization, without
regard to the social or political systems of the member
states, with United States' participation, and with sub-
sequent termination of the North Atlantic Treaty, the
Paris agreements, and the Warsaw Treaty. The Paris
agreements were singled out as the chief factor in aggra-
vating Europe's tensions and Molotov suggested that an
all-Europe collective security system would encourage
German reunification. -55
In late October, at Geneva, the Western powers
offered a proposal for the reunification of Germany.
The USSR countered with a proposal establishing a collec-
tive security organization, requiring the dissolution of
NATO and the Warsaw Pact, but only vaguely referring to
German reunification. British Foreign Secretary Macmillan,
at that point, stated that the West did not consider NATO
and the Warsaw Pact as equals and would refuse to trade
one for the other in negotiations. 5° r^g yestern powers
were attempting to make progress on German reunification,
European security, arms limitations, and improved East-West
contacts without defining the military-political status
,quo. 5?
1956
On January 18, 1956. the East German Parliament
approved the creation of an East German Army and a Ministry
of the Defense o The Soviet Union had in September, 1955.
restored East German sovereignty58 and. these acts of the
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st German Parliament provided the legal bar;!:: for trans-
formation of the East German Garrisoned People's Police
into a recognized armed force to provide the nucleus of
the new Army. It ^\ras estimated that the People's Police
consisted of 95 f 000 ground troops and 15i000 airmen and
naval personnel. -59 on January 20, Willi Stoph was appointed
/Try
Defense Minister. ou The creation of the East German Army
was designed to allow East German participation in the
military structure of the Warsaw Pact.
The Political Consultative Committee met for the
first time on January 27-28,1956, in Prague, Czechoslo-
vakia. In addition to the signatory nations to the Treaty,
the Chinese People* s Republic was represented by an observer.
Two items were on the agenda: recommendations for strength-
ening the alliance and common actions required by the Warsaw
Treaty. 1 The Communique' issued by the conference stated
that: organizational problems of the armed forces had
been solved; the East German Army had been accepted into
the Joint Armed Forces and the East German Defense Minister
would become a Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the Pact forces;
it had been decided that the Committee would meet whenever
•necessary but no less than twice annually; the Standing
Commission for foreign policy recommendations and the
Joint Secretariat had been established; and the members
had issued a joint declaration on the international situ-




negotiations instead of force in settling disputes, empha-
sizing the formation of such "aggressive" military blocs
as NATO and SEATO—and the resultant arms race—as increas-
ing the threat of war. Support of the decisions reached by
the Asian and African countries at the Bandung conference
was enunciated. The Declaration also stated the readiness of
the members to cooperate in measures to strengthen European
security. Included in its proposals were: a European col-
lective security system; withdrawal or reduction of foreign
military units in both Germanics; the establishment of a
zone of restricted armaments in both Germanies; banning of
nuclear weapons from both Germanies; and disarmament. ^
The Twentieth Congress of the Communist Party of the
Soviet Union, held in February, 1956, revealed that the
goals of the Communists were still those of Stalin but that
their tactics in international affairs were changing. At
the Congress Khrushchev attempted to make this clearly
evident to the satellites to prevent their assuming that
the basic goals were being revised. J He identified the
West's "positions of strength" policy with "economic and
political pressure, threats, and military provocations . . . ,"°^
.called for a united front, and indicated tolerance for
non-USSR socialist programs. -5 The expressed tolerance
for other socialist programs, an offer of rappro chement
with Yugoslavia, was emphasized in a special section of
the keynote speech in which Khrushchev addressed questions
concerning international development principles. 00 He
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officially recognized the existence of different forms of
transition to socialism. In the same section, Khrushchev
raised the theory of peaceful coexistence to a position
of dogma and, revising Lenin's doctrine, announced that
war was no longer inevitable, that due to the strength
of the USSR and the socialist bloc the possibility existed
for preventing war in the present era. < Commenting on
armed strength Khrushchev stated that,
Compelled to pool their forces and resources,
our states have concluded the Warsaw Pact, which is
an important stabilizing factor in Europe. They are
fully resolved to employ all their forces to protect
the peaceful life of their peoples and to prevent the
outbreak of another conflagration in Europe. °8
Khrushchev identified the Party's further tasks in the
foreign policy sphere:
1. to pursue peaceful coexistence;
2. to strengthen relations within the Communist
bloc and with Yugoslavia;
3. to strengthen friendship with countries who
refuse to join blocs, such as India, Burma, Afghanistan,
Egypt, Syria, and others, and with Finland, Austria, and
other neutrals;
k, to improve relations with the West and its allies;
5. "To follow vigilantly the intrigues of circles
that do not want a relaxation of international tension;
to expose in good time the subversive activities of the
enemies of peace and the security of nations; to take
necessary measures for further strengthening the defense
potential of our socialist state; to maintain our defenses
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the level demanded by present-day armaments and science,
and to ensure the security of our socialist country. n °9
The Twentieth Congress made explicit the restoration
of flexibility and innovation taking place in Soviet foreign
policy. ' ° The design to relax East-West tension, the
tentative steps toward detente embodied in the emphasis
on peaceful coexistence, seemed to indicate the direction
of the new Soviet tactics. The relaxation, however,
coupled with Stalin's denigration in Khrushchev's "Secret
Speech" and the sanctioning of Tito's heresy, was to prove
in the future to have produced undesired effects: the
satellites were soon to begin moving toward more national-
istic forms of communism. The dissolution of the Cominform
in April further indicated the softer policy line that the
Soviets were pursuing.
NATO analysts of Communist bloc strength estimated
in April that, within thirty days of mobilization orders,
the Soviet-East European bloc could have ^00 mechanized
divisions with 6,000,000 men in the field. It was estimated
that 3 » 000, 000 men were already in the field, of which
twenty-two divisions were based in East Germany, posing
a threat to NATO defenses in Europe. ^
7
armed forces of 30,000 men to a new total of 90,000 men.
On June 30 East Germany announced a cut in its
7
This followed an announced cut by the Soviet Union of
1,200,000 in May and the reductions announced by the
bloc in 1955. 72

;>e
Events in Poland beginning in June and culminating
in a bloodless revolution in October, 195&, served to
bring to Poland a more liberal government and gave increased
sustenance to Polish nationalism. '^ Soviet military units,
including tanks and naval ships, deployed to tactical
locations during the unrest, x^ere removed from their threat-
ening positions—either returning to Polish bases or leaving
Polish territory completely. ?^ As a result of the October
events, on December 1? the Soviet Union and Poland signed
an accord covering the stationing of Soviet troops in
Poland.* The strength and disposition of Soviet forces
in Poland were made subject to agreement between the two
states; movement within Poland of Soviet troops was made
subject to Polish consent; Polish jurisdiction over Soviet
troops in Poland was defined; and Soviet financial support
of Soviet troops in Poland was specified.
On October 23. 195c s students demonstrated in
Budapest, among other grievances against the presence
of the Soviet Army in Hungary.?^ Fighting broke out
between the students, police, and military troops, and
quickly spread throughout the country. As a result of
Hungarian attempts to establish independence, repudiate
the Warsaw Pact, establish neutrality, and gain Western
support, the Soviet Union intervened. 3y November k t
the Red Army had crushed the revolt."1
"
'"'See Appendix C.
+For a more complete discussion of the 1956
Hungarian crisis, see Chapter 4.
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In response to a declaration by the Soviet Union
during the Hungarian crisis of its willingness to discuss
the status of Soviet troops on satellite soil, Rumania
on November ] stipulated that Soviet withdrawal of troops
vvould have to be negotiated on the basis of "strategic
security considerations" by Warsaw Pact military authori-
ties.? Thus hopes by the East European bloc or by Western
states for early removal of Soviet troops from any of the
bloc nations were dashed.
In December Western estimates of Soviet troop
strength in satellite nations were: 19-27 divisions in
East Germany, 5-7 divisions in Poland, 12 divisions in
Hungary, and 2 divisions in Rumania.??
3 957
In testimony given on February 19. 1957. by Major
General Bela Kiraly, formerly an Hungarian Army officer,
it was revealed that the East European bloc military
forces had conducted in 1 956 a mock Communist attack on
the West. He reported that during the exercises Marshal
Zhukov, Defense Minister of the USSR, had noted glaring
weaknesses—the lack of mechanization and mobility— In
the bloc armed forces. '°
On March 27 the Soviet Union announced that decisive
strengthening of the Warsaw Pact was required in view of
the Western policy of maintaining military blocs. '? A
joint Polish and East German declaration, issued on June 20,
expressed their preparation to strengthen their Warsaw Pact
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ties but also expressed the desirability of normalizing
relations with West Germany. °^
In March, April, and May, the Soviet Union concluded
"status-of-forces" agreements with East Germany, Rumania,
and Hungary, respectively. These were similar to the
agreement made with Poland" in December, 3 956.
3 958
The Political Consultative Committee met for the
second time on May 2^, 3 958* over two years after its
first meeting. The Chinese People's Republic was again
represented. The Committee's Communique"** stated that it
had: heard a report by Marshal Konev concerning new
reductions of the armed forces of the Pact states and on
the withdrawal from Rumania of Soviet troops; announced
that it would reduce the strength of the combined armed
forces of the member countries by ^19.000 men in 3 958;
approved the withdrawal of the Soviet forces from Rumania
"in the near future" and the reduction by one division of
Soviet troops in Hungary; made decisions on unspecified
armed forces organizational questions; adopted a resolution
proposing a NATO-Warsaw pact non-aggression agreement;
and issued a declaration analyzing the international situa-
tion. The Declaration"1" stated that the Warsaw Pact acted
as a deterrent to the aggressive activities of the Western




Vapprehension over West German "military preparation::"
and concern over the interference by Western powers in
the affairs of Asian and African countries. It condemned
NATO activities, pointing to the unilateral troop reduc-
tions by Pact members as an indication of their good "will
and desire to cooperate; proposed a nuclear-free zone in
Central Europe, including both Germanies; condemned the
attempt to put German reunification on the agenda of an
anticipated summit conference "over the heads" of the
'
two Germanies; and, noting the Western rejection of a
proposal to include all NATO and Warsaw Pact countries
in the summit meeting, recommended including three or
four spates from each bloc. The Declaration also called
for reductions in forces and armaments by NATO countries
and fully discussed the proposed non-aggression pact for
NATO and the Warsaw Treaty countries.
1959
The Twenty-first Congress of the Communist Party
of the Soviet Union met in January, 1959- Discussing
the international situation, Khrushchev reaffirmed the
conclusion of the Twentieth Congress that war was not
fatally inevitable. He offered to withdraw Soviet troops
not only from Germany but also from Poland and Hungary
if the NATO countries would x\Tithdraw their troops from
foreign countries and abolish military bases on foreign
soil, an offer that the Soviets had made before. He also
discussed the German question, emphasizing the militarism
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and revanchism of Western Germany, suggested reduction
or complete withdrawal of foreign troops from Germany,
and made a pica for German reunification. Claiming Soviet
superiority in rocket technology, Khrushchev called for
banning the production, testing, and use of nuclear
weapons, including destruction of existing stockpiles;
supported reduction of armaments in Europe; supported
universal disarmament; and emphasized the need for peaceful
Op
coexistence.
On April 27-23, a conference of the foreign ministers
of the Warsaw Pact countries, with a Communist Chinese
representative observing, was held in Warsaw. Before the
meeting convened, it was viewed in the West as a dress
rehearsal for the Geneva foreign ministers conference,
scheduled for May, and an opportunity for the USSR to
explain its position to its allies. 3 <phe conference
proved to be a show of strength; there was no joint
hammering out of decisions in preparation for Geneva. ^
The Communique issued stated that agreement had been reached
on the convening of foreign ministers and summit conferences,
restated the suggestion of a German peace treaty, called
for a free city of Berlin, and noted that the questions
of a German peace treaty and Berlin should not depend on
a solution for European security. °5 it also included a
"moderate" view of the world situation, specifically
"moderate" for the purpose of encouraging flexibility in
the West in its attitude toward negotiating with the
Soviet bloc. 8^

At that time Western estimates of troop strength
in Warsaw Pact nations were:
East Germany: 150,000 East German plus ^00,000
Soviet troops; total, 550,000 men;
Poland: 3"! 0,000 Polish plus 30,000 Soviet troops;
total, 3^-0,000 men;
Hungary: 90,000 Hungarian plus 60,000 Soviet troops;
total, 1 50,000 men;
Czechoslovakia: 200,000 men, all Czechoslovak;
Albania: 35 #000 men, all Albanian;
Bulgaria: 3 60,000 men, all Bulgarian;
Rumania: 250,000 men, all Rumanian;
USSR: 1,250,000 men, all Soviet.*
I960
The third meeting of the Political Consultative
Committee i\Tas held in Moscow on February k, 1960. All
members were represented and representatives of the
Chinese People's Republic, North Korea, the Mongolian
People's Republic, and Worth Vietnam attended as
observers. 00 The Communique issued by the meeting
announced that with a unilateral reduction in armed
forces by the Soviet Union—then in progress—of
1,200,000 men, the total armed strength of the Warsaw
Treaty organization member states would be reduced to
3».796,500. It also stated that the representatives had
"*For Soviet strength by military branch, see





discussed major International problems, heard a report
from the USSR on its new armed forces reductions and on
its position at the pending summit conference, coordinated
plans for relaxing international tension, and adopted a
Declaration. The Declaration began with a Pact analysis
of the world situation which underlined such efforts as
:
promotion of peaceful coexistence by talks between leaders
of Warsaw Pact states and "such countries as India,
Indonesia, Burma, Cambodia, Afghanistan, the United Arab
Republic, Ethiopia, Guinea and others"; " agreement on
peaceful use of the Antarctic; and establishment of a
permanent United Nations Committee for the Peaceful
Exploration of Outer Space. NATO was accused of increasing
its military strength, with particular emphasis placed
on West German "militarism." Continuation of the arms
race by NATO, SEATO, and CENTO and the nature of Western
propaganda as instilling mistrust and hatred were cited
as obstacles to peace. The Declaration called for dis-
armament, reductions in forces by NATO countries, the
creation of an effective control system to enforce dis-
armament, a nuclear test ban, and—stressing West German
revanchism—a German peace treaty. The threat of signing
a separate peace treaty with East Germany, if efforts
for a German peace treaty failed, was made. The proposal
for a- NATO-Warsaw Pact non-aggression pact was again made.
The Declaration ended by proposing disarmament, a German
peace treaty, a nuclear test ban, and East-West relations
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as subjects for the pending summit meeting. Western
observers believed that at the conference the East had
developed and solidified its position for the summit
talks." Despite the apparent unanimity shown at the
meeting of the Political Consultative Committee, the
Sino-Soviet dispute broke into the open during the spring
of i960 as the Chinese began to challenge Soviet foreign
policy and ideology. °"L
On July 2k the Warsaw Pact nations announced the
replacement of 62-year-old Marshal Konev by Marshal
Andrei A. Grechko as the supreme military commander of
Pact forces. Konev* s health was reportedly failing.^2
Grechko also replaced Konev as Soviet First Deputy Minister,
directly under Defense Minister Malinovsky.93 He had
been closely associated with Khrushchev since the beginning
of World War II. 9^
1961
The Political Consultative Committee met for the
fourth time in Moscow on March 23-29 » *9&~x , for the purpose
of studying the crisis in Laos and issues such as disarma-
ment, the Congo, and Berlin, and to formulate a bloc
economic plan for the next twenty years. 95 jn addition
to the member states, the Chinese People's Republic,
North Korea, and the Mongolian People's Republic were
represented by observers. The heads of the Albanian
government and Communist Party were absent and Albania
was represented by personnel of lesser rank and position.

In its Communique /"' the Committee stated that it had been
"guided by the theoretical and political conclusions of
the November Conference of Representatives of the Communist
and Worker's Parties" and that new successes had been
scored in the camp of socialism since its last meeting.
It attacked NATO, West Germany, and military intervention
by the West In the Congo, Algeria, Angola, and Laos, and
the activity directed against Cuba. Emphasis was placed
on West Germany as the "chief center of war danger in
Europe. "9° The need for a peace treaty with both Germanies
and the demilitarization of West Berlin were particularly
stressed. 3y spotlighting the German question, the
Committee was evidently trying to divert world attention
from Laos and the Congo. 9?
Although the process had begun the year before, it
became quite apparent in 1961 that the nature of the Warsaw
Pact was changing significantly. The alliance was being
tightened to improve its "collective military efficiency"
and to strengthen the "political cohesion" of Eastern
Europe. ^ By summer, it was fully evident that the Soviet
Union was in the process of upgrading the contribution to
Soviet military planning made by the armed forces of the
East European nations. The role of the other Pact forces
was being changed from collaboration in air defense—the
only significant contribution of the non-Soviet forces




participation in tactical theater operations and the Soviet
Union was taking an interest in training the other Pact
forces and equipping them with modern arms. 99
One significant factor causing the shift to greater
reliance on the forces of the other Pact states was Khrush-
chev's desire to economize by reducing the size of the Soviet
armed forces and relying on the deterrent ability of the
Soviet Union's missilery. 500 By I.96I Khrushchev had moved to
a position solidly in favor of strategic deterrence at the
expense of conventional warfare, causing considerable dis-
sension among Soviet Army marshals. Konev had disagreed
with Khrushchev in the balanced forces-strategic missiles
controversy which in no small measure had contributed to
Konev's replacement by Grechko in I960.-101 In 1 96O-61
,
Khrushchev seized on the possibility of developing the
other Pact forces as conventional warfare units, allowing
reductions in Soviet troop strength and the release of
resources to Soviet strategic forces.
It was also recognized that under nuclear war
conditions it would be difficult, if not impossible, to
deploy ground troops from the Soviet Union to Europe.
The alternative of stationing a larger number of Soviet
units in the East European states was recognized as
unacceptable and the solution, therefore, was to develop
the armed forces of the other pact states into effective
units. A coincident benefit was seen in the more subtle
management of Soviet garrisons in East Europe through
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closer it ties between loviet Union and the
host countries. 102
Another factor contributing to the new direction \
of development of the Pact was, in the face of growing
polycentrisn, "the need for organizational means to main-
tain discipline and political unity among the Communist
countries of East Europe.""10 ^ Additionally, the Soviets
needed evidence of successful military cooperation as
an example to hold up to the Chinese People's Republic
in the deepening rift between the two countries.- ^
In early June the Soviet and East German armies
completed joint maneuvers in East Germany near the VJest
German border. East German newspapers noted that the
games were held in accordance with Pact plans and that
Marshal Kalinovsky joined Marshal Grechko in attending
the conclusion of the maneuvers.- ^
On August 3-5 t a meeting of the First Secretaries
of the Communist Parties of the Warsaw Pact states was
held in Moscow. Though no mention was made of the countries
represented, it is probable that Albania was absent. °°
The conference emphasized the urgent need for a German
peace treaty; declared that the Pact states were determined
to conclude such a treaty by the end of the year, even if
a treaty with East Germany alone was required; and
instructed the appropriate competent bodies to pre-
pare all necessary foreign political and economic
measures ensuring the conclusion of a German peace
treaty and observance of its provisions, including
those provisions which refer to VJest Berlin as a








It stated that NATO aggression and West German
re-militarization, the failure of the West to "normalize"
West Berlin, the refusal of the West to accept Soviet
proposals for a German peace treaty, and the use of West
Berlin's borders for purposes of gathering intelligence
and waging economic warfare on East Germany made necessary
measures for the security not only of East Germany but of
the other Warsaw Pact states. It proposed to East Germany
the adoption of control and security measures along the
West 3erlin border which
would securely block the way for the subversive
activity against the Socialist camp countries, so,
that reliable safeguards and effective control can
be established around the whole territory of West
Berlin including its border with Democratic Berlin. 5 08
The Communique specifically prohibited interdiction of
traffic and communication between West Berlin and West
Germany. On the same day, East Germany issued a Communique*
accepting the proposal and adopting a decree specifying
control measures along the West Berlin-East German border.
The Berlin wall started up and Soviet troops were used
to assist the East Germans in enforcing the closure of
the border. ^ ° The resultant tension between East and
West gave added impetus to the development of cooperation
within the Warsaw Pact.- 1 u
A meeting of the Defense Ministers of the Warsaw




was announced that the participants "discussed specific
questions concerning enhancement of military preparedness
of the troops belonging to the joint armed forces" and
that the chiefs of the general staffs were "instructed
to work out practical measures toward further strength-
ening of the defense of the Pact states stemming from
111the agreement reached at the meeting." " It is doubtful
that any representative from Albania was present as
Albania's participation in the Pact appears to have ended
in March, 1 $61 , the result of an ideological split with
Moscow. Soviet-Albanian differences and Chinese-Albanian
ties can in Dart be traced back to j957i the time of a
renewed Soviet-Yugoslav break. At that time Albania
took a strong stand on Yugoslav revisionism. The Chinese
also took an ideological position on revisionism, and on
Yugoslav revisionism in particular, that was stronger
than that of the Soviet Union or of any East European
112
state except Albania.
Soviet-Albanian relations progressively deteriorated.
As a result, the Soviet Union was forced to evacuate its
11?Naval base at Valona. wJ The words of Waxter Ulbricht,
East German Communist leader, at the Twenty-second Congress
of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in October,
calling for Albania to accept Warsaw Pact decisions were
interpreted by some observers to mean that Albania had
been expelled from the Pact. At the Congress, Khrush-
chev emphasized that the Warsaw Pact had grown stronger
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and declared that due to the increased defense strength
of the Soviet Union, the "imperialist" aggressive designs
had been checked and peaceful coexistence assured. J
In October East European armed forces began moving
into positions for war games. It was estimated by the
West German Army that a total of twenty-eight divisions
participated: twenty Soviet, six East German, and one
each Czechoslovak and Polish. The maneuvers were held
in November in Poland and East Germany. The size and
scale of the games indicated that they served a military
preparedness purpose in addition to being a political
demonstration in the face of the Berlin crisis. The
Warsaw Pact nations had announced that their purpose was
117
to strengthen readiness. '
It was estimated that the combined armed forces
of the Warsaw Pact in 1 961 was ^,762,500 men.' This
figure does not include the Albanian armed forces or
any reserve and para-military units. "
1962
The Defense Ministers of the Warsaw Pact countries
(less Albania) concluded a three-day conference in Moscow
on February 1 , 1962. Discussion had centered on the
strength of the combined armed forces and it was reported
that the decisions reached, which were undefined, would
be submitted for ratification to the Political Consultative
'For strength by country, see Appendix D, Table 3.

Committee at its next meeting. ^ 9 on February 8 Albania
protested to the Warsaw Pact nations her exclusion fr
the conference, '^
The Soviet Union, Rumania, and Hungary conducted
joint military maneuvers in April. Tass reported that
the games confirmed the participating countries' readiness
i pi
and combat power.
The Political Consultative Committee held its
fifth conference in Moscow on June 7. Albania did not
attend. Some reports indicated that the Chinese Ambassado:
to the Soviet Union did attend as an observer. ^ The
Communique* of the meeting reported that the Committee
heard a report by Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko concern-
ing Soviet-United States talks on a German peace settle-
ment; fully supported the Soviet position in the talks,
declaring it to be the Pact's general stand; and agreed
on the necessity for continuing the talks. It stipulated
that further talks should center on a determination of the
West's willingness to seek a "concerted solution" to the
German question and on the "main" question of withdrawal
of occupation troops from Berlin. The intention of
signing a separate peace treaty with East Germany if
necessary was reiterated. A general statement of the
Pact's desire for solving problems through peaceful





event that the r to bheir peaceful policy
is in the form of actions directed against the in-
terests of their security, against the sovereign
rights of the German '.c Republic and against
the interests of peace, they are determined to defend
their security in a worthy manner and to defend peace
with all the means at their disposal. 12 3
In June General Pavel I. Batov succeeded General
Antonov as Chief of Staff of the Joint Armed Forces and
as Deputy Chief of the Soviet General Staff. General
Antonov had died on June 18. General Batov was a career
Army officer, twice decorated Hero of the Soviet Union,
who had been a late-comer to the Communist Party, joining
in 1929. 12 5
Prague radio announced on October 1 that Soviet,
Czechoslovak, and East German troops had participated
in large-scale maneuvers in Czechoslovakia during the
preceding week under the Warsaw Pact f s training program. 1
2
°
On October 9 the Polish press agency announced that
Soviet, East German, and Polish forces had been conducting
joint training maneuvers in East Germany and western
1 27Poland for ten days. ' These games were ceremoniously
ended with a parade in Szcaecin (Stettin) , Poland.
Attending were Marshal Grechko; Wladyslaw Gomulka, Poland's
Communist chief; Polish Premier Cyrankiewicz ; and Polish
Defense Minister General Marian Spychalski. No figures
concerning participation were released but units of six
different divisions were known to have been involved.- 28
The increased frequency of joint maneuvers and the recog-
nition accorded them, evidenced by the stature of the
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officials attending closing ceremonies of the exercises
in Poland, further confirm the commitment made to develop
the Warsaw Pact into a viable military alliance.
In response to the declaration of intended quaran-
tine of Cuba by the United States, it was announced in
Moscow on October 23 that Marshal Grechko had placed all
Warsaw Pact forces on alert and issued instructions for
a posture of increased readiness. 2 9 During the crisis,
there were several communication exchanges between Premier
Khrushchev and President Kennedy and among the Soviet
proposals was one for a NATO-Warsaw Pact detente. President
Kennedy assured Moscow that the United States would be
interested in any useful proposal and Khrushchev welcomed
Kennedy's willingness to discuss the matter. 1 3° jj resolu-
tion of the detente was, however, forthcoming. On November 21,
after the crisis had subsided, General Grechko ended the
alert of the Pact forces. 31
The estimate of the combined armed forces strength
of the Warsaw Pact (less Albania) in 1962 was ^,5^-9,500
men." This figure is exclusive of reserve and para-military
units. 132
1963
The Defense Ministers of the Warsaw Pact states
(less Albania) met on February 2?-28, 1963. 1 33 The
Communique issued at the conclusion of the conferer.
*For strength by country and military branch,
see Appendix D. , Table ^.
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indicated that the conference had centered on the condition
of the joint armed forces and the coordination of training
curing 1963» -^
The heads of government and Party First Secretaries
of the Warsaw Pact states with the exception of Albania
met in Moscow in July, 1. 9°3» A statement issued at the
end of the conference approved the agreements reached by
the United States, the Soviet Union, and Britain on a
limited nuclear test ban treaty, 35 Shortly thereafter,
the Political Consultative Committee convened for its
sixth meeting on July 26 in Moscow, Little information
is available on this conference but the Communique issued
stated that the Committee heard a report from General
Grechko on, and reviewed questions concerning, the state
of the Pact armed forces. It reported that "appropriate
decisions were adopted as a result of the review and
exchange of views on these questions" and that the session
"was held in an atmosphere of complete mutual understanding
and agreement. !,i ^ Albania did not attend the meeting,
nor were any observers known to attend.
On September 2 Moscow radio announced that Albania
had broken with the Warsaw alliance. In the broadcast
the Soviets accused Albania of attempting to seize Soviet
military property during tne Soviet evacuation of the
naval base at Valona, Albania, in 1 9^1 « 37
It was estimated that the combined armed forces
of the Warsaw Pact (less Albania) in 1 9&3 was ^.3^9»000

men. This figure does not include reserve or para-military
units. 1 33
1964
On September 23, 196^, the Soviet press reported
that the Warsaw Pact forces had conducted maneuvers during
the preceding week and that in the maneuvers Rumanian
troops had distinguished themselves. 39
Indications appeared before Khrushchev's replacement
in October that the need for improvement of conventional
force capabilities was receiving attention within the Soviet
Union." Soviet Army leaders apparently were successful
in persuading the government to retain the option of con-
ventional force and in preventing a planned reduction of
ground troops. A contributing argument was the possibility
of a protracted, Vietnam-type, land war in which strategic
forces would be of little use, ^ When Brezhnev and
Kosygin assumed command, the defense posture was not
significantly changed. Reliance continued to be placed
on strategic military capability but other military
capabilities began to receive more attention than they
had under Khrushchev. ^*~
The Soviet equivalent of the United States Marine
Corps, their marine forces, were reactivated and training oanwj.l >w/"**'t«3
started again in 196^. The size of these forces was
"""For strength by country and military branch,
see Appendix D, Table 5.

^7
modest but the Soviet Union was demonstrating its potential
for amphibious assault. ^3
Late in the year, Rumania began making efforts
designed to loosen the alliance. In a statement made
on November 19, in Bucharest, a government spokesman
emphasized that Rumania was continuing its policy of
independence in the dispute between the Soviet Union and
Red China. He also announced that Rumania was opposed
to all military pacts, including the Warsaw Pact.-1 ^ 1'
In 196^ the strength of the combined armed forces
of the Warsaw Pact countries (less Albania) was estimated
to be ^» 373*000 men.* This figure does not include
reserve or para-military forces. ^J
1965
Under the Brezhnev-Kosygin regime, the Soviet
Union continued its efforts to integrate the East European
armed forces into Soviet defense plans. Emphasis continued
to be on joint exercises and re-equipment of the Warsaw
Pact forces. The increasing participation of the East
European states, however, appears to have had the undesired
(by the Soviet Union) effect of encouraging their inde-
pendence from Moscow. J>f° Indications appeared in 1965
that the East European nations were demanding a greater
voice in the determination of Pact policy and were also
""For strength by country and military branch,
se'e Appendix B, Table 6.

balking at the expense burden required of them in supporting
the Pact's forces.
The seventh conference of the Political Consultative
Committee was held in Warsaw on January 19-20, 1 965. This
was the Committee's first meeting following Khrushchev's
downfall. Albania did not attend. It was convened
primarily to discuss NATO's plans to form a multilateral
nuclear force. The Committee's Communique' stated that
it would consider a NATO multilateral nuclear force a
grave threat to peace, specifically as a proliferation
of nuclear arms. The creation of such a force was defined
as a ploy by the United States to ensure hegemony over
Western Europe. It further stated that access to nuclear
weapons by the West German "militarists" would only
stimulate German revanchism and that West German parti-
cipation in the force would put to an end any hope of
German reunification. Western provocations throughout the
world in general, and in Cuba and Vietnam in particular,
were condemned. The Communique then made the following
proposals: a nuclear-free zone in Central Europe, a con-
ference of European states on collective security, a non-
aggression pact between NATO and the Warsaw Pact, a
German peace settlement, legal recognition of existing
national boundaries, renunciation of the use of nuclear
arms by both Germanies , a x^orld conference on the pro-




dis ment. It appears that at the conference the East
European countries, and particularly Ul orient of East
Germany, pressed the Soviet Union for nuclear sharing
within the Pact. 1 ^"? As early as 1 960 the Soviets had
decided to arm East Germany with missiles and in 1961
had made the same decision with respect to the remainder
of the former satellites
.
J ^° Thus the East European
states had the vehicles for delivery of nuclear war-heads
but presumably the Soviet Union retained possession of
the nuclear weapons themselves.
On February 3 Albania published a letter to all
signatories of the Warsaw Pact in which she called for
condemnation of the Soviet Union and the correction of
errors made under Khrushchev. Albania also disclosed
her rejection of an invitation to participate in the
Political Consultative Committee conference just concluded.
The letter was interpreted by some observers as a rejection
by China, to whom Albania was quite close, of a Soviet
attempt at reconciliation. In the letter, Albania made
it very clear that she considered herself still a member
of the Pact, that she had been illegally excluded, and
she listed the conditions which she required be met
before she would return to the bloc:
Condemnation oy the Warsaw Pact members of
the "illegal and hostile" Soviet actions against
Albania, and the restoration of Albania's "legitimate
rights" in the organization.
The Soviet Government's return of all Albanian
military equipment and payment for Albanian defense




for damage caused to the Albanian
economy th h the aid cutoff.
An official Moscow admission of Soviet "error."."
Cessation of Soviet arms shipments to Yugo-
slavia and India.* 49
It was reported on May 1 6 that the Rumanian govern-
ment had circulated among Warsaw Pact states a note declar-
ing that the presence of Soviet troops in other states was
no longer justified and that Rumania was no longer willing
to share in the cost of maintaining such troops. Although
Soviet troops had been removed from Rumania in 1958» it
was estimated that there were approximately twenty-four
Soviet divisions in East Germany, four or five divisions
in Hungary, and about 20,000 troops in Poland at that
time. It was also reported that the Rumanian note criti-
cized the continuity of Soviet command over the joint
forces of the Warsaw Pact since its inception. ' -5°
On May 18, 19&5, a nine-day meeting of Defense
Ministers and armed forces chiefs of Warsaw Pact states
(less Albania) , held in Carpathia in the Ukraine of the
Soviet Union, was concluded. According to Tass, tactical
exercises were conducted and military armaments were
shown at the meeting. *•->!
Rumania continued the process of quietly reducing
Its role in the Warsaw Pact. In 196^1- the Rumanians had
decreased the length of obligated military service from
twenty-four to sixteen months and allegedly had reduced
its armed forces from 2^-0,000 men to 200,000 men. Although
Rumania outwardly gave the appearance of continued

participation in the Pact, since 196^ she had taker,
position against all military pacts. The last joint
ercises in which the Rumanians had participated were
ineuvers with Bulgaria and the Soviet Union in the
summer of 1 96^ . ' -5-
On September 1^ in a speech in Moscow, Soviet
Party Secretary Brezhnev stated that the East European
Communist nations were planning to strengthen the Warsaw
Pact military alliance, 1
"
Tass reported on September 26 that joint maneuvers
involving troops from the Soviet Union, East Germany,
Poland, and Czechoslovakia would be held in October. ^
On October 1.6 the war games began in Thuringia in south-
western East Germany. Western officials viewed the
maneuvers as a demonstration of Soviet bloc military
might.-1 " on October 23 the large-scale maneuvers were
completed. ~->°
Tass announced on November 23 that Soviet General
Mikhail I. Kazakov had succeeded General P. I. Batov as
Chief of Staff of the Joint Armed Forces. 1 57
A high-level conference of Warsaw Pact nations
concerning military training opened in Warsaw on Novem-
ber 2^. ^ On November 25 the two-day meeting of Defense
Ministers and Army commanders ended, and the Polish press
agency announced that battle readiness of the Warsaw Pact
member armies had been agreed upon. -5°
The estimate of the combined armed forces strength

of th< act (less Albania) in 5965 was ^,223,000
men.'"'' This figure is exclusive of reserve and para-military
units. 160
1966
In March, i960, at the Twenty-third Congress of the
Communist Party of the Soviet Union, Party Secretary
Brezhnev stressed the need for strengthening the "might
and solidarity" of the Communist bloc. He emphasized
the role played by the treaties of friendship, cooperation
and mutual assistance and noted the growing strength and
perfection of the Warsaw Pact, its capability to "rise
in awesome force to the defense of the socialist system. "^ "^
He also devoted considerable effort to outlining: the
"revanchist" designs of West Germany; the complicity of
the United States—alone and in conjunction with the
other NATO nations; and a reminder of the warning against
West German possession of nuclear weapons given in the
Political Consultative Committee Communique in January,
1965. 162
3y Hay, 1966, Rumania's participation was at its
lowest point since the founding of the alliance. Not
only had Rumania been boycotting joint maneuvers since
196k, but no Rumanian military units were under the
military command of the ?act. lfc3 jn a speech in Bucharest
on May 7, Rumanian Communist Party Leader Ceausescu
For strength by country and military branch,
see Appendix D, Table ?.
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complained of Soviet interference in Rumanian affairs
id condemned military blocs, both in the East and West.
st observers felt that the Warsaw Pact was at the bottom
of Ceausescu's discontent.- 04' Though some suggested it,
few felt that Rumania would leave the alliance. Pear,
throughout East: Europe, of a resurgent Germany and recog-
nition of Soviet military strength were the major factors
holding the Pact together. Ceausescu's speech was inter-
preted as a voice for national independence and an effort
to stem Soviet demands for strengthening the Pact—which
would make stronger the Soviet voice in the policies of
the other states. Rumanian officials did not deny the
Western interpretations of the speech 1 °-5 and Rumania
pointedly ignored the Pact's eleventh anniversary. 100
Rumanian diplomats, elaborating on the Rumanian
efforts, indicated that Rumania's demand was for the
Soviet Union to relinquish its monopoly of control over
Warsaw Pact forces. The sources admitted that costs of
supporting Soviet troops in other East European countries
was not a significant issue. What was desired was that
each member have autonomy over its own national forces,
greater opportunity to participate in the planning of
Warsaw Pact strategy, and a veto power over the use of
strategic and tactical nuclear weapons quartered in its
country. ' Rumania denied, on May 1 8, any desire to
leave the Warsaw Pact or seek its dissolution but did
make clear that it was opposed to the strengthening of




The Defens :isters of th( 1 Pact s
(less Al held a conference in Moscow on May 2 7
reportedly to plan for a summit meeting of the East
European governments. Secrecy surrounded the meet;
but it was understood that the summit was planned for
July in Bucharest. Both the time and place were in doubt
due "Co Rumania's opposition to Soviet efforts to cen-
tralize and strengthen the alliance. "9
On Hay J1 , in a statement made in Prague to the
Thirteenth Congress of the Czechoslovak Communist Party,
Soviet Communist Party chief Brezhnev called for a
strengthening of the Warsaw Pact. ?° on June 3, three
days after his statement in Prague, Brezhnev delivered
a speech in the Siovakian capital of Bratislava in
Czechoslovakia in which he strongly urged unity and
strengthening of Communist positions. This speech was
interpreted in the West to be a warning to Rumania against
continuing its policy of attempting to loosen the bonds
of the Pact. 1 71
The Foreign Ministers of the East European Communist
countries held a conference in Moscow on June 6-9, report-
edly to coordinate a joint position for an attempt to thaw
East-West European relations. This was evaluated as an
effort to capitalize on the uncertainty caused by France's
withdrawal from the North Atlantic military system. The
conference was seen as another planning session for an
expected July summit."'

June 11, in a speech in Rumania, Ceausescu
called for the abolition of military blocs in the strongest
public statement he had at that time made. In it he
referred to the North Atlantic and Warsaw alliances by
le and specifically called for their dissolution. He
stated, however, that as long as NATO existed, Rumania
would fully support the Warsaw Pact. '3 These remarks
were interpreted as a compromise of the Soviet-Rumanian
dispute and a concession by Rumania to the Soviet Union. ^
Military leaders of Czechoslovakia, East Germany,
Poland, and the Soviet Union met with East German leader
Iter Ulbricht on June 12. The East German news agency
reported that "questions of mutual interest" were dis-
cussed. Analysts felt that the meeting might imply plans
for changes in the deployment of Warsaw Pact forces in
Europe. '-> East German and Czechoslovak air force units
had been participating with the Soviets in maneuvers
over East Germany and there was speculation following
the meeting that the East Germans and Czechs might be
preparing to take over some of the tasks assigned to
the Soviet Union. J-?°
Hungarian Communist Party leader Janos Kadar
arrived in East Germany for a state visit on June 13.
In greeting Kadar, East German leader Walter Ulbricht'
s
remarks stressed the importance of the Warsaw Pact and




aether with the Soviet Union and the other fraternal
countries of the Warsa it, the German Democratic
Republic and the .rian People's Republic will
fulfill their contributions to overcome the threat
o: and to secure peace to turn Europe into a
peaceful continent. "* ?/
In his reply, Kadar ignored the alliance. 1 ?"
On June 1? the Foreign Ministers of the Warsaw Pact
countries concluded a twelve-day, originally scheduled as
a three-day, meetin;; in Moscow. The Soviet news agency
Tass reported that European security and other questions
of mutual interest had been discussed. There were rumors
that there had been differences between the ministers,
particularly regarding Rumanians line of independence.
It was also announced that the Warsaw Pact summit meeting
would be held in July in Bucharest. At the same time
that this meeting was being conducted, Premier Chou En-iai
1 70
of Communist China was visiting in Rumania. • 7
In Bucharest on July 4 the eighth meeting of the
Political Consultative Committee began unceremoniously
with a conventional welcome by host Rumanian Premier
Ceausescu. Within an hour, the problem of conflict
between Rumania and the Soviet Union apparently emerged,
as the delegates from the other five states left the
meeting. (Albania was not represented. ) The Soviet
delegation, led by Party Secretary Brezhnev and Premier
Kosygin, and the Rumanian delegation remained for three
hours, evidently deep in discussion.-"




on European peace and security. The declaration noted
the participating countries* desire for lasting European
ice and security, placed the responsibility for the
failures of post-Worli r II international relations on
Western "aggression," and expressed their belief that the
Suropsan states 1 relations must be based on
the renunciation of the threat of force or the use
of force, from recognition of the need to solve
international disputes only through peaceful means,
on -che principles of sovereignty and national inde-
pendence, of equality and noninterference in domestic
affairs, on respect for territorial inviolability.-3 ^
Imperialist aggression, embodied in the United States, was
seen as a prominent feature of the international situation.
U.S. policy, supported by West European reactionaries—and
particularly in collusion with militarist, revanchist
Germany—was presented as a significant threat to Europe's
peace. The idea of a NATO multilateral nuclear force was
again denounced and again the Pact declared its intentions
of taking the requisite defensive measures. The declaration
appealed to the Germans to quit their territorial claims
(this referred to German claims on territory taken from
Germany and given to Poland by the Soviets after World
War II). Recognition of the actual European situation, the
existence of two Germanies, was called for. The Committee
stated that because almost half of the European countries
were socialist, joint efforts by all European countries
could ensure European security. They called for normal
East-West relations and specifically for relations between
East and West Germany. The Committee declared that the

z countries favored speedy strengthening of European
security and that they were ready to cooperate with other
states toward that end. ey then proposed the following
specific measures: (j ) development of "good-neighbor"
relations between all European countries; (2) simultaneous
dissolution of NATO and the Warsaw Pact or, failing that,
liquidation of the respective military organizations of
the two alliances; (3) partial measures toward a European
military detente including liquidation of bases, withdrawal
of foreign troops, reduction in the forces of both Germanies,
creation of denuclearized zones, and cessation of nuclear-
armed flights over and port visits of nuclear-armed naval
vessels in European territory; (^) the definite precluding
of Western German access to nuclear weapons ; (5) recognition
of existing national boundaries, including the Polish-German
frontier ; (6) conclusion of a German peace settlement, based
on the existence of two Germanies and leaving the question
of reunification to the "gradual rapprochement" of the
two German states; and (7) the convening of "an all-European
conference to discuss questions of ensuring security in
1 ft?
Europe and establishing all-European cooperation. J 0<c
The conference ended on July 6. On the final day
the delegates completed a communique'"" in which they stated
that they had signed a statement on Vietnam. "*" The state-
ment declared condemnation of the United States' partici-




people of Vietnam in defense of freedom and independency,
for the unity and integrity of their homeland
,
,,:] 8 3 called
for the immediate end of U.S. aggression, and gave support
to the programs of North Vietnam and the National Libera-
tion Front of South Vietnam. The Pact then specifically:
(1) warned the U.S. of its responsibility in the conflict;
(2) promised moral and political support and material aid
to North Vietnam; (3) offered to send "volunteers" to
assist in the struggle against the U.S. if requested by
North Vietnam; and (^) condemned U.S. actions spreading
the war to Laos and Cambodia.
The Soviet Union declared on July 11 that it had
instructed all agencies of its government to carry out
the Warsaw Pact pledge of increased aid to North Vietnam.
This included both economic and military assistance.
On September 1 8 the Warsaw Pact forces finished
preparations to begin the largest Communist bloc maneuvers
since the end of World War II. Countries participating
were the Soviet Union, East Germany, Czechoslovakia, and
Hungary,, It was reported that new weapons were to be
tested including limited nuclear attack defense measures. °5
The war games opened on September '9 with Exercise Vltava,
a mock battle in which the bloc forces repelled a Western
attack that included both nuclear and conventional wea-
pons o The maneuvers ended on September 22. 6 <
Leaders of the Pact armed forces held a conference in
Budapest, Hungary, from November 13 through November 17. 1 °°

. 1966 the strength of the combined armed forces
of -c'r^ Warsaw Pact (less Albani as estimated to
^.233 1 000 men," not including reserve and para-military
forces. 189
1967
In January, 1967, Rumania established unconditional
diplomatic relations with West Germany. Cn February 2 it
was announced that a meeting of the foreign ministers of
the Warsaw Pact countries would open in East Berlin on
February 6. stern analysts expected the meeting to
be a display of solidarity with East Germany on the ques-
tion of diplomatic relations with West Germany. In addi-
tion to East Germany, the Soviet Union and Poland had
shown displeasure over giving West Germany a stronger
base in East Europe. It was expected that East Germany,
the Soviet Union, and Poland would try to obtain an
agreement from Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Bulgaria to
extract political concessions from Bonn before establish-
ing diplomatic ties. The conditions desired were:
recognition of the Polish-German frontier, disassociation
from sharing nuclear weapons, and recognition of East
Germany. East Germany, additionally, wanted political
ties between West Germany and West Berlin severed.^ 90
The Soviet Union announced in Warsaw, also on
February 2, its intention to withdraw 50,000 Soviet
'"'For strength by country and military branch,
see Appendix D, Table o.

troops from East Europe for use along the Soviet-Chinese
frontier. At the time, Western experts estimated th*
there 500,000 Soviet troops in bloc countries with
: majority in East Gvi y. 1 ^- mhe united States and
West Germany disavowed any knowledge of the Soviet plan
to withdraw troops. y^
On February 3 the East German press criticized
Rumania for having established diplomatic relations with
West Germany. On the same day Rumania declined to send
her Foreign Minister to the scheduled Pact foreign minis-
ters' meeting, stating that she would instead send a
lesser official. '* On February 6 it was announced that
the meeting, originally scheduled for Berlin, had been
shifted to Warsaw. This was interpreted as an attempt
to placate Rumania who by this time had declared her
intention to boycott the meeting, °^ The Polish press
announced on February 7 that the foreign ministers or
their deputies would meet in Warsaw within the week.
It was understood that Rumania had accepted an invitation
and would send a deputy minister. "5 The meeting opened
on February 9« It was expected that in addition to the
demands desired by East Germany and Poland a demand for
closer consultation on political questions in accordance
with the Warsaw Treaty would be made. 96 ^g conference
ended on February 1 and all indications were that it
was a failure from the East German and Polish points of
view. The communique issued mentioned nothing specific;

62
it was limited to general statements that the conference
d reviewed and exc gd views on European peace and
security. Rumania was the only state not represented by
her foreign minister.-1 97
In a speech in Moscow on March 10, Party Secretary
Brezhnev supported the East German and Polish positions
on diplomatic relations with West Germany and rejected
3onn*s attempts at rap-pro chement with East Europe. He
pointed to the February Foreign Ministers 1 meeting as the
genesis of a "new state in concerting the foreign-policy
efforts of the Socialist states. "^S
A two-day conference of Communist Parties of Europe
at Karlovy Vary, Czechoslovakia, issued a statement on
April 26 calling for dissolution of NATO and the Warsaw
Pact and replacement of them by a general European plan
for peace and security. The statement also recognized
the growing military strength of West Germany and urged
non-aggression pacts among all European states and recog-
nition of West Berlin as a separate political entity."1 99
In early June* the Soviet Union began a naval
build-up in the Mediterranean Sea which reached a peak
of forty-six ships during the summer. 00 Included in
the vessels dispatched to the Mediterranean were tank
and troop landing ships,
^
01 making explicit the newly-
developed Soviet capability for amphibious assault.
By the end of 19 6? , the Soviet's permanent Mediterranean
fleet would be at a level of thirty-five, five to ten
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mere than the preceding June and representing a four-fold
increase over two years. 202 Though initially interpreted
as a response to the Arab-Israeli Conflict, the build-up
was later evaluated by most observers as a long-planned
Soviet move to develop its naval capability. As Hanson W.
3aldwin suggested,
For the first time since the Bolshevik Revolu-
tion, Communism has demonstrated an appreciation of
the economic, political, psychological, diplomatic,
and military importance of sea power. 2 °3
Although a unilateral effort, the enlarged Soviet Mediter-
ranean fleet contributes substantially to the Warsaw Pact's
military posture.
In a news conference held on June 25, following
talks between Soviet Premier Kosygin and United States
President Johnson at Glassboro, New Jersey, Kosygin called
attention to the lack of NATO acceptance of proposals for
2 (V'
a NATO-Warsaw Pact non-aggression agreement. On July "?
at a news conference in The Hague, Netherlands, Premier
Maurer of Rumania urged dissolution of both alliances
stating that Europe would be safer if both were discarded. 20 ^
..^rshal Ivan I. Yakubovsky, First Deputy Defense
Minister of the Soviet Union, was named Commander-in-Chief
of the Joint Armed Forces of the Warsaw Pact on July ?.
•Yakubovsky succeeded Marshal Grechko who had in April
become the Soviet Defense Minister folloxfing Marshal
Malinovsky*s death. 200
In an article on July 23 Pravda , while not mentioning
her by name, urged Rumania to resume a full role in the Pact.
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ie Rumanian National Assembly, expected to make a major
policy decision on Pact participation, was scheduled to
open on July 2k. The timing of Pravda « s words,
Fraternal countries of socialism consider their
participation in the Warsaw Treaty not as a formal
hip but as a vital, creative working cpop-
eration in military and political questions20 '7
was clearly aimed at Rumania. 208
On July 2k , contrary to predictions that Rumania
was about to increase its separation from Moscow, Party
Secretary Ceausescu emphasized that cooperation with other
Communist countries was the cornerstone of her foreign
policy and called for increased consultation among Com-
munists. Speaking to the National Assembly, Ceausescu
also reaffirmed Rumania 8 s participation in the Warsaw
Pact. He did express a difference of opinion with the
USSR on the question of the Arab-Israeli Conflict and
on nuclear disarmament. In speaking of the Middle East
hostilities, he said,
3ut we wish honestly to tell our Arab friends
that we do not understand and do not share the posi-
tion of those circles which speak in favor of the
liquidation of the state of Israel.
We do not wish to give advice to anybody, but
the lessons of history show that no people can
achieve their national and social aspirations
against the right to existence of another people. 20°
Many observers regarded Ceausescu 1 s speech as an attempt
to maintain Rumania's independent position while presenting
his policy in a manner which would be acceptable to the
Soviets. 210
Rumania's resumption of participation in Warsaw

ouvcrs after failing to participate for t
years was interpreted to be an attempt to r ire t:
Soviet Union that .-ecognized her obligations to tl
bloc. Rumania realized that her actions of unilaterally
recognizing West Germany in January and refusing to adopt
the Soviet position in the Arab-Israeli crisis might have
caused deep concern in the Soviet hierarchy which the
Rumanians desired to alleviate. Rumania's prime objective
in her move for independence was economic, not ideological.^-"1-
The West German Defense Ministry, on August 2^,
announced that the Warsaw Pact states had 807 naval vessels
in the Baltic, considerably outnumbering the 97 warships
that members of NATO stationed there.
Joint exercises involving Soviet, Bulgarian, and
Rumanian forces—both ground and naval—were completed
on August 27. The maneuvers were held in Bulgaria with
the ships operating in the Black Sea and were concluded
with a military review in Plovdiv, Bulgaria. 2 -' 3 This
marked the first time that Rumania had participated in
Pact exercises since 196^, indicating a resumption by
Rumania of Pact responsibilities. A similar exercise
had been held earlier in August by USSR and East German
214forces.
East :.n, Polish, and Soviet troops held joint
maneuvers in Poland on the night of August 31 . The
maneuvers were interpreted as an effort to bolster Polish
confidence in the Warsaw Pact's effectiveness. Confidence

had started wavering as a result of the quick Isra..
victories over Arab force., equipped with Soviet arms
in the ju^er 1 s Middle East crisis, 215
On October 10 Rumanian Foreign Minister Malitza
called for the withdrawal of Soviet troops I central
and eastern Europe and the removal of all United States,
British, and Canadian troops from Europe. ^1°
In a speech on October 12 U.S. Ambassador to NATO
Harlan Cleveland stated that the United States was deter-
mined to maintain NATO even if the Warsaw Pact were dis-
solved within the next two years. Ambassador Cleveland
indicated that mutual dissolution would not bring peace
and he emphasized the "political necessity" of the Western
alliance. '
In Moscow on December 12 after two days of consul-
tations, East German leader Ulbricht and Soviet Party
Secretary Brezhnev and Premier Kosygin issued a communique
in which they denounced West German aggressiveness and
called for strengthening of the Warsaw Pact. The activi-
ties against which the statement was aimed were West Ger-
many's policies toward East Europe and the growth of a
strong political right in West Germany. Some observers
believed that this was the initial step in a Soviet effort
to return the German question to the center of the world
21 P
stage. At the same time it was alleged that Rumanian
leader Ceausescu was delaying the renewal of a Soviet-
Rumanian friendship treaty due to the inclusion in the
treaty of a standard Soviet warning concerning Germany. ^ 9

In 1967 the strength of the combined armed forces
of the Warsaw Pact states (less Albania) was estimated to
be ^,271,000 men.'::' lS did not include reserve and
-military forces. ~°
1968
,ving recognized West Germany, having failed to
concur with the Soviet Union* s stand on the 1 9&7 Arab-
Israeli Conflict, and having blocked Soviet attempts to
transform the Council of Mutual Economic Assistance
(COMECON) into a regional economic planning device,
Rumania came under attack from some of the more orthodox
Communist leaders. After such an attack, the Rumanian
delegation on February 28, 3 968, walked out of a 66-nation
conference of Communist Parties being held in Budapest,
Hungary." i Following the walkout, the expectation in
Bucharest was that while the Soviet Union would probably
bring increased pressure on Rumania to conform, military
intervention would not be contemplated—due in part to
the fact that, after the Soviet Union and Albania, Rumania
was domestically the most tightly controlled state in
Eastern Europe. 222
On March 6, shortly after Rumania's walkout, the
ninth meeting of the Political Consultative Committee
of the Warsaw Pact was convened in Sofia, Bulgaria. 22 3
The Conference ended the following day and Rumania was
'""For strength by country and military branch,
see Appendix D, Table 9.

apparently successf;
. intaining its divergent position
without provoking an open clash with the Soviet Union. ^2^
;ree statements were issued by the Committee: the usual
Communique,'"' a Declar .: on Vietnam, and a Statement*
concerning the nuclear nonproliferation treaty being
considered by the world's nuclear powers. The Communique
aed the meeting's participants, reported that Vietnam
and the nuclear nonproliferation treaty had been discussed,
and stated that the :; _-ican imperialists" had been
unanimously condemned for their "criminal actions" in
Vietnam. The Declaration on the Threat to Peace Created
as a Result of Expansion of American Aggression in Vietnam
elaborated on the Committee's condemnation of the United •
States and support of the Democratic Republic of (North)
Vietna . Unanimous support for and recommended approval
of "the draft treaty on nonproliferation of nuclear weapons
that was submitted by the Soviet Union on Jan. 18, 1968,
for the consideration of the 1 8-nation Disarmament Com-
mittee""" J was expressed in the Statement on nuclear
nonproliferation by the signatory nations. Rumania,
however, was not among the Statement's signatory nations;
for the first time in the history of the Warsaw Pact,
the Political Consultative Committee had issued a document
that had not been unanimously endorsed by all participants
at a meeting. Furthermore, after the conclusion of the






the existence of the S : lent. While some doubt should
be attached to Rumania's ranee," it is probable that
issuance of the document without Ri . l's concurrence
was a move on the part of the Soviet Union to isolate
Rumania from the Communist camp.
Communist leaders from the Soviet Union, Czecho-
slovakia, East Germany, Poland, Hungary, and Bulgaria
met in Dresden, East Germany, on March 23. ' By this
time, leaders of the other bloc states
—
particularly the
Soviet union, East Germany, and Poland—had become con-
cerned with the "democratization" process in Czechoslo-
vakia initiated by Alexander Dubcek who in January had
replaced Antonin NcVotny as Secretary General of the
Czechoslovak Communist Party. Among the steps taken
in the "democratization" process, Dubcek had earlier
in March lifted media censorship. The communique issued
by the Dresden meeting declared the participants' deter-
mination to strengthen the Warsaitf Pact and to consolidate
228its armed forces; Czechoslovak leaders were successful,
however, in preventing the planning of joint maneuvers by
Pact forces in Czechoslovakia. ^9 Rumania, who had not
been invited to Dresden, later declared that she would
not consider herself bound by any decisions made in her
absence; the Soviet-Rumanian split was deepening. ^30
During early Kay Soviet and Polish troops conducted
major military exercises along the Czechoslovak border
2^1in Poland and East Germany. J Prague stated that it

ha<: .ice that "regular neuvers of
Treaty countries in the region of southern
Poland 11 would be conducted. 2 ^2 The movements were not
in fact Wars.. ,'c maneuvers ; 2 33 the operations were
designed to apply psychological pressure on Czechoslo-
in an attempt to moderate its "democratization"
process and its new, liberal "Action Program" adopted
in early April.'"' 3y May 12 the Polish press began
attacking the Czechoslovak regime. 2 3^
In a speech on May 22 Czechoslovak President
Svoboda stressed the importance and desirability of
continued alliance with the Soviet Union2 35 antj. on
ty 2k it was announced that Warsaw Pact exercises would
be held on Czechoslovak and Polish territory in June.
The agreement to the maneuvers was interpreted as a
gesture by Czechoslovakia to convince the Warsaw Pact
of her loyalty go the bloc; it apparently had been extracted
by Soviet Defense Minister Grechko during a visit earlier
in the week. Czechoslovakia, however, had been successful
in resisting proposals, probably transmitted by Grechko,
that 1.1,000 Soviet troops be stationed in her western
areas and that a "military Cominform" political department
o *) /
be created within the Warsaw Pact structure."
Warsaw Pact forces entered Czechoslovakia on
; 3- for announced staff exercises. The number of
troops exceeded the expectations of the host country. 2 3?
or more discussion of the Czechoslovak crisis,
see Chapter k.

ris reported that Soviet tanks had joined
the "staff" exercises. 2 38 3v June 3 8 it was known th
several thous b and Polish troops, includi.
signal units and motorized infantry, had entered Czecho-
slovakia. Marshal Yakubovsky, in Prague on that date,
assured the government that the maneuvers involved only
command units and would include forces .from the Soviet
Union, Hungary, Poland, Czechoslovakia, and East Germany. 2 39
The maneuvers were completed by the end of June but the
Pact forces—under a variety of pretexts—remained in
Czechoslovakia; these forces totaled an estimated 3 6,000
men, 4-500 vehicles, 70 tanks, and 40 airplanes. 2 ^" It
was not until early August, after tension resulting from
the Warsaw Letter"*' had dissipated and apparent resolution
of Soviet-Czechoslovak differences had been obtained at
the Cierna and Bratislava conferences, that the Pact
forces finally left Czechoslovakia.
On August 4 General Sergei K. Shtemenko replaced
General Mikhail I. Kazakov as Chief of Staff of the
joint Warsaw Pact forces. The 68-year-old Kazakov,
Chief of Staff since 1956, was reportedly retiring for
reasons of health. Vi
It was announced on August 10 that military maneu-
vers in areas bordering Czechoslovakia and involving
Soviet, East German, and Polish troops, had ended.
Simultaneously, it was announced that joint communications
'See Chapter 4.

.ercises Involving troops from the same three ccuntri-:
had begun in Poland, southern Germany, and th
western Ukraine of the Soviet ., 2^2 Soviet military
,
Incluc :.. )efense Minister Grechko, visited
southwestern Poland to discuss Warsaw Pact maneuvers with
3 Polish Army leaders. 2^3
tile the Cierna and Bratislava agreements had
calmed the Soviet-Czechoslovak dispute, not all tension
had disappeared. On August 18 the Communist Party of
the Soviet Union, through Pravda , charged that the Czecho-
slovak leadership was losing control of the country. 2^
The Czechoslovak news agency, C.T.K., announced on August 1 9
that Czechoslovak Army divisions would, hold maneuvers in
Bohemia on August 21 and 22 with observers from other
Warsaw Pact states attending. ~*J
On August 20, at approximately 11 P.M., troops of
five Warsaw pact countries—the Soviet Union, Poland,
East Germany, Hungary, and Bulgaria—invaded Czechoslo-
vakia. Occupation was quickly effected. The Soviet
Union announced in Koscow that the action had been requested
by Czechoslovak leaders. This was denied by the Czecho-
slovak government but the government did ask the Czecho-
slovak people not to resist and to continue to report for
work.*"40 Active resistance was slight and scattered; 24 '
it was quickly overcome. The invasion force was initially
estimated at about 200,000 troops248 but by the ti 11
occupation troops had arrived in Czechoslovakia estimates
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. upwards, Lng from 500,000 to 650,000.
a Jovict Union apparently had second thoughts on t.
role of Rast German forces participating in the invasion
and quietly withdrew them during the first three days. 2^9
]?he invasion of Czechoslovakia greatly increased
tension in Rumania and on August 23
, the first full day
of invasion and occupation, Rumanian leader Ceausescu
pledged that any similar invasion of Rumania would be
met with armed resistance. The following day, in an
effort to remove any excuse for the Soviet Union to
consider such an invasion, Ceausescu obtained unanimous
parliamentary approval for his "program of national
sovereignty combined with strict adherence to socialism.
"
2 50
The invasion of Czechoslovakia was decided on by
the Soviet Union and supported oy the other four Warsaw
PacT; states due to their feeling that Dubcek had failed
to meet secret agreements made at Cierna. D On August 27
a compromise was apparently reached in Moscow between the
Soviet and Czechoslovak leaders. The Czechoslovaks
returned to Prague, Soviet tarRks withdrew from strategic
positions in the city, and the Czechoslovak United Nations
delegation—having originally protested the invasion
—
announced that it would no longer participate in debate
concerning the occupation of Czechoslovakia. 2 -52 The
following day President Svoboda informed his cabinet that
withdrawal of the occupation troops would take several
months and that at least two divisions would remain
permanently stationed on the West German border. 2"

On August 31 the United States charged that b
Soviet Union had, by massing Soviet troops in Czechoslo-
,
upset the military balance in central Europe. 2 ^' !'
Western observers of the invasion and occupation
of Czechoslovakia concluded that: (1 ) staff planning,
probably begun six months before the invasion, was near
perfect; (2) execution of the operation was as smooth as
that within the capability of any Western nation; (3) com-
munications equipments were first rate; (^) logistics were
smooth and efficient; and (5) Soviet troop discipline and
morale were superb. 55
Tirana radio in September reported that Albania
had formally withdrawn from the Warsaw Pact. 2 *° The
announcement had little effect as Albanian participation
in the Pact had effectively ended in 1961.
Pressure was applied to Rumania by the Soviet
Union in September to live up to Warsaw Pact commitments
and to allow joint maneuvers on Rumanian territory.
These proposals had probably been made earlier in the
year but shelved due to the Czechoslovakia crisis. $<
In mid-September, Marshal Yakubovsky made a tour of the
East European capitals, advocating the strengthening of
the Warsaw Pact and particularly emphasizing a military
build-up in the Balkans.
*
On September 1 7 the United States warned the
Soviet Union and the Warsaw pact that any intervention
by' them in West Germany would result in collective

response ~oy NATO. The purpose of this warning was to
fears in West Germany caused by a Soviet note of
July 5 in which the Soviet Union contended that under
Articles Q and 10^ of the United Mat ion. "ter, it
and its allies could intervene in West Germany "against
Lewal of aggressive policy by a former enemy state"
of World War II. ->° Prior to the invasion of Czechoslo-
vakia, on August 16, West Germany had offered to declare
the 1933 Munich Pact null if such a move would facilitate
the establishment of West German-Czechoslovak relations. °^
Czechoslovakia—well aware of the strong opposition by
the Soviet Union, Poland, and East Germany to such a
move—had immediately responded that while Czechoslovakia
not exclude it as a possibility, establishment of
relations with Bonn remained far in the future.^
"
1 After
the United States issued its warning in September, Pravda
an<3- Izvestia continued their propaganda campaign against
West Germany but Western officials agreed that a Warsaw
Pact move across the West German border was highly
unlikely.^ On September 27 Czechoslovakia requested
Britain to declare the 1933 Munich agreement null.*- -3
Following acquiescence by Czechoslovakia to Soviet
demands early in October, ° a treaty was signed between
the two countries on October 16 concerning the stationing
of Soviet troops in Czechoslovakia. 0:> The treaty provided
for the "temporary"—but for an unspecified length of
time
—
garrisoning of Soviet troops in Czechoslovakia,

pledged that the troops would not interf-
affairs, a .de them subject to Czechoslovak lav/. While
the authorized troop strength was not disclosed, it was
estimated that the Soviet garrison would number about
100,000 men. While discussing ratification of the treaty,
Czechoslovak Premier cVrnik told the National Assembly
that the other Warsaw Pace creeps could be expected to
leave Czechoslovakia in about two months. °°
On October 30 a two-day meeting of the Defense
Ministers of the Warsaw Pact was concluded. The purpose
of the meeting had been the discussion of methods of
strengthening the Warsaw Pact. Czechoslovakia was repre-
sented by a Deputy Defense Minister. "
Speaking at a Polish Party Congress on November 1^-,
Rumanian Politburo member Stoica declared that Rumania
would fulfill its duty if Rumania or any other Socialist
country were attacked by imperialism. He also stated
that Rumania would strengthen her defenses in order to
meet Warsaw Pact membership requirements. Kent ion of
Czechoslovakia or revisionism was carefully avoided. "
A military conference of the Warsaw Pact states
opened in Bucharest on November 26 to "analyze problems
of combat training.
"
2 "9 During the meeting, the Rumanians
apparently yielded to Soviet pressure and agreed to the
conduct of joint maneuvers in Rumania. Though no date
for the maneuvers was se"c, observers suggested that they
wduld probably be held in the spring or summer of * 9o9.
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The unsuccessful Hungarian Revolution of October,
1956, was in large measure initiated by events of the
Twentieth Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet
Union held in February of that year. Khrushchev* s deni-
gration of Stalin, the open tolerance of Tito, and the
explicit recognition of "different roads to socialism"
produced almost immediate effects in Hungary. Former
Interior Minister Rajk, executed in 19^-9 for "Titoisrn,"
was quietly rehabilitated in March. The Stalinist Com-
munist Party chief Rakosi was openly criticized in Kay
and replaced by Erno Gero in July. Despite a tougher
Soviet position in July following the Polish Poznan riots,
and a Soviet secret directive instructing the satellites
to use the Soviet Union, not Yugoslavia, as a model for
development, Hungary continued to de-Stalinize and de-
Soviet ize. Former Premier Imre Nagy, expelled from the
Party in 1955 for "Titoisrn," was reinstated in October. ?2
On October 21 university studen'cs began demanding
more personal and national freedom. The following day
similar demands circulated among the population and demon-
strations called for the release of incarcerated Cardinal
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idszen ie removal of Soviet troops from ary.
The ban on public assembly was lifted on October 23 due
to pressure by the demonstrators, and the demonstrations
became more intense. Finally the secret police fired on
3 croitfds in Budapest and the demonstrations became violent
d uncontrolled. At this point, Party chief Gero, Premier
;;edus, and Party Secretary Janos Kadar returned from
visiting Yugoslavia. 2 73
3y October 24 Soviet armed forces, requested duri:.
the night by Gero, and an appeal by Nagy, who during the
night had succeeded Hegedus as Premier in an effort to calm
the populace, appeared to have quelled all rioting except
in a few scattered places. ?^ Fighting continued, however,
and Kadar, who replaced Gero as First Secretary of the
Hungarian Working People's (Communist) Party on October 25,
promised to negotiate with Moscow for the removal of Soviet
troops as soon as order was restored. United States'
President Eisenhower denounced the Soviet intervention
and declared that the action proved that the Soviet Union
had remained in Hungary to continue its occupation, not
27 <for protection of Hungary from aggression. (
J
The revolt spread to the countryside by October 26
and there was fierce fighting between Hungarian patriots
and the Red Army. The United States, Britain, France,
and other nations attempted to find some way to appeal
the Soviet intervention. The U.S. State Department
confirmed that the Soviets had the right to be in Hungary
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under the W fc but . ested that the legitimacy of
putting down an internal rebellion could be questioned.
[t should be emphasized, though, that at the time the
Soviet troops were being used at the Hungarian governments
j 276request.*- ' u
In an effort to halt the revolt, Premier Nagy held
out hope to the Hungarian people of early departure of
Soviet troops fro.. rian soil. ?? A new Hungarian
government was formed on October 27 and on October 28 Nagy
announced that he would "seek complete withdrawal of Soviet
troops from Hungary, "~'° recognized a "new" army and police,
and abolished the secret police. The following day he
announced that free elections would be held. '? It appeared
that the Soviet troops were leaving Budapest; and at the
same time the Soviet Union announced that it was willing
to discuss with the satellite states the matter of Soviet
troops stationed in their territories. 280 ^"he Revolution
had all but obtained its objective. A Soviet statement,
drafted on October 30 and printed in Pravda on October 31
,
declared:
Since it considers that the further presence of
Soviet army units in Hungary can serve as a cause
for an even greater deterioration of the situation,
the Soviet Government has instructed its military
command to withdraw Soviet Army units from 3udapest
• . . (and) is ready to enter into negotiations with
the Hungarian People's Republic and other participants
of the w Treaty on the question of the presence
of Soviet troops on the territory of Hungary. 281
On October Jl , however, Soviet leaders appeared in
Budapest to seek a stabilization of the situation. The

offer w .de to immediately withdraw all Soviet troo;
from ry except those static. lere under Wa
• merits and to submit the removal of those fore
zo negotiation by the Warsaw Pact members. The new Hungarian
lister of State Affairs, non-Communist leader Tildy,
"used the offer; he demanded immediate withdrawal of all
Soviet troops and declared that Hungary, in any case, would
definitely repudiate the Warsaw Pact. The Hungarians and
Soviets then agreed to the establishment of a joint com-
mission to discuss the Soviet withdrawal. °2
The Soviet leaders, shocked by the Hungarian govern-
nt f s determination to repudiate the Warsaw Pact, probably
consulted with Moscow during the night of October 31 and
reached the decision to intervene. ^ while Hungary alone
would not have been particularly significant, the Soviet
fear was that such cracks in its buffer-zone defense might
spread t;o more strategic states as Poland, Czechoslovakia,
p Oh
or East Germany. ov The Soviet leaders met with Kadar
the following morning and it is probable that at that time
plans were made for the formation of a new Hungarian
government that would request Soviet military assistance.
The Soviet leaders then left Budapest. ~^3
Soviet troops began pouring into Hungary. On
November 2, premier Nagy demanded the withdrawal of the
Soviet reinforcements. In a note to Secretary-General
Hammarskjold of the United Nations, Nagy informed the
U.N. that Hungary had repudiated the Warsaw Treaty,

declared neutrality ted to the U.N. id the
powers for defense of ieutrality. 2 ^° The Soviet
parently reassu concerning the Soviet
tro< vements, indicating that they consisted of nothing
more than simple regrouping. On November 3 Hungarian
spokesmen (including D< . .. Lster Maleter and General
Staff Ch Kovacs) net with Soviet military representatives
in the Soviet »s Budapest headquarters. Nagy appealed
by radio for their return on November 4 but nothing was
heard of them until the arian government, two years
later, announced their execution. Nagy*s radio appeal
came only hours before Soviet units, including armored
forces, crushed the Hungarian revolt .287 News of the
formation of Xadar's "Hungarian Revolutionary Workers 1
and Peasants'" government and of Xadar's appeal for Soviet
intervention was broadcast to the Hungarian people during
the morning of November ^. 28S In May, 1 957 » the Soviet
Union and Hungary signed a "status of forces" agreement,




Events leading to the August, 3 968, invasion of
Czechoslovakia—by five of her allies—began with the
October, 1967, clash between reform-minded Alexander
Dubcek and Stalinist Antonin Novotny at a plenary session
of, zr.3 Czechoslovak Communist ?arty J s Central Committee. 2 ?0
On January 5» 1963, Dubcek replaced Novotny as Secretary

I,
a "democratization" process .clng both economic orra
and civil liberties.
Early i 'ch, Dubcek lifted media censorship. By
late March, the Czechoslovak leaders were beginning
-go
feel pressure from Communist leaders in allied states.
Some pressure was exerted at the Dresden meeting of the
Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Poland, Hungary,
and Bulgaria on March 23* After the Czechoslovak Communist
Party adopted its new "Action Program" in April, the pres-
sure increased. On May 3 Dubcek and the new Czechoslovak
Premier Cernik met with Soviet leaders in Moscow where the
Soviets apparently demanded that Czechoslovakia not with-
draw from the Warsaw Pact or allow the liberalization to
undermine Communist Party strength and that censorship
of the press be restored— thus stopping liberal Czecho-
slovak attacks on orthodox Communism and on Muscovite
intervention in Eastern Europe* ° Having witnessed the
Hungarian experience twelve years earlier, it is unlikely
that Dubcek even considered severing Warsaw Pact ties;
in his public statements throughout the year he emphasized
Czechoslov; ' s loyalty to the bloc.
Communist leaders of the Soviet Union, East Germany,
Poland, Hungary, and Bulgaria held discussions in Moscow
an . y 3 concerning the growing Czechoslovak problem. 92
Soviet troop movements, begun the next day along the Czecho-
slovak border in Poland, were noted in Prague but interpreted

psycho!--
. 1 pre , 2 93 £uri May top Soviet
leaders—including Premier Kosygin and Defense Minister
iko—visited : md Dubcek agreed to allow Warsi
Pace .;vers in Czechoslovakia in June.
^.ying groundwork for later Soviet intervention,
on May 25 the Sovi med forces newspaper, Krasru
Zvc. v.
t published an editorial implying "that the United
States was engaged in sabota. socialism in Eastern
Europe through subversive activities in Czechoslovakia, "29**
On May 30 Novotny was expelled from the Central Committee
and suspended from the Czechoslovak Communist Party. 2 95
In June Warsaw Pact maneuvers were held in Czechoslovakia;
at the completion of the exercises, however, Soviet troops
remained in the country.
Early in July the Soviet Union, East Germany, Poland,
Hungary, and Bulgaria called for an E«.st European summit
meeting to discuss the events in Czechoslovakia. The
Czechoslovak leadership rejected the proposal. 9° a short
time later, a meeting in Warsaw was announced. Though
boycotted by Czechoslovakia, representatives of the other
five states met on July Ik- and 1.5 and discussed Czechoslo-
vakia^ democratization movement. The Warsaw Five issued
a letter to the Czechoslovak leadership charging them with
tolerating counterrevolutionary activity and demanding
2Q7that the liberalization be reversed. 7 ' At the same time,
Czechoslovakia on July '. 5 called for a revision of the
Warsaw Pact, specifically for a rotation of the top

commander's post and for an amendment to the tr :o
used for political ends rather th
military purposes. 2^ on July 18 the Central Committee
of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia issued a reply
to the letter received from the Warsaw Five in which deter-
mination to continue the reforms was declared. 99
.ile allegations of the discovery of a U.S. weapons
cache in Czechoslovakia were being published, the Soviet
Politburo demanded a meeting with the Czechoslovak Presidium
on July 22 or 23 in either Moscow or the Ukraine. J On
July 22 the Soviets agreed to have the meeting in Czecho-
slovakia and at the same time revived their demand that
rsaw Pact troops be stationed in Czechoslovakia along the
-ani
. st German frontier. JKJ - On the same day the Soviets
announced that military maneuvers were being held in the
western parts of the USSR, including the Ukraine and near
the Czechoslovak border, and that the exercises were
scheduled to continue until August 10.-^
The Soviet Politburo and the Czechoslovak Presidium
met in Cierna, Czechoslovakia, from July 29 to August 1
.
The Soviets demanded
reimposition of censorship in Czechoslovakia; the
suppression of ant i-Communist political activities;
the ouster of so-called ultraliberal Communists from
leading positions; a tightening of border security
and controls
;
^and a limitation on relations with
st Germany. 303
It appeared that the Czechoslovaks held firm and that the
Soviets finally gave in. The only announced result of the
conference was that the Soviet and Czechoslovak leaders.

-et on A - Bratislava, the c .1 of
Sic




J In a radio broadcast on August 2 Dubcek
tounced that the Soviet Union had acquiesced to t
liberalization program. 3°*
he meeting in Bratislava lasted only one day. It
appeared that bhe only concessions made by the Czechoslovaks
was that press articles criticizing the Soviet Union would
be discontinued.-^ 00 Soviet troops, present in Czechoslo-
vakia since the end of Warsaw Pact maneuvers in June,
departedo Following the Cierna and Bratislava conferences,
the Soviets abandoned their attacks on Prague. -J ^' In mid-
August Yugoslav leader Tito and Rumanian leader Ceausescu
each visited Dubcek, implying their support of his position.
On August 16 after three weeks of silence the Soviet
press began again attacking the Czechoslovak leadership. 3°°
A Prayda article on August 1 8 charged that they had lost
control of the country and allowed the resumption of anti-
socialist, subversive activities. The same article
announced that the Czechoslovak people could depend on
their Communist neighbors for help to "rebuff the intrigues. "309
On August 20 forces from the Soviet Union, East
Germany, Poland, Hungary, and Bulgaria invaded Czechoslo-
vakia. ->0 On August 21 the following Soviet statement was
distributed in New York:
Tass is authorized to state that party and
Government leaders of the Czechoslovak Socialist
Republic have asked the Soviet Union and other allied
states to render the fraternal Czechoslovak people

issistance, includ! ;e with arm
fo]
:>slov< statehood
j ion— the I from t
counterrevolutionary fore
-ered into
collusion : hostile to Sooiali.
The events in Czechoslovakia and around hi
re re - the ject of exchanges of v
be. ers of fraternal Socialist cou .
icluding the leaders of Czechoslovakia. The
countries are unanimous in that the support, consoli-
dation defense of the peoples' Socialist gains is
Lalist duty of all the Socialist
states. This cc - stand of theirs was solemnly
proclai I in bhe Bratislava statement.
^he further aggravation of the situation in
Czechoslovj fects the vital interests of the
Soviet Union and c ' Socialise states, the interests
of the security of the states of the Socialist com-
munity. The threat to the Socialist system in
Czechoslovakia constitutes at the same time a threat
to the mainstays of European peace.
.e Soviet government and the Governments of
bhe allied countries—the People's Republic of
Bulgaria, the Hungarian People's Republic, the
rman Democratic Republic, the Polish People's
Republic—proceeding from the principles of inseverable
friendship and cooperation and in accordance with
the existing contractual commitments, have decided
to meet the above-mentioned request for rendering
necessary help to the fraternal Czechoslovak people.
This decision is fully in accord with the
right of states to individual and collective self-
defense envisaged in treaties of alliance concluded
between the fraternal socialist countries. This
decision is also in line with vital interests of our
countries in safeguarding European peace against
forces of militarism, aggression and revanche which
have more than once plunged the peoples of Europe
into wars.
Soviet armed units, together with armed units
of the above-mentioned allied countries, entered t
territory of Czechoslovakia on August 21 . They will
be immediately withdrawn from the Czechoslovak
Socialist Republic as soon as the obtaining threat
to the gains of socialism in Czechoslovakia, the
threat to the security of the socialist countries,
is eliminated and the lawful authorities find that
further presence of these armed units there is no
longer necessary.
The actions which are being taken are not
directed against any state and in no measure infringe
state interests of anybody. They serve the purpose
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. Prague radio announcement of the invasion,
as monitored In the United States, was:
To the entire people of the Czechoslovak
Socialist Republic:
sterday, on 20 August, around 2300 (1* P.M.),
troops of the Soviet Union, the G.D.R. (East Germany),
the Hungarian People's Republic and the Bulgarian
People's Republic crossed the frontiers of the Czecho-
slovak Social! public.
This happened without the knowledge of the
President of the Republic, the Chairman of the
itional Assembly, the Premier, or the First Secretary
of the Czechoslovak Communist party Central Committee.
In the evening hours the Presidium of the
Czechoslovak Communist party Central Committee (had)
held a session and discussed preparations for the
14th Czechoslovak Communist party congress.
The Czechoslovak Communist party Central
Committee Presidium appeals to all citizens of our
republic to maintain calm and not to offer resistance
to the troops on the march. Our army, security corps
and people's militia have not received the command
to defend the country.
The Czechoslovak Communist party Central
Co: ;ee Presidium regard this act as contrary
not only to the fundamental principles of relations
between Socialist states but also as contrary to
the
;
iples of international law.
leading functionaries of the state, the
.-arty and the National Front: Remain in
your functions as representatives of the state, elected
to the laws of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic.
Constitutional functionaries are immediately
convening a session of the National Assembly of our
republic, and the Presidium is at the same time
convening a plenum of the Central Committee to discuss
the situation that has arisen.
PRESIDIUM OF THE CZECHOSLOVAK
COMMUNIST PARTY CENTRAL COMMITTEE3 " 2
On August 21 the invading forces continued to
consolidate their occupation of the country. Radio Prague

b shortly thereafter resumed
broadcasting from a clandestine location.
3
1
3 At the Unit
itions the Czechoslovaks demanded the withdrawal of
invading forces. 3^ Many Communist leaders throughout the
rid, and including Tito and Ceausescu, condemned the
invasion. >1 D Dubcek, Premier Cernik, and President of the
National Assembly Smrkovsky were arrested,-^ and it
appeared that the Soviets were searching for a conservative
group zo form the hard core of a new government. -^ 7
Dubcek was attacked by name for the first time on
August 22 in the Soviet press. 3- ! b That evening a secret
congress of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia elected
a new Central Committee and Presidium,^' y each dominated
by liberals. The congress also named Venek Silhan, an
economist, to act in place of Dubcek and issued a demand
for the withdrawal of a.ll occupation troops and the release
of the arrested Czechoslovak leaders. 320 \}\\Xq active
resistance was slight, the solidarity of the Czechoslovak
people with Dubcek was demonstrated through passive resist-
ance and through the large number of clandestine radio
stations broadcasting opposition to the occupation.
3
2 *
Czechoslovak President Svoboda was flown to Moscow
on August 23, apparently to discuss replacement Party and
government leaderships.-^22 The Soviets, embarrassed by
their inability to find a cons -Ive base in Czechoslo-
vakia, were forced to bring Dubcek, Cernik, and Smrkovsky







he Czechoslovak leaders returned to Prague.
3
2 5
ue issued by the mec aled little but it
.r determined th eraent had been reached on
the withdrawal of the occupation troops and on other
iditions: (1) Czechoslovak political development was
to be changed to be more in accordance with the Sovi,_
type of socialism; (2) the l^th Czechoslovak (secret)
Party congress declaratio. re to be invalid; (3) press
censorship in Czechoslovakia was to be strengthened;
(<t-) a declaration of counterrevolutionary activity was
proposed but protested by the Czechoslovaks and not required;
(5) the Czechoslovak mass media were not to criticize allies;
(6) removal of Soviet troops was to be accompanied hy the
removal of other Soviet security forces; (7) Czechoslovak
Interior Minister Pavel was zo be relieved; (8) reparations
were requested by the Czechoslovaks; (9) the international
situation was to be adjusted in accordance with the
Bratislava agreement; (10) the Czechoslovak government
was to issue a declaration that it had not requested the
United States and would not request the United Nations
co discuss the invasion; (11) Czechoslovak Deputy Premier
Sik and Foreign Minister Hajek were to be removed;
(12) the Czechoslovaks xvere to issue a declaration that
the Czechoslovak-West German border was not secure and
would have to be secured by allies; (13) "^he results of

cow negotiations were to remain secret and not be
.id (1^-) friendship and nee with the Soviet
states of the socialist camp were to be
stren : Led ay Czechoslc i,32o
on returning jo P: both President Svoboda and
Dubcek addressed the Czecho.. : people. Their spe.
stressed normalization of life in Czechoslovakia, the need
for calm, and the avoiding of provocation of occupation
forces. Continued co:. ent to the liberalization program
s pledged. Agreement on the withdrawal of the invading
troops was reported but it was emphasized that their
presence had to be accepted as "a political reality. "327
On August 29 Smrkovsky announced to the nation that
"certain measures" of press censorship and the disbanding
of non-Communist political groups would be the first steps
in restraining the liberal reform. 32o <j'he Central Committee
of the Czechoslovak Communist Party met on August 31 for
the purpose of reorganiz i'ng the Czechoslovak leadership to
meet Soviet demands. Liberal General Pavel was replaced by
moderate Jan Pelnar as Interior Minister. 3-9 «phe Central
Committee elected a new, enlarged Presidium. Surprisingly,
only two of its members were staunch Soviet supporters and
they had been members of the old Presidium. Seven of the
sixteen new members came from the Presidium elected by the
secret Party congress, which the Soviet Union had declared
illegal. 330
During September other liberal Communist officials

. engineered the economic
Pore ijek.3 epteml
printed 'inition of the conditions require
before occupation troops vrould be withdrawn:
The process of -lization means, f of
.1 , the complete exposure and stamping out of the
subversive activities of the right-wing, antisocial ist
forces, the elimination c fluence on a part
of the population and especially youth, the resolute
bhening of the 1< ; role of the Comm
party in the activities of th<
: , in
the ideological and public spheres, in the whole
life of the country.-^
Soviet and Czechoslovak leaders continued to meet
throughout September, negotiating and discussing the
"normalization." On September 11 most Soviet armor was
withdrawn from Czechoslovak cities but the countryside
remained an armed camp.-^-5 On September 13 the National
Assembly reimposed direct censorship, re-established certain
unspecified police measures, and announced the formation
of a State Defense Council for the purpose of strengthening
the Warsaw Pact and the Czechoslovak Army. 33*^
Dubcek, Cernik, and Deputy Premier Kusak went to
Moscow on October 3 for negotiations. ^^ On October 4
the Czechoslovaks apparently agreed to Soviet demands.
The talks ended and the co -.que issued stated that
Czechoslovakia had agreed to more vigorously work to
ensure the agreements made in Moscow between August 23
and 2 5 and "chat
They will step up efforts to raise the leading re:
of the Communist party, wi: ensify the struggle
against the antisocial ist forces, will take the




to positions ol .ism and proletariat
bional *3o
s agreed to sign a treaty concerning the perm-
Lent stationing of Warsaw Fact forces in Czechosl La
and indicated the need for a reliable barrier against the
"mounting revanchist strivings" of West Germany. 337 rj»he
"status of forces" t: r v.Tas signed on October l6.33o
On October 28 tens of thousands of Czechoslovaks
ged celebration of the fiftieth anniversary of the
Czechoslovak Republic with the biggest anti-Soviet demon-
strations since the first days of the occupation,. The
demonstrations constituted the first anniversary celebra-
tion held since the Communist coup : ' .. :,. ,; in 1 9^-8. In
addition to protesting the Soviet occupation, they also
demonstrated support of the Czechoslovak leadership. 339
Despite the demonstration, by November the Soviet
Union had substantially curbed the Czechoslovak reform
program. While Dubcek, due to popular support, could
not be removed as Nagy had oeen in Hungary, efforts were





The members of the Warsaw Pact explained its creation
as a response to the Nc Atlantic Treaty Organization
and the re-arming of V.rest Germany; the West tended to view
the new alliance as an attempt to hasten military integra-
tion of the bloc and to provide justification for Soviet
troops remaining in satellite countries. 3^1 Each of these
reasons partially explains the Pact's existence. Of greater
importance, underlying the military commitments made at
in May, 1955? a formal institutional framework was
created that provided the Soviet Union with a channel for
dominating bloc foreign affairs and a vehicle for attacking
Western unity.
The Russians have historically had ambivalent
feelings toward the Germans, both admiring and f
them, and Russia has always desired a buffer zone between
the two nations. Post-World War II domination of the
East European states has given the Soviets such a buffer
and military integration has increased the value of the
zone. As a result, the "northern tier" of the Pact's
countries--Poland, Czechoslovakia, and East Germany—has
received the greatest portion of the Soviet Union's atten-
tion within the Warsaw alliance. -^2 These three countries

pre
. .on of t
r. In
ion, the "nor 1 tier" would be pivotal duri
military campaign in central Europe. ^ ^
.? only real military significance of b .
Pact initially was that it provided justification for the
irtering of Soviet troops throughout the bloc. The
presence of the Red Army helped install Communist regimes
in most of the East European states. The presence, use,
or potential use of Soviet troops has since World War II
been used by the Soviet Union—and by the client states--
as a method of maintaining discipline and Communist control
in Eastern Europe. The bilateral treaty network executed
within the bloc did not provide any justification for
the presence of Soviet troops within the territories of
the East European states; the Warsaw Pact agreements did
provide such justification. After the Polish and Hungarian
experiences in 1956, the USSR concluded more definitive
reements with the other bloc countries, as with Poland,
concerning the status of Soviet troops within their terri-
tories. ^ A similar agreement was made with Czechoslo-
vakia in 1968 after Soviet troops occupied and remained
within that country.
The Warsaw Pact may also be interpreted as having
crystallized a Soviet "sphere of influence, i'-^4 -5 it has
presented a barrier "Co national autonomy and has con-
tributed to keeping the bloc together.

e Pol: tativ btee : .
for Le Sovi sould direct the foreign
policy efforts of the bloc. The guise of mute onsult -
tic hers made this domination more palatable
to both the puppet governments and their peoples. After
the Cc 'orm was dissolved in April, 1 956, the framework J^
provided by t .rsaw Treaty became the only permanently
device thro; :ich the Soviets could br^.
pressure to bear on the collective external politics of
i East European countries.
The communiques of the Political Consultative Com-
ttee have been used to express unanimity, thereby pi*o-
viding considerable propaganda value both within and outside
the bloCo Statements favoring solution to such issues as
disarmament, a German peace treaty, German unification,
and de-nuclearized zones in Europe have appeal throughout
the world. Constant reinforcement of the position that
the Communist countries are peace-loving, oppose aggression,
and favor ncn- interference in the internal affairs of other
countries will certainly convince some communities, world
events not withstanding. Such reinforcement is afforded
in the Committee's communiques.
^he political meetings of the Warsaw alliance have
been used to bestow collective blessing on Soviet forei
policies, as in Cuba in 1962; to demonstrate unity in the
face of crisis, as in 3erlin in 196l; and to exert pressure
on 'member states, as in the issue of diplomatic relations

...
n f particularly Unit.
ates NATO actions, and to time and a,
bhe rearmament of West Gei Two purposes are served
by criticism of the West and particularly of West Gem
world opinion is encouraged again. i military po*i
.ty, and the East Eur* s are made to feel the
necessity of their alliance with the Soviet Union for
fense. In a similar manner, the political statements of
the Pact are usee to mobilize world opinion in favor of
certain bloc aims, as recognition of the Polish-German
frontier—which would sanction the illegal Soviet action
of transferring German territory to Poland after World
-" II.
The Soviets have, since its formation, made every
effort to enhance the status of the Warsaw Pact. The rank
of the delegates to the Warsaw Conference in 1 955. the
composition of the Political Consultative Committee, and
the naming of top Soviet military men as Commander-in-Chief
of the united Pact forces are evidence of these efforts.
The object of these endeavors has been to create an organi-
zation equal to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and
to prepare the way for a trade-off between the two alliances
in East-West negotiations. The proposal for an all-encom-
passing European collective security organization—which
would remove some of the barriers to messianic Communism
—
dates back in Warsaw Pact history to the initial meet in

y-
for a non-a it between :
es is almoi b s old, having been formulated ; ;he
Committee^ second meet 58.
.
the pursuit of equal statu: . NATO, the Warsaw
3 neared at it of its goal. While in 1 955
British Foreign Secretary Macmillan could state
i not consider NATO and the Warsaw Pact equals a.
would not trade one for the other in negotiations and while
even as late as October, I967, U.S. NATO Arab - Cleveland
could that even if the Wars, ct were dissolved in
the next two years, the United States was determined to ^/
maintain NATO, the same statements could not be made in
1968. On June 1^, 19o8, in a meeting of the North Atlantic
Council of NATO at Reykjavik, Iceland, the members "stressed
the need for the alliance to maintain its military strength
until balanced reduction of forces could be negotiated with
the Warsaw Pact states. "3^7 on June 26 NATO specifically
called for mutual reductions. 3^° Though the invasion of
Czechoslovakia later in the year no doubt caused swift
reappraisal of this position, the equality of the two L^-
anizations had been implicitly voiced.
During the first six years of the Warsaw Pact's
existence, the Soviet Union was interested in neither
strengthening the satellite forces nor truly integrati
them into the Soviet military ma.- . Only one maneuver
was conducted between 1955 an 1961. An integrated bloc

• defense system was formed, technical mill. ,ce
tc apons were
standardized throughout I . :_cc,3^9 but no reliance was
,ced en forces other
. t the Red Army nor does it appear
satellite forces were considered capable of anytlr
more t ielaying or hara : actions. This may be seen
even in the command relationships established when the Pact
was formed. No in ition of command, such as exists In
NATO, was envisioned. The forces of each country were
considered a separate entity, each headed by its own mili-
tary organization. Co-ordination was provided only between
the Commander-in-Chief, with his supporting staff—which
did include representatives from each country—and th
Deputy Commanders-in-Chief, one from each member state.
This was not the framework of a viable military organization.
The USSR did and has continued to maintain complete control
of the Joint Command; the Commander-in-Chief and the Chief
of Staff have always been Soviet.
In 19oi the USSR reversed its former position,,
Although no changes have been made to the formal command
relationships, close military liason now exists at the
working level between the Pact members. Joint maneuvers
are held frequently and not only at politically propitious
times, ^ne swift, decisive invasion and occupation of
Czechoslovakia in 1 968 indicates how well co-ordinated the
Pact's forces have becc ie armies of oho East European





it is assumed t Ids t
nuc oris. 3-5°
i the event o. 'war, the movement i
reinforcements frc i e Soviet Union to the East Europe
countries would be physically difficult. This alone makes
the War b and a capable, integrated military force
des le.-^ reliability of the non-Soviet forces
of the unified command may still be questionable—even
despite Czechoslovakia. Though they would no doubt be
dependable in a conflict against traditional national
adver: s, they are probably politically undefendable. JD~
Che loss of Albania in i 961 was not particularly
damaging to the Warsaw Pace as an alliance, although it
did give the Chinese Communists a sympathetic voice in
Europe. In fact, the defection of Albania may have con-
tributed to the Soviet decision to reshape the Pact into
a capable, integrated military force, in which case the
loss of Albania actually contributed to the viability of
the alliance.
Beginning in late 196b, the Soviet Union's position
in the warsaw Pact alliance began deteriorating. Perhaps
-led ~oy the downfall of Khrushchev and the subsequent
Lability of the Soviet Politburo to agree on a single





policies. continued her uncommitted rol. he
-o -Soviet dispute and iced opposition to all military
blocs, including t aw Pact. . 1965 East Germany's
pushed the Soviet Union for nuc taring and
Lnued its attack on the Warsaw Pact and crit -
cized Lhe presence of Soviet troops in other states.
he Soviet leadership apparently decided in 1 966 to
curb the gi g loss of control over the East Europe
)C I". iia continued her opposition x,o the Pact and
.ry's Kadar failed to si ?t Ulbricht's statement
of support of the Pact. Soviet Party chief Brezhnev,
however, in speeches in Czechoslovakia, warned against
further attempts to loosen fc] ,nds of the alliance.
sh the Foreign Ministers meeting in June and the Eighth
Political Consultative Committee meeti - i 1 July were rent
by arguments en the question of independent policies.
.la established relations with West Germany i
Jar , 1 96?, causing considerable disturbance in bhe bloc
and very real concern on the part of East Germany : .
July she was finally forced to quit her opposition and
declare support for the Warsaw Pact. She continued to
folic. . .dependent for in ot . tatters;
specifically, she failed to support the Soviet Union's




. Soviet Union to cru.
the Czechi slo'v .. democr - .-.cess in 1968 must have
:r. difficult to reach. Although expecting support frc
conservative elements—whj to materialize—the
Soviets did not have a "Czechoslovak Kadar," already
selec and instructed, to . ..' \ the move appear legitimate.
At a time support for NATO was declining ana overtures
were being made tp -"or mutual force reductions, the
Soviets could ill afford so drastic a step as invasion
of another country, even one .in their "sphere." While
supported 'cy East Germany, Poland, and Bulgaria, the more
moderate Kadar of Hungary was only lukewarm to the idea
of invasion, and the Soviet Union knew to expect opposition
from Rumania if she were asked to participate. The Soviet
Union also ~n^a to ct to lose a great-amount of prestige
and position among the world 1 s uncommitted states and
possibly among the Communist Parties in Western nations.
e Soviet reaction to Czechoslovakia stands in
contrast to its reaction to Hungary in 1 95c. In the
Lrian instance the Soviet Union was willing to allow
increased internal liberty and democracy but objected to
Hungary* s attempt to leave the bloc. In the case of
<
Czechoslovakia the Soviet Union genuine assurances
of Czechoslovak loyalty to • but was unwilling to
allow the desired internal liberalization.

lion stoc
to si decision to invade C ^Slovakia ca tly
be ,ood as a choice e to t fcer loss-
outbreak of revolution i ,n the bloc or within the So-"
lf« ie libel echo Slovakia coupled
.3 unrest and agitation of the intelligentsia ove
the past few years, particularly in the Soviet Union, must
e been evaluated as a greater risk than the losses to
incurred by invasion and occupation of Czechoslovakia.
Since I.96I the Warsaw Pact has grown from a paper
litary alliance into a capable, integrated armed fc
nee 1964 it has evolved from a rubber-stamp congress
to a less tightly controlled forum for the discussion
of mutual policy. he recent efforts of the Soviet
Union to reimpose its uncontested will on the bloc, inde-
pendence of action continues to appear. Return to a
pre-Dubcek Czechoslovakia seems inconceivable. Kadar in
Hungary continues to grow more moderate. The events of
early I.969 indicate that Rumania still feels no compunction
to yield to Soviet pressure.
As the Soviet monolithic hold on the Communist world
continues- to loosen and the desire within the East European
countries for national Communism continues to grow, mor
dissension in the ranks of the War . Pact can be expected.
The Soviets may find that the "consultations envisaged ]
3 Treaty" on a basis -of equality among the members--
without the pre ence of' the Soviet Union—will be the

onl . d by
List r of a unified bloc.
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of -.idship, Coo] • MutUai-,«
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' Republic
of A: -a, the blic of
Bu: .a, the Hungarian People-- Republic,
.public, —
pol3 lie, the Rumanian
b Republic, the Union of Soviet
tlist Republics and the Czechoslo^
Republic





S 5S J; « Pf - t. unite
in Europe^ j*^




dancer of anotl and constitutes a
miwif
fcircumstances t
:f tne necessary measures
- in th. interests of pre-
serving^ in Eux principles of the Charter
of the t ions Organize tiorw developing
Irotis of xuitnor pro-
p, co. tion . I
B PriROi L£ Tnter in tl
ty of states and oi non-i iercuec
internal affairs,





















11 or . ] . lish People : .-publ .
PS
of the Polish R bl Lc;
of the
public: g. s Ghe< rghiu-De
.oil c. .isters of the Rumani
1
Let of oho Union
of Soviet Socialist R ndrovi
iin. Chairman of ill of Mini ;he
he President ohoslovak Republic:
Villain Siroky, Prii Slovak Republic,
lo, having pre - vll powers, fc In
good and due sed as fol!
/tide 1
The Contracting ] undertake, in accordanc
r of the United Nations organization, to
. frain in their int itions from the threat
3 of force, and to le their i: ational disputes
tcefully and in such manner as will not jeopardize
international peace and security.
Article 2
2 Contracting Parties dec! -„ their readiness to
:icipate in a spirit of i incere cooperati Ln ail
;ernational actions designed to si ard international
ace and security, LI fully devote their energies
to the attainment of this
The Contracting ties will furthermore strive for
ion, in ( - :.y
rate in this, of effective asures for
universal reduction of arm. aits and prohibition of atom--.
hydrogen and other weapons of mass destruction.
Article 3
The Contract .11 consult with o'
on ail imp noting
their common J rests, guld the desire to strengthen
international scurit
They shall cons
^ver, in the opinion of any one o .. a threat of
I ./stack on one c to the Treaty
arisen, in order to ensure e and tl




In the event of armed attack in Europe on one or more
of the Parties to the Treaty by any state or group of states,
each of the Parties to the Treaty, In the exercise of Its
right to individual or collective self-defence In accordance
with Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations Organi-
zation, shall immediately, either individually or in agree-
ment with other Parties to the Treaty, come to the assistance
of the state or states attacked with all such means as It
deems necessary, including armed force. The Parties to the
Treaty shall Immediately consult concerning the necessary
measures to be taken by them jointly in order to restore and
maintain International peace and security.
Measures taken on the basis of this Article shall be
reported to the Security Council in conformity with the pro-
visions of the Charter of the United Nations Organization.
These measures shall be discontinued immediately the Security
Council adopts the necessary measures to restore and maintain
international peace and security.
Article 5
The Contracting Parties have agreed to establish a
Joint Command of the armed forces that by agreement among
the Parties shall be assigned to the Command, which shall
function on the basis of jointly established principles.
They shall likewise adopt other agreed measures necessary
to strengthen their defensive power, in order to protect
the peaceful labours of their peoples, guarantee the
inviolability of their frontiers and territories, and
provide defence against possible aggression.
Article 6
For the purpose of the consultations among the
Parties envisaged in the present Treaty and also for the
purpose of examining questions which may arise in the
operation of the Treaty, a Political Consultative Committee
shall be set up, in which each of the Parties to the Treaty
shall be represented by a member of its Government or by
another specifically appointed representative.
The Committee may set up such auxiliary bodies as
may prove necessary.
Article 7
The Contracting Parties undertake not to participate
in any coalitions or alliances and not to conclude any
agreements whose objects conflict with the objects of the
present Treaty.
The Contracting Parties declare that their commit-
ments under existing international treaties do not conflict




The Contracting Parties declare that they will act
In a spirit of friendship and cooperation with a view to
further developing and fostering economic and cultural
intercourse with one another, each adhering to the prin-
ciple of respect for the independence and sovereignty of
the others and non-interference In their internal affairs.
Article 9
The present Treaty is open to the accession of
other states, irrespective of their social and political
systems, which express their readiness by participation in
the present Treaty to assist In uniting the efforts of the
peaceable states In safeguarding the peace and security of
the peoples. Such accession shall enter into force with
the agreement of the Parties to the Treaty after the
declaration of accession has been deposited with the
Government of the Polish People's Republic.
Article 10
The present Treaty is subject to ratification, and
the instruments of ratification shall be deposited with
the Government of the Polish People's Republic.
The Treaty shall enter into force on the day the
last instrument of ratification has been deposited. The
Government of the Polish People's Republic shall notify
the other Parties to the Treaty as each instrument of
ratification is deposited.
Article 11
The present Treaty shall remain In force for twenty
years. For such Contracting Parties as do not at least
one year before the expiration of this period present to
the Government of the Polish People's Republic a statement
of denunciation of the Treaty, it shall remain in force
for the next ten years.
Should a system of collective security be estab-
lished in Europe, and a General European Treaty of Col-
lective Security concluded for this purpose, for which
the Contracting Parties will unswervingly strive, the pres«
ent Treaty shall cease to be operative from the day the
General European Treaty enters into force.
Done in Warsaw on May 14, 1955* in one copy each in
the Russian, Polish, Czech and German languages, all texts
being equally authentic. Certified copies of the present
Treaty shall be sent by the Government of the Polish









- Peopled Republic of Bu la
Vylko Chervenkov
Poi sidium of the Hungarian People's
Republic
Andras .us
For the Pr nt of the Ger n Democratic
Republic
Otto Grotewohl




' Z : ciewicz
For the Pi ium of the Grand National
As ly of the \. ..ople's
Republic
Gheorgh^. Gheorghiu-D
For the Presidium of the Su] Soviet of
the Uhic / Soviet Socialist Republics
Nikolai Alexandrovich Bulganin
For the President of the Czechoslovak Republic
Viliam Siroky
ESTABLISH T OF A JOINT COMMAND
of the Armed Forces of the Signatories to the Treaty of
Friendship, Cooperation and . ,^e
In pui ice of th 7 of . dship, Cooperation
_ . publ i c v..
Alt .e*s ^-_.ublic of Bulgaria, the Hungarian
epublic, the German .blic, the
Polish People's Republic, th :Ie*s blic,
n of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Czechoslovak
mblic, the sig decided to establish a
Join"; C .nd of thei: forces.
ion provi
to the st: : and the organi-
;ion* of the Joint Arm. I
..II be subj .ion by >litical C
tive Committee, which shall t the ne< ry decisions.





of th.. ; Comi
in-Chief c. Join .11 cc
I by their . jo the
Joint A: - ed For
stion partici] . of bh
.
c in j res rces
.nt Command will be b a 1:
A S Armed For - Dry
.tes will in-Chief o:
.nt _'_:.. inclu . ; r present
tives of th le sigi atory >s.
. s 1 i rs in .:c^o^
The disposition o ... Joi I Forces in the
rritor of th bory states will be effected,, by
-ig th. ;, in accordance with the requlre-
its of their mutual defence.
FINAL' C .TQUS
on .- Conference of European Countries on Safe-
guarding European Pe tnd Security
Frc i May 11 to 1^ 9 1955? a second Conference of
Countries on £ _;nd
Security took r participation of
i People's Republic of Al' .opublic
of Bulgaria the ^ple's H ::.
aocratic Republic, the Pol ~ j .. Republic, the
Rumai- .public, the Union of Soviet Socialist
publics and tl lc public.
The C - by the following
re] s of the partici; ating Jt
Fc. sople's Republic of Alt.
hu, Chairman of the Council of .. jrs of the
ople*- ic of Albania ( . of th :_on) 5
ir I "._.. rst Vice-Chair of
the Council of Ministers anc 1 t r of National Defence;
Behar Sh Minister 01" Foreign . ..airsj
..• People 8 s Republic of Bui
Vylko C3 3V, Chairman of .cil of Ministers of
blic of Bulgaria .tion)
aeral Army Pyotr . ster of Dofen-_;
Minch, .chev 5 ..
For t iblicj
Council c . .
:traor< _' and . ilpotentlary of the








. Dr. : Deputy Prime Mini 3terj
y?
Lie tenant General Heinz ]
•ior; nd
Plenipo. ry of t alio in Poland;
olish. ] blic:
;z, Chs i i Council c ulsters
lish People c s ! .lie (] t nation);
1 of Po: ki, Vice-Cha.
of Council of Minis [ Kin ? of Nat:
Minister of ?orei
Affairs; Marian Naszkowski, Deputy Minister of Foreign
Affa!
3 Republic:
:ghe Gl ;hiu-Dej, C a c Council of Ministers
of ian People's Republic (] ion);
3.1 of the Army Bodnaras. Vice-Chairman of the
Council of Ministers and Minister of the Armed Forces;
hici, Minister of Foreign Affairs; Lieutenant
.1 Ion Tutoveanu, f Staff of the Armed Forces;
Gri irst E Minister of F ;n Affairs;
i Florea Ionescu, I dinary and Pleni-
po ten.- of tl republic in Poland;
For the U - of Soviet Socialist E lies:
N# A. Bu! m of the Council o .isters,
U.S.S.R. (head of the D on) ; V, M. Molotov, Fix
Vice-chairman of the Council of Ministers and Minister of
For :, U.S.S.R. j _. -1 of the Soviet Union
G. K. Zhukov, Minister c fence, U.S.S.R.; Marshal of
the Soviet I I. S. Y.onav, A. .. Puzanov, Chairman of
the Council of Minis . R.S.F.S.R.j N. T. Kale 3,
- of the Council of . Uki nian S.S.R.
;
K. T. Mazurov, Chairman of the Council o: bers,
-lorussian S.S.R. ; V. T. Lacis, Chairman of the Council
n S.S.R. ; M. A. Gedvilas, Ch ..-_ .n of
.1 of M .n: - srs, Li -ian S.S.R.; A. A. 'i-
sepp Chair le Council of Ministers, Estonian S.S.R.;
V. A. Zorln, Deputy M r of Foreign Affairs, U.S. S.I .




Fo:. . Czechoslov blic:
a Siroky, Pri: Ls >r of the Czechoslovak Republic
he De! _on) % ual of the Ai
picka, First Deputy Pri;
.-of Foreign Affairs.
The Conference dso . . . by an obs.
lese ?-.jple 8 s folic— of the











For this pui :.p, Ceo; -on
"by
.ople^s 1. )lic of ilic of
lie, the G
.lc Republic,, the Pol. _ s s Republic, t:
- of Soviet Socialii.
Rep- oslovi blic.
3 Con: rence ,-ision to set up a
Joi: . of the armed forces of the Tr
: Conf i in an atmos; of Cv.
lich r fri ndship t
coc\ - of tl rial peoples of the camp of peace,
de: and socialism.

Co.. f York iry 29, 1 956, p. ^3).
ras discussed
' com:. r in c f he
1 I. S. Konev. Lizati
problems cone orces
counti ned the Warsaw Treaty
,-e solved,
proposal of tl :ion of the (east) Germ
eratic Republic .t ion of the
itional peopled ) armed contingents be incor-
porated in the unifi ...ed forces was adopted.
It was resol - _ ter of ense
s German Democratic Republic (Willi Stoph) would become
3 of the a: commanders of : unified armed forces.
I ^er prov . Treaty stating th -
racting parties would consult each other on inter-
nal c:_ ions affect common interests, the
political -c ."sultative committee discussed the inter-
nal situation an r ached conclusions contained _ i
a d ion signed by repr .atives of members of t'
Wa: v.
It was decided .3 Political Consultative
Committee would me, ..:ver necessary, but at least
twice a year, to discuss cuestions arising from implemen-
;ion c : Warsaw Treaty. ".. be presided
over by representatives of each country in turn.
Subsidiary organizatioi lall be established and
will have their headquarters in Moscow. They are:
A standing commission ?ged with the task
of draftir recommendations concerning problems of fore., i
policy.
3. A ^oint secretariat composed of representatives
of all members of the Warsaw Treaty.







in Prague of the Political Co i Lve
set up in pursua - ..y 1^,
irsaw ;y states, to
of Soviet Sociali blics, Polish
ople's lublic, ;he Czechoslo" epublic, the Germ;..
..public, th -pie : s Republic, t
•.. People- People's Republic of
opie's blic of Albania, exchan
onal £ . iion and the question of
irity. They fully us
their appraisal both of t ie eneral international situa-
tion of the situation is arisen in Europe. Th
are li >us as "cc the measures t .re necessary
ier relaxation of inte .1 tension, settlement
of outstanc >roblems, and consolidation of
peace and security of Europe.
.; deep desire of th joples for peace has already
to substa] _ change. i srnational situation
id to a definite ea of tension in relations between
states. Mew ana hitherto unutilized oppc ities have
been revealed for i r vin rel :ions en cc Les
id promoting international cooperation, irrespective of
differences in social system. Th fectiveness has been
demonst;
. of the method of settling differences and
disputes between coun nee by force or the threat of
force, but oy negot .on, with due 2 3ct for the mutual
.eresus of the parties concerned. ; is for this reason
the recent meetings of leading state .. notably' the
Geneva rence of the Fou: .ds of Government, have
n of great positive value in creating a healthier inter-
mate generally and les.: ; the ;er of
3 : r
»
Interna in these past years have
she far fro. of
"ferences t ie policy of forming aggressive
blocs directed a. : pea. : countries, such as
3 bloc, the ;hdad bloc and the Southea.
tary bloc (Seato), only tends to .te such
causes still greater i ^national strain.
policy is an armaments race of unpre-
cedented scale, notably i . of \ lc, hydrogen,
nd other weapons of mass ruction. It has already





to be in th .ry blocs by c
by j or foul, such part-
_ :i involv .t
: to their .ng
'licts in Lt . ... .nvolve
colonial resubjugation of nations which,
as a result of per ;n of
colonial yoke ~.n<i ob—ned the opportunity to ..lop in
independ
It is not wit on that the policy of c: t .ng
military blocs and 3 production is
iiatic. ;e of
er collect. ffort
ace, and .1 coc ion b
on mutual i rial intu ".id sc gnty,
non-aggression, non-1] in the internal af:
of ot. ountries, equality and mutual . ace-
ful coexist irthered by ti
.icy on the par >f a m of st to pursue a
policy of non-participation in aggr re military blocs,
a policy of r, .lity.
by stat .
-y»
being conv! : support of such t jrengthens
i forces of :ens the foi .r.
They express th h the peoples of Asia
uphol .-itimate right to in-
snt n tio develc nt,
r full support
of the decisions of the B g Asi. ica Conference,
who* rticipants .2 .ion to up-
3 and progress and co
colonial system, another telling blow to ' hie]
victory of the le nd the establishment
of the People's Republic .na, x*hich is today a power-
ful b l els. of world - :anding part
. by India, Indonesia, Burma, Egypt
and other countries . T. h ir readiness to
facilitate th. n of the Bandung Conference
visions, includ .- onomic and cultural
cooperation o: ... of mutual ithou
,y politico _ military or other conditions.
tach espce.
import situation in Europ . jo the . sures
,0 safeguard .ty. In the ; nt
is di\ lly-op]
grou ting on an
.-easing scale, and . .
..to and ing . ..•;...-. ely sd,










lains rt $ French
people in .ctlons to the for'.
3nal coo] on, pe 1 settle. lent
of ou
, and Ling of the peac
ity of rorld.
3 Sov. ind, Czechoslo*
-ratio blic, Hi ] y, Rumania, Bulgaria and Alt
:d to coop .1 other
is in .n European security
Europe. T.
.;d to cont ;ir policy all-round
ooper.. th ..LI countries 9 b: , 11.
Thi iration springs p conviction
anoth. ould spell for the nations ..ori-
fice and d ion, primarily of countries co:v : nto
;t\ 'ie It s:: internal d :p-
of their countries,
whose peop'.- .c plans for raisii
tal living standar,. ting all-round economic
i cult velopment, is to enable the late.
achi its of so.. and technology to be plac_. at the
vice of man.
In cont: notion to the desire of the ble
.tes to conso. i security, certain circles in
West fe .laxation of international tension and
broader coope: : n among th „ey are plainly
seeking to foster a war psychosis and continue "cold
'," believing that only in h .y can they prevent the
disintegration of itary bloc i in
2..L'ope, and not only in Europe, mj .in th s drive
. ensure the further gro..~. 5 already high profits of
the ca] j monopoli..
.. , the ive elements in the-
re s^ ..oadly advertised milit
nd in: s , to frighten the peace-
Ltries and .
—
pel th incur excessive military
exp ure and curtail .r peaceful economic and cultural
;. They are < .1 of the growing strength of the
forces of peace, and of the growing prosperity of the
s nations.
All this ex;. s create one
-le after anc... r to agre
-, re- .em of redu. ;s
nning atomic jns, and refuse to disconti:.
.on.
The peoples of our countries, confident in their









-nt o- Europe ty,
. Warsaw Tr
h other .. .Is to
This object . » cone >n of
an agre -is nature first by soiue of the Euro
countries, includ: U.S.S.R,, C
-he Un: s by the
in Europe of a zone in which t] location of armed
forces would ent of the
counts. d. The is on this scor
by the British go\ : at the C neva Conference of
Fou: Gove: it might be id in this connec-
tion.
rthy i is the question of
ablishing such a special zon
.rope nclude both parts of Ger-
ny, and an to this effect.
Such an ag] ; provide for bhe ' t . al, or for
limitation of .,_' the . orces in both parts
of Gen ny, and for 1: contingents
blic and t
bli . ary control
to ensur - observance of the a it. Such an agr^
o a loi rds furtl. eion of
tension in Euro;: It would likewise create more favourable
conditions for the solution of man qi . - .en in
accordance with tfc f European security.
Pursuing tir policy of ts expansion,, the
•Atlantic bloc countries, in .st, pronounced
favor equi; . atomic "..^apons and
increasi- , of - o air forces in Europe by
i third. i purpose of this step
to ag vain i. rope, n s the r*ive,
i inci the a .tary bic his
is beir t t] le countri.
e aire rri sd c it i Leasures to
reduce rid mil it- is.
In the decision of the .-Atlantic bloc
ad the j
ee and atomic war, t
Jhis decision as inc.
ity. Th< .".at, pendin
ls, the e c c .eerned




of uly and Oc
lly t t] is connection, it
would be of value I jy sta
., and th on th
.e all i
.ely b; is.
Th- e of the opinion t
nt of con-
troversial is ;ive of
vrith one or other
military alliance, wou] ; for t
Th pplie: neighbouring
countries. ( aid be the
ent of good-neighc .tlons between the Sovi.
ion, 1 y, Bulgaria, Gr nia, I .o-
.blic. b value,
111 = uld be the »stabl mal re; .
~n countri. ich still do not maintain such re
f
ion to str . -
eurity and creatii ary confid . ..- ; the
European s ion of non jion
treati* . v i .< r
to settle all dispi .y hy peace ns.
The gov. -, Poland, Czecho-
the Ger: public, Hungary, Rumania,
Bulgaria and All . the. ion to dedi-
cate th j nob"., s j of promoting pea.
Th. - ;o join
with the other coui j con- 31 .mining the urgent
pro'- - arope. jurity and other out
incl. - -•.., ; bhe an
the s; ..tinue to display tl 8 n -
concern fo: teir security, and are det_ .
to do all - to protect the p . ul laboi
jzens, . the conditions for the peace
and prosperity of their p 3S.
People's ... lie of Albania!
j, b. . ;ku
.. ,le 8 s Republic of Bu ia»
R. r0V, P. PANCHI^VSKY
Hi -an Peo"ole*3 Republic:




J. CYRANKIEWICZ, K. ROKOSJ
Ru: public:
J. L.
Union of Soviet Socialist Republic...
V. MOLOTOV, G. ZHUKOV
Czechoslovj oublic:
A. CEPICKA, V. DAVID
Prague, C ,ry 28, 1956
II. E Secc lng of the Politic.!
-ltative Cc ;ee
current c__of the Soviet Press
. Vol. X,
, 2i~, July 2, ic ;p 6 16-19)
-.' OF CONFERENCE 0? WARSAW PACT COUNTRIES
DECLARATION OP THE WARSAW TREATY STATES. (Pravda and
Izv< , May 27, pp. 1-2. ,rds. Cond ,:)
Guided b of assuring pe .ce in Europe and
deve sful coo; .e'.ch i
primary task of th .nization, ;overn-
of the nian People 8 s Republic, tl rian
People »s Republic, th epublic, tl
German Democratic Republic, the Pol 5 s Republic,
Jnion of Sow socialist Republics and the Cz^ lovak
.blic called a ice of the Political Consultative
tes on May Zk, 1958,
to cor. • the intei bio -ion a: :>rk new
joint n ires to reduce int fcional ,ion.
... of views—in which observ from t
.blic also participated—confirmed tl
e gove ited at \zq
tig both . - the international s_
en peace.
b countries of the
socialist camp to develop :ional cooperation on
aceful co-exist
social systems, to settle dispu ;h ne^
between states and and ;he 3 :nd elimi-
:he th: of atomic war ber influence
on the . ;ate ;-rld.
i pants at t. . j not^ .on
at not only the so but also ehe majority













;y of Frier. , Coc
.ble pre securit; :ce
of the peoples of ;, but i a powerful
:. the activ leal to the cause of
of 7 alignments of ... rn powers, particu-
larly th North At Bloc ...
At present, NATO mi! ncies are dra . up new
plans for ; the armed f< . and military Li-
tures of these coun';: . se ..^nisters 8
co] nee in April, 1958 9 dj , b-
ling the armed fore Ameri nder
is fi .... i May 1 , 1958, the
pe .it NATO Council t .vision on suppl
jns to tho~ .-th Atlantic bloc
that have sucl sent. The go' nts
of a number of
.
coun —Britain, ie, I ;aly,
.rkey and others—made land avail, .'or Ameri c. ohing
sites for atoi lies and for :>ns
the jus p: cs of the peoples of
these cou: j
... Ltary jns in . . d public,
lose BundeJ 1 a _-osolutic- .G.R.
government to ed fc: with
nuclei missiles, are becoming particularly
;.s. Thus, th oi are
ihist
circles making territorial c is on other states.
ortir .cy of the P. G.R. and
tons and
U.S. goven ; is in f sneour se
circles to purs poll- volving
di.
At the same time, :en to enli ,st
many in the pro ^he li
types of .pons j one sue . is th se-
ment
' he P. G.R. on coop. on in
mill'. ion--
l quite •.'.. public
ive
shension est G ounterin
cc ....
One cannot t















Britain, F and other cole bo
int. ..n the trie.
as
are prepared once
:-in to sell c colonizers cour. .at have only
recently on the I ,nal 1
roarii si .ig
spilled in Jia, Algeria, Lebanon, Ye. in, f.
ponsible p; circl
olicy Lt by NATO,
•ting to grab up the natural
ones of these countries and throttle th 1 libera-
tion movement of tb iid Afri<
..rs
of other states. Just as ^r of 1957 storn clou^
? Syria, so today c ?ous "... ..ng
. .; this time the U.S.A., citing
_"ious r doctrine,"
re jecte . the As
forces into actio. ;t a people th .t ants only
to I .jter of its own ho—• and free from foreign dicta-
ht well ask who gave anyone the ht to
of 1 on other coi
such. The obvious
of the "Dull ... r doc. .
is of c hors have made
bold as to dec'.:. act openly. All this
hich, it would s
st, since this amounts
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movement, all countries opposing war, and all peace-loving
forces, to prevent a world war. In the interests of safe-
g peace it is extremely essential to remove the
vestiges of World War II by concluding a peace treaty with
both n states and thereby rendering harmless the focal
center oi" danger in West Berlin, making the latter a
demilitarized free city.
The Warsaw Pact states triumphantly declare that
they will continue undeviatingly to pursue a policy of
peaceful coexistence and are ready at any moment to under-
take the implementation of the broadest measures agreed
upon with other states for the purpose of ensuring peace
and the security of peoples.
V. Declaration of the Fifth Meeting of the Political
Consultative Committee
(from The Current Digest of the Soviet Press , Vol. XIV,
No. 23, July 4, 1962, pp. 4-5)
WARSAW PACT COMMITTEE SESSION
DECLARATION. (Pravda, June 10, p. 1. Complete text:) A
session of the Political Consultative Committee of the
Warsaw Pact member states was held in Moscow on June 7,
1962. Taking part in the session were:
from the Bulgarian People 1 s Republic—T. Zhivkov,
First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Bulgarian
Communist Party, and A. Yugov, Chairman of the Council of
Ministers of the Bulgarian People* s Republic;
from the Hungarian People's Republic—J. Kadar,
First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Hungarian
Socialist Workers 1 Party and Chairman of the Hungarian
Revolutionary Workers' and Peasants 1 Government;
from the German Democratic Republic—W. Ulbricht,
First Secretary of the Central Committee of the German
Socialist Unity Party and Chairman of the G.D.R. State
Council, and W. Stoph, Acting Chairman of the G.D.R.
Council of Ministers;
from the Polish People's Republic—W. Gomulka,
First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Polish
United Workers' Party, and J. Cyrankiewicz, Chairman of
the Council of Ministers of the Polish People's Republic;
from the Rumanian People's Republic—G. Gheorghiu-De j
,
First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Rumanian
Workers' Party and Chairman of the State Council of the
Rumanian People's Republic, and I. G. Maurer, Chairman of
the Council of Ministers of the Rumanian People's Republic;
from the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics—N. S.
Khrushchev, First Secretary of the Central Committee of
the C.P.S.U. and Chairman of the U.S.S.R. Council of
Ministers;
from the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic—A. Novotny,
First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Czechoslovak
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Communist Party and President of the Czechoslovak Socialist
Republic, and V. Siroky, Chairman of the Czechoslovak Re-
public Government.
The session of the Political Consultative Committee
heard a report by A. A. Gromyko, U.S.S.R. Minister of
Foreign Affairs, on the talks between the Soviet government
and the government of the United States on the question of
a German peace settlement. The participants exchanged
opinions on the Soviet-American talks and expressed full
approval of the Soviet stand on these talks, which is also
the general stand of the Warsaw Pact states.
It was unanimously affirmed that a German peace
settlement effected through the conclusion of a peace
treaty and the elimination on its basis of the occupation
regime in West Berlin and the creation of a free city of
West Berlin is in accord with the interests of European
security, and in equal measure with the interests of general
peace.
All the participants agreed on the necessity of
continuing talks between the governments of the U.S.S.R. and
the U.S.A. with the aim of further clarification of the
possibilities of finding a concerted solution to the prob-
lem.
At the same time the participants in the Political
Consultative Committee noted that during the course of the
talks it had become clear that the Western Powers desired
to delay an agreement artificially. This applies chiefly
to the main question—the necessity of withdrawing the
occupation forces of the three powers from West Berlin
and eliminating the occupation regime there. This indicates
that the Western powers are not prepared to seek a solution
on a mutually acceptable basis to the question of normalizing
the situation in West Berlin and eliminating the occupation
regime in that city.
Further talks should clarify whether the occupation
powers intend to continue avoiding a concerted solution to
the question of a German peace settlement or whether
they are prepared to adopt a mutually agreeable solution
to this question, to the normalization of the situation in
West Berlin and, consequently, a lessening of the dangerous
tension in Europe and the elimination of the threat of
armed clashes between the powers.
If the further talks indicate that procrastination
is a deliberate policy of the Western powers, indicating
their unwillingness to seek a concerted solution to the
task of a German peace settlement and the solution in this
connection of a number of questions considered during the
Soviet-American exchange of views, the Warsaw Pact member
states will be obliged to draw the appropriate conclusions.
The participants in the Political Consultative
Committee declare unanimously that the unwillingness of
the Western powers to cooperate in eliminating the vestiges
of World War II will not deter the states that fought against
Hitlerite Germany and that now stand for the conclusion of
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a peace treaty with Germany from signing such a treaty with
German Democratic Republic, with all the ensuing conse-
quences for West Berlin, which would be considered a free,
demilitarized city.
The Warsaw Pact member states declare that, as
before, they stand for solving peacefully, through negotia-
tions, the problems that divide states, and they hope that
the Western powers will also adopt this sober approach to
solving these problems. In the event that the answer to
their peaceful policy is in the form of actions directed
against the interests of their security, against the
sovereign rights of the German Democratic Republic and
ainst the interests of peace, they are determined to
defend their security in a worthy manner and to defend
peace with all the means at their disposal.
VI. Communique of the Sixth Meeting of the Political
Consultative Committee
(Cf. Pravda , July 28, 1963, pg. 1 and U.S. Congress,
Senate, The Warsaw Pact: Its Role in Soviet Bloc Affairs,
pp. 4-5-ij-ol
The 450-word Communique of the Political Consulta-
tive Committee meeting on July 26, 1963. included little
of substance. It stated only that questions concerning
the size and strength of the Pact forces were discussed,
that Marshal Grechko presented a report, that decisions
were made on the basis of his report, and that the pro-
ceedings were conducted in an atmosphere of complete
accord by the participants.
The most significant representatives of the coun-
tries attending were:
Bulgaria: Todor Zhivkov, First Secretary
, Bul-
garian Communist Party; Chairman, Council of Ministers;
Czechoslovakia: Antonin Novotny, First Secretary,
Czechoslovak Communist Party;
East Germany: Walter Ulbricht, First Secretary,
Socialist Unity Party; Chairman, Council of State;
Hungary: Janos Kadar, First Secretary, Hungarian
Socialist Workers 1 Party; Premier;
Poland: Wladyslaw Gomulka, First Secretary, Polish
United Workers* Party;
Rumania: Georghe Gheorghiu-De j , First Secretary,
Rumanian Workers' Party; Chairman, Council of State;
USSR: Nikita Khrushchev, First Secretary, Communist
Party of the Soviet Union; Chairman, Council of Ministers.
VII. Communique of the Seventh Meeting of the Political
Consultative Committee
(from The Current Digest of the Soviet Press
. Vol. XVII,




COMMUNIQUE ON SESSION OF POLITICAL CONSULTATIVE COMMITTEE
OF WARSAW TREATY STATES. (Pravda, Jan. 22, p. 1. Complete
text:) The Political Consultative Committee of the partners
to the Warsaw Treaty on Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual
Aid, which was in session in Warsaw on Jan. 19 and 20, 196^+,
discussed the new situation arising in connection with the
plans of several North Atlantic Pact states to form a NATO
multilateral nuclear force, as well as the possible conse-
quences for the world that a realization of these plans
would entail.
The major tendency of the present-day development
of international events is a growth of the forces that
favor the preservation and strengthening of peace. The
might of the socialist countries, which consistently pur-
sue a peace-loving policy, is growing constantly. The
Communist Parties and popular masses of the states of
Europe and other countries fight resolutely for improvement
in the international atmosphere. The independent states
of Asia, Africa and Latin America actively contribute to
the strengthening of peace.
At the same time, Imperialist forces manifest con-
siderable energy and stubbornness in their attempts to
aggravate the international atmosphere in various regions
of the world. The hostile policy of the U.S A„ against
the Rupublic of Cuba has not ceased. The dangerous pro-
vocations of the U.S.A. against the Democratic Republic of
Vietnam continue. This aggressive policy is resolutely
condemned by the Warsaw Treaty states, as well as all other
socialist countries.
The imperialist forces interfere in the domestic
affairs of independent states and use methods of economic,
military and political pressure. They use their military
grouping for the suppression of national-liberation move-
ments. Examples are provided by the continuing war against
the people of South Vietnam, the intervention in the Congo
and the aggressive actions of the colonialists in Malaysia.
The Warsaw Treaty states declare their solidarity with the
peoples who are fighting for their freedom and independence
or for the strengthening of their independence.
The plans for creating a NATO multilateral nuclear
force are to play a special role in implementing the
aggressive policy of imperialism. The Warsaw Treaty states
regard the plans for creating a NATO multilateral nuclear
force, which are favored by the ruling circles of the U.S.A.
and of West Germany, as a grave threat to peace in Europe
and the world over The formation of a multilateral nuclear
force in any form would mean a proliferation of nuclear
weapons and, in particular, the presentation of these
weapons to the West German militarists.
This applies to the U.S. plan for a multilateral
nuclear force, supported by the F.R.G., as well as to the
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British plan for an "Atlantic nuclear force." Both variants
are incompatible with the desires of the peoples and of the
peace-loving states, which favor a cessation of the nuclear
arms race, elimination of the threat of nuclear war and
the realization of general and complete disarmament. They
are incompatible with the efforts of many states toward
creating nuclear-free zones in various regions of the world.
A NATO multilateral nuclear force aims at the con-
solidation of a separate American-West German bloc within
the North Atlantic Alliance. It is a sort of a deal,
through which the U.S.A. wants to ensure its military and
political hegemony in Western Europe and the F.R.G., in
return for its willingness to support this American line,
will gain access to nuclear weapons.
F.R.G. access to nuclear weapons, whether within
the framework of the "multilateral" or the "Atlantic"
nuclear force, is viewed by the West German militarists
merely as a step on the way to obtaining their own nuclear
weapons.
When the F.R.G. became a member of the North Atlantic
Pact, it gained an opportunity to create, in violation of
the Potsdam Agreements concluded after the unconditional
surrender of Hitlerite Germany, an aggressive military
force. Access to nuclear weapons would undoubtedly stimulate
the desire of the West German revanchist forces to change
the situation that came about in Europe after the end of
the second world war and to realize territorial claims upon
the German Democratic Republic and other states. No as-
surances from the Western powers can serve as a guarantee
against this threat to peace.
The true intentions of the F.R.G. are indicated by
facts such as the provocational plan, proposed by the
leadership of the Bundeswehr, for creating an atomic-mine
belt along the eastern frontiers and by the announcement
of the so-called "front-line strategy," which requires the
use of nuclear weapons from the very outset of any military
conflict in Central Europe. This attests to the desires
of the F.R.G. revanchist forces to make the U.S.A. and other
NATO countries party to their adventurous plans.
But any attempts to effect the West German revanchist
demands with the help of nuclear weapons are of the greatest
danger to the German people, because such attempts would
inevitably lead to a nuclear war, resulting not in the
reunification of Germany but in its reduction to an atomic
desert.
The Warsaw Treaty states resolutely oppose giving
nuclear weapons to the Federal Republic of Germany in any
form whatever—directly or indirectly, through groupings
of states, for its exclusive use or in any form of parti-
cipation in the use of these weapons.
The Warsaw Treaty states fully support the peace-
loving policy of the German Democratic Republic and consider
that participation by the Federal Republic of Germany in
creating a NATO multilateral nuclear force to mean that
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the F.R.G. government is writing off the unification of
Germany. A relaxation of tension and effective agreements
on disarmament in Germany and in Europe are the only ways
to create conditions for the unification of the two existing
sovereign and equal German states in the spirit of the
principles of the Potsdam Agreements.
The formation of a NATO multilateral nuclear force
is aimed not only against the interests of peace and
security in Europe. It would also increase imperialist
and neocolonialist pressure on the newly liberated peoples
and those fighting for their independence.
The basic interests of all peoples demand a renun-
ciation of the plans for creating a NATO multilateral
nuclear force. But if the NATO states, acting contrary to
the interests of peace, realize their plans for creating
a multilateral nuclear force, no matter in what form this
may be done, then the Warsaw Treaty states, faced with the
grave dangers this would entail for peace and security in
Europe, will be compelled to take the necessary defensive
measures to ensure their security.
The chief goal of the policy of the Warsaw Treaty
states is to ensure peaceful conditions for building social-
ism and communism in their countries and for the liberation
of mankind from the threat of a nuclear world war through
the joint efforts of all the peace-loving peoples.
The Soviet Union and the other Warsaw Treaty states
have submitted a whole series of proposals for improving
the international situation. The Warsaw Treaty states
will continue to support measures leading toxrard an easing
of international tension and the creation of favorable
conditions for a cessation of the arms race and the attain-
ment of general and complete disarmament
The Political Consultative Committee of the Warsaw
Treaty states considers that an urgent demand of our time
is to ensure European security, which is threatened by the
plans for creating a multilateral nuclear force. This goal
would be served by the realization of the proposal for
freezing nuclear armaments and the proposal for creating
an atom-free zone in Central Europe.
Supporting the initiative of the Polish People*
s
Republic, the Political Consultative Committee proposes
the convocation of a conference of European states to
discuss measures ensuring collective security in Europe.
The Warsaw Treaty states remain willing to conclude
a non-aggression pact with the NATO states that would
greatly contribute to a relaxation of tension in Europe
and the world over.
The Warsaw Treaty states support the efforts toward
attaining a German peace settlement in the interests of
ensuring peace in Europe. The attainment of this goal
would be furthered by legal recognition of the existing
frontiers, the. liquidation of the remnants of the second
world war and pledges by the two German states not to add




The Political Consultative Committee of the Warsaw
Treaty states also supports the proposal of the G.D.R. that
the two German states renounce nuclear weapons.
The Warsaw Treaty states support the proposal of
the government of the Chinese People's Republic for calling
a conference of world heads of state on the complete pro-
hibition and complete destruction of nuclear x\Teapons and,
as a first step, on prohibiting the use of these weapons.
The Warsaw Treaty states also support the convoca-
tion of a world conference on disarmament, which was pro-
posed by the Cairo conference of nonaligned states.
The Political Consultative Committee declares that
the socialist countries are in complete unity and solidarity
in the face of the imperialist threat and that any attempts
by imperialist circles to undermine this solidarity are
doomed to failure.
The Warsaw Treaty states will continue to exert
their efforts toward universally contributing to a relaxa-
tion of tension, to disarmament, to peaceful coexistence
and to ensuring a peaceful future to all the peoples.
Warsaw, Jan. 20, 19&5.
VIII. Communique, Declaration on European Security, and
Statement on Vietnam of the Eighth Meeting of the
Political Consultative Committee
(Communique from New Times , No. 29, July 20, 1966, pp. 31-32;
Declaration and Statement from The Current Digest of the
Soviet Press , Vol. XVIII, No. 27, July 27, 1966, pp. 3-8)
COMMUNIQUE
on the Meeting of the Warsaw Treaty Political Consultative
Committee
A meeting of the Political Consultative Committee
of the member nations of the Warsaw Treaty of Friendship,
Co-operation and Mutual Assistance was held from July b
to 6, i960, in Bucharest.
The meeting was attended:
For the People's Republic of Bulgaria—by Todor
Zhivkov, First Secretary, CC, Bulgarian Communist Party,
and Chairman of the Council of Ministers; Stanko Todorov,
Political Bureau member, CC BCP, and Deputy Chairman of
the Council of Ministers; Ivan Bashev, member, CC BCP, and
Minister of Foreign Affairs; General of the Army Dobri
Jurov, member, CC BCP, and Minister of National Defence;
Ivan Popov, Deputy Foreign Minister; Colonel General
Atanas Semerjiyev, alternate member, CC BCP, and Chief
of General Staff; and Georgl Bogdanov, member of the
Central Auditing Commission of the BCP and Ambassador to
the Socialist Republic of Rumania;
For the Hungarian People's Republic—by Janos Kadar,
First Secretary, CC, Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party;
Gyula Kallai, Political Bureau member, CC HSWP, and
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Chairman of the Hungarian Revolutionary Worker and Peasant
Government; Colonel General Lajos Czinege, alternate
Political Bureau member, CC HSWP, and Minister of National
Defence; and Janos Peter, Minister of Foreign Affairs;
For the German Democratic Republic—by Walter
Ul orient, First Secretary, CC, Socialist Unity Party of
Germany, and Chairman of the State Council of the G.D.R.;
Willi Sto ph, Political Bureau member, CC SUPG, and Chairman
of the Council of Ministers; Erich Honecker, Political
Bureau member, CC SUPG, and Secretary, CC SUPG; Hermann
Axen, alternate Political Bureau member, CC SUPG, and
Secretary, CC SUPG; Gerhard Weiss, Deputy Chairman of the
Council of Ministers; Otto Winzer, member, CC SUPG, and
Minister of Foreign Affairs; and General of the Army Heinz
Hoffman, member, CC SUPG, and Minister of Defence;
For the Polish People's Republic—by Wladyslaw
Gomulka, First Secretary, CC, Polish United Workers 1 Party;
Jozef Cyrankiewicz, Political Bureau member, CC PUWP,
and Chairman of the Council of Ministers; Zenon Kliszko,
Political Bureau member, CC PUWP, and Secretary, CC PUWP;
Adam Rapacki, Political Bureau member, CC PUWP, and Minister
of Foreign Affairs; Marshal Marian Spychalski, Political
Bureau member, CC PUWP, and Minister of National Defence;
Marian Naszkowski, member, CC PUWP, and Deputy Foreign
Minister; and Lieutenant General Wojcech Jaruzelskl, member,
CC PUWP, Deputy Minister of National Defence and Chief
of General Staff;
For the Socialist Republic of Rumania—by Nicolae
Ceausescu, General Secretary, CC, Rumanian Communist Party;
Ion Gheorghe Maurer, Executive and Permanent Presidium
member, CC RCP, and Chairman of the Council of Ministers;
Paul Niculescu-Mizil, Executive and Permanent Presidium
member and Secretary, CC RCP; General of the Army Leontin
Salajan, Executive member, CC RCP, and Minister of Armed
Forces; Mihal Dalea, Secretary, CC RCP; and Corneliu
Manescu, member, CC RCP, and Minister of Foreign Affairs;
For the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics—by
L. I. Brezhnev, General Secretary, CC, Communist Party
of the Soviet Union; A. N. Kosygin, Political Bureau
member, CC CPSU, and Chairman of the Council of Ministers;
A. A. Gromyko, member, CC CPSU, and Minister of Foreign
Affairs; Marshal of the Soviet Union R. Y. Malinovsky,
member, CC CPSU, and Minister of Defence; K. V. Rusakov,
member of the Central Auditing Commission of the CPSU
and assistant department head, CC CPSU; and A. V. Basov,
member, CC CPSU, and Ambassador to the Socialist Republic
of Rumania;
For the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic--by Antonin
Novotny, First Secretary, CC, Communist Party of Czecho-
slovakia, and President of the C.S.R. ; Jozef Lenart,
Presidium member, CC CPC, and Chairman of the Government;
Otakar Simunek, Presidium member, CC CPC, and Deputy
Chairman of the Government; Vaclav David, member, CC CPC,
and Minister of Foreign Affairs; and General of the Army
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Bogumir Lomsky, member, CC CPC, and Minister of National
Defence.
The Commander-in-Chief of the Warsaw Treaty Joint
Armed Forces, Marshal of the Soviet Union A. A. Grechko,
took part in the meeting.
A broad exchange of views was held during the meet-
ing on the problems of peace and security in Europe. The
member nations of the Warsaw Treaty of Friendship, Co-
operation and Mutual Assistance represented at the meeting
of the Political Consultative Committee adopted a Declara-
tion on Strengthening Peace and Security in Europe.
The meeting discussed the situation created by the
U.S. aggression in Vietnam, with special reference to the
latest criminal acts of the U.S. armed forces, calculated
to extend the war against the Vietnamese people.
The states represented at the meeting unanimously
adopted a Statement on the U.S. Aggression in Vietnam.
The meeting of the Political Consultative Committee
was held in an atmosphere of fraternal friendship and
complete mutual understanding which contributed towards
further strengthening the unity and co-operation among
the socialist countries.
Bucharest, July 6, 1966
WARSAW ALLIANCE DECLARATION ON EUROPEAN SECURITY
DECLARATION ON STRENGTHENING PEACE AND SECURITY IN EUROPE.
(Pravda and Izvestia, July 9, pp. 1-2. Complete test:)
The People's Republic of Bulgaria, the Hungarian People's
Republic, the German Democratic Republic, the Polish
People's Republic, the Socialist Republic of Rumania, the
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Czechoslovak
Socialist Republic—the member states of the Warsaw Treaty
of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Aid represented at
the Bucharest conference of the Political Consultative
Committee—adopt the following Declaration:
I.
The ensuring of lasting peace and security in Europe
accords with the ardent desires of all peoples of the
European continent and with the interests of universal
peace.
The peoples of Europe, who have made and are making
an immense contribution to the cause of the progress of
mankind, can and must create in that part of the world a
climate of detente and international mutual understanding
that will make it possible to utilize in full measure the
material and spiritual resources of each people, of each
country in conformity with their will and decision.
The state of the relations between the European
countries exerts a great influence on the state of affairs
throughout the world. It should not be forgotten that two
world wars, which cost tens of millions of human lives and
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caused vast devastation, arose on the European continent.
The problem of European security did not arise
today or yesterday. Half a century ago it was placed on
the agenda with the outbreak of World War I. It rose before
the peoples in all its vital significance two decades later,
when Europe and the world came face to face with a brutal
fascism that crushed one country after another under its
feet.
The peoples who entered the mortal combat imposed
on them were inspired by the hope that they were fighting
the last world war.
In 19^5 the goal of ensuring European security appeared
close; the roads to it seemed open. German fascism had
been defeated and was awaiting judgment. Justice was
celebrating victory. The peoples who had just lived through
a war of unprededented savagery with Hitler's Germany were
demanding that everything possible be done to prevent the
forces of militarism and aggression from ever again dis-
rupting the peaceful life and creative labor of the present
and future generations.
The Potsdam Agreement, which crowned the allied
relations of the powers of the anti-Hitler coalition, pro-
claimed a broad program, aimed at the future, for establish-
ing peace. For the first time in history Europe had a
real chance of solving the problem of its own security.
It was generally recognized that the chief condition for
security in Europe was to prevent a resurgence of German
militarism and Nazism and to ensure that Germany would
never again threaten its neighbors or the preservation of
peace throughout the world. Nor was there any disagreement
that the fulfillment of this chief condition called for
honest and friendly cooperation among the states of Europe,
among all states interested in the preservation of European
and universal peace.
But events did not justify these aspirations. The
hopes of the peoples of Europe did not materialize, their
desire for a life free of the fear of war has not been
realized to this day. The responsibility for this devolves
on the powers which immediately after the defeat of the
German aggressors renounced the cooperation that had been
forged in the great anti-Hitler coalition, which did not
follow the common path of building peace in Europe and,
moreover, became themselves the bearers of an aggressive
policy.
Now, two decades after the end of World War II, its
consequences have not yet been liquidated in Europe; there
is no German peace treaty, there are hotbeds of tension,
abnormal situations in the relations between states.
The socialist states that have signed the present
Declaration believe that if this situation is to be elimi-
nated and a firm foundation is to be laid for peace and
security in Europe, relations between states must proceed
from the renunciation of the threat of force or the use
of force, from recognition of the need to solve international
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disputes only through peaceful means, on the principles of
sovereignty and national independence, of equality and
noninterference in domestic affairs, on respect for ter-
ritorial inviolability. The European states must strive
for the adoption of effective measures for preventing the
danger of the outbreak of armed conflict in Europe and for
strengthening European collective security. The realiza-
tion of the common desire of all European nations pre-
supposes the responsibility of and a contribution from
each state, big or small, irrespective of its social and
political system, in establishing worthy cooperation between
sovereign, independent and equal states.
In the opinion of the states participating in the
present conference, today's situation requires of all the
peoples of Europe, of all peace-loving forces even greater
determination and vigor in the struggle for strengthening
peace and security in Europe.
II.
One of the decisive features of the present-day
international situation is the growth of the forces that
favor the preservation and strengthening of peace. Against
the Imperialist policy of aggression and for ensuring the
security of peoples are resolutely ranged the socialist
states with their vast economic, political and military
might, the international working class headed by its
Communist Parties, the national-liberation movement, the
new states that have attained independence in the last few
years, the progressive and democratic forces of the whole
world. Tendencies are increasingly arising and developing
in Europe toward liquidating the sediment of the cold war
and the obstacles standing in the way of the normal develop-
ment of all-European cooperation, toward solving disputed
issues through mutual understanding, toward the normali-
zation of international life and the rapprochement of
peoples.
This course is opposed by imperialist reactionary
circles, which, pursuing aggressive goals, are striving to
fan tensions, to poison relations between European states.
A direct threat to peace in Europe and the security
of the European peoples is presented by the present policy
of the United States of America, that same policy which in
another part of the world—Southeast Asia—has already led
to the unleashing of an aggressive war against the Viet-
namese people and which in recent years has more than once
exacerbated relations between states to the point of
international crises. The United States interferes in the
domestic affairs of other states, violates the sacred right
of each people to decide its own destiny, resorts to colo-
nial repressions and armed interventions, stages plots in
various parts of Asia, Africa and Latin America, and every-






There can be no doubt whatsoever that the goals of
U.S. policy in Europe have nothing in common with the
vital interests of the European peoples, with the tasks
of Europe's security. The American ruling circles would
like to impose their will on their allies in Western Europe
with a view to making Western Europe a tool of the global
policy of the U.S.A., which is based on a desire to halt
or even turn back the historical process of the national
and social liberation of peoples. Hence the attempts to
draw some West European states into military ventures
even in other regions of the world, in particular Asia.
The aggressive circles of the U.S.A. , which are
supported by the reactionary forces of Western Europe, are
trying, with the help of the North Atlantic military bloc
and the war machine it has created, to deepen ever further
the division of Europe, to fan the arms race, to increase
international tension and to frustrate the establishment
and development of normal ties between the West European
and East European states.
In pursuit of these ends, which are alien to the
genuine interests of the security of the European peoples,
troops of the United States are still kept in Europe, their
military bases are located in West European countries,
stockpiles of nuclear weapons are being created, nuclear
submarines are sent to the seas that wash Europe, the
American Sixth Fleet sails in the Mediterranean Sea and
planes carrying nuclear bombs fly in the skies over
European countries.
The policy pursued by the U.S.A. in Europe in the
postwar decades is all the more dangerous for the European
peoples in that it is increasingly based on collusion with
the militarist and revanchist forces of West Germany.
These forces are directly prodding the U.S.A. to a still
more dangerous course in Europe.
This policy finds its expression in the projected
creation of a sort of alliance between the American imperial-
ists and the West German revanchists.
The militarist and revanchist forces of West Germany
refuse to consider the vital interests of the German people
themselves and are pursuing aggressive goals that manifest
themselves in all their actions in the switching of the
country's economic potential to military rails, in the
creation of a 500, 000-strong Bundeswehr, in the glorifi-
cation of the history of German conquests, and in the
nurturing of hatred against other peoples, whose lands are
again coveted by the above-mentioned circles of the Federal
Republic of Germany.
At present this policy is focused on the demand for
nuclear weapons. In the F.R.G. the creation of a scientific-
technological and industrial base that could at some time
serve for the production of its own atomic and hydrogen
bombs is being openly and secretly pushed. The combined
efforts of the peace-loving countries and peoples have so
far succeeded in delaying the creation of a joint NATO
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nuclear force that would give the P.R.G. access to nuclear
weapons. However, plans to this effect have not been
abandoned.
The fundamental interests of all peoples demand the
renunciation of plans for creating a NATO multilateral
nuclear force. But if the NATO members, acting in disregard
of the interests of peace, embark on the path of implement-
ing the plans for creating a multilateral nuclear force or
for giving West Germany access to nuclear weapons in any
form whatsoever, in that case the Warsaw Treaty member-
states, faced with the grave consequences that this would
entail for the cause of peace and security in Europe, would
be compelled to carry out the necessary defensive measures
to ensure their security.
The territorial demands of the West German revanchists
must be decisively rejected. They are totally unfounded
and hopeless. The question of the frontiers in Europe
has been solved finally and irrevocably, and the peoples
of Europe will know how to bar the path to revanchism.
One of the chief conditions for ensuring European
security is the inviolability of the existing borders
between the European states, including the borders of the
sovereign German Democratic Republic, Poland and Czecho-
slovakia. The states represented at this conference reaf-
firm their resolve to crush any aggression against them
on the part of the forces of imperialism and reaction.
The Warsaw Treaty member-states declare for their
part that they have no territorial claims with respect
to any state in Europe.
The policy of revanchism and militarism pursued
by German imperialism has always suffered bankruptcy.
Given the present correlation of forces in the world
arena and in Europe, it not only will fail to bring any
advantages or benefits to the P.R.G. but is fraught with
irreparable consequences for the Federal Republic of
Germany.
The interests of peace and security in Europe and
in the whole world, like the interests of the German people,
demand that the ruling circles of the Federal Republic
of Germany take into account the actually existing situa-
tion in Europe. And this means that they must proceed
from the fact of the existence of two German states,
renounce their claims for the redraxtfing of the map of
Europe, their claims to the exclusive right to represent
the whole of Germany and the attempts to exert pressure
on states that recognize the German Democratic Republic,
renounce the criminal Munich diktat and recognize that it
has been invalid from the very beginning. They must prove
in deeds that they are really taking the lessons of history
to heart, are putting an end to militarism and revanchism
and will pursue a policy of normalizing relations between
states and developing cooperation and friendship among
peoples.
The German Democratic Republic, which is an important

3-4?
1 actor in ensuring peace in Europe, has addressed construc-
tive proposals to the F.R.G. government and the Bundestag!
to renounce nuclear arras on a reciprocal basis, to reduce
the armies of both German states, to pledge not to use
force against each other, to sit down at a table and confer
on the solution of urgent national questions of interest
to both the G.D.R. and the F.R.G. However, the F.R.G.government has displayed no interest in these proposals.
The states that have signed the present Declaration supoort
the above-mentioned initiative of the G.D.R.
Having comprehensively reviewed the present situationin Europe and weighed the basic factors determining its
development, the states represented at the conference
arrived at the conclusion that in Europe, where almost half
of the states are socialist, there are chances for pre-
venting an undesirable development of events. The problem
of European security can be solved through the joint efforts
of all the European states, of all social forces that are
for peace, regardless of their ideological views and re-
ligious and other persuasions. The more quickly the in-
fluence of the forces that would like to continue kindling
tension in relations between European states is paralyzed,
the more successfully will this task be solved.
In the postwar years it has more than once been
possible to thwart plans aimed at undermining peace in
Europe. Of decisive importance in this have been the
unity and solidarity of the European socialist states,
of all the countries of socialism, their pursuit of a
peace-loving foreign policy while maintaining vigilance
with respect to potential violators of peace, their wil-
lingness to cooperate with all states that are ready to
make their contibution to the strengthening of European
security. The efforts of the working class of the West
European countries, of its advanced detachments, of demo-
cratic progressive organizations and the movement of peace
partisans, which mold the public opinion of the broad
working masses, are directed with all vigor to the same
end.
A major factor that is increasingly complicating
the implementation of military ventures in Eurooe is the
growing influence of forces in the West European states
that are aware of the need to rise above differences in
political views and convictions and to take steps toward
a relaxation of international tension, toward the all-
round development of mutually advantageous relations among
all the states of Europe without discrimination, toward
the complete independence of their countries and the
preservation of their national identities.
The states that have signed the present Declaration
note as a positive phenomenon the presence in the Federal
Republic of Germany of circles that oppose revanchism and
militarism, demand the establishment of normal relations
with the countries of both West and East, including normal
relations between the two German states, and strive for a
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relaxation of International tension and the ensuring of
European security so that all Germans may enjoy the blessings
of pence.
The influence of those who are for peace and security
in Europe is becoming more marked each day, while the propo-
nents of an aggressive course are beginning to lose their
positions. More and more European countries and peoples
are corning to understand the real source of the threat to
each of them and to Europe as a whole and what is needed
to protect the security of all European states.
The participants in the conference proceed from the
premise that each European state is called upon to play a
worthy role in international affairs and to become a full-
fledged partner in building in Europe a system of relations
between peoples and relations between states whereby the
security of each would at the same time be the security
of all. The European states are capable of solving questions
of the relations among them without outside interference.
The socialist countries believe that one of the basic
conditions for the realization of European security is the
affirmation and development of normal relations between
states based on observance of the principles of sovereignty
and national independence, equality, noninterference in
internal affairs and mutual advantage. The situation in
Europe proves that, despite various obstacles, these prin-
ciples are being more and more broadly recognized as a
reasonable basis for cooperation between peoples and for
improving the international situation.
It is very important to strengthen political relations
between states, regardless of their social systems, aimed
at the defense of peace.
The European countries, bound by traditional trade
relations, can only gain from the development of their
economic cooperation on a reciprocal basis. A broadening
of economic relations between European states, and the
elimination of the discrimination and obstacles existing
in this area, is an especially important factor for rap-
prochement and for the establishment of an atmosphere of
trust and mutual understanding among peoples. The develop-
ment of economic relations among European countries makes
it possible to broaden their trade with partners in other
parts of the world. These relations, together with the
all-round development of scientific, technical and cultural
cooperation which makes possible the better mutual ac-
quaintance of peoples, may provide as they develop a mate-
rial base for European security and for the strengthening
of peace throughout the world.
Despite all the differences in social-political
systems, ideologies and political views, the European states
and peoples have a common cause, conforming to the vital
national interests of all— it is the task of preventing a





The states that have signed the present Declarationbelieve that the situation as it is now developing demands
of all European states vigorous actions toward strengthen-ing European peace.
The governments of the European states cannot rely
on the soothing assurances of those who are hatching plans
of aggression, cannot take on faith the declarations of
those who want to revise the results of World War II while
claiming that they need nuclear weapons for their own
security, cannot remain passive, thereby willingly or
unwillingly encouraging the forces that are preparing for
Europe the fate of being a springboard for a devastating
nuclear conflict.
Conscious of their lofty responsibility before the
peoples, the governments of the European states must under-
take steps capable of ensuring a turn tox^ard a relaxation
°f tension in Europe, the strengthening of security andthe development of peaceful mutually advantageous coopera-
tion among the European states.
This is not. the first time Europe has been confronted
with this task. The first and second world wars were pre-
pared by the aggressive forces in deep secrecy, under the
cover of deceptive declarations about peaceful intentions.
A gigantic apparatus of propaganda and misinformation was
used each time to lull the vigilance of the peoples. The
peoples' eyes did open, but not before millions of people
were already dying, and flourishing cities and villages
lay in ruins. This cannot be permitted to happen for a
third time— in the age of nuclear energy and mighty rockets.
The countries participating in: the conference resolute-
ly favor the speediest implementation of constructive meas-
ures for strengthening security in Europe. They are con-
vinced that in present-day conditions it is actually possible
to undertake such steps. To this end they are ready to
cooperate with other states.
The creation of stable guarantees for the cause of
peace and security in Europe is an important task demanding
the participation of all European states, the patient and
constructive discussion of points of view with the aim of
reaching decisions that would enjoy general approval.
The European socialist countries have repeatedly
submitted well-grounded proposals constituting a concrete
program of action.
The states that have signed the Declaration believe
that measures for strengthening security in Europe can and




The states participating in the conference
appeal to all European states to develop good-neighbor
relations on the basis of the principles of independence
and national sovereignty, non-interference in internal
affairs and mutual advantage—on the basis of the principles
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of the peaceful coexistence of states with different social
systems. Proceeding from this premise, they favor the
strengthening of economic and trade ties and the multipli-
cation of contacts and forms of cooperation in the fields of
science, technology, culture and art, as viell as in other
fields that provide new opportunities for the cooperation
of European countries.
There is no field of peaceful cooperation where the
European states could not find opportunities for undertaking
further mutually advantageous steps.
The development of all-European cooperation demands
from all European states the renunciation of any kind of
discrimination and pressure, whether it be economic or
political in nature, aimed against other countries, equal
cooperation among them and the establishment of normal
relations between them, including the establishment of
normal relations with both German states.
The establishment and development of good-neighbor
relations between European states that have different
social systems could intensify their economic and cultural
ties and thus increase the possibilities of the European
states for making an effective contribution to the cause of
the improvement of the atmosphere in Europe and the develop-
ment of mutual confidence and respect.
Second . The socialist countries have always consist-
ently stood against the division of the world into military
blocs and alliances and for the elimination of the dangers
for universal peace and security stemming from this.
In reply to the formation of the military aggressive
NATO grouping and to the inclusion in it of West Germany,
the Warsaw Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual
Aid—a defensive pact of sovereign and equal states that
is an instrument for the defense of the security of the
treaty's member-states and of peace in Europe—was concluded.
But the members of the Warsaw Treaty have been and
are of the opinion that the military blocs imposed by the
imperialist forces and the presence of military bases on
the territories of other states constitute an obstacle to
cooperation among states. The security and progress of
each European country can be genuinely guaranteed not by
the existence of military groupings, which do not correspond
to the present-day healthy tendencies of international life,
but by the establishment in Europe of an effective security
system based on relations of equality and mutual respect
among all the states of the continent, on the joint efforts
of all the European nations,,
The countries that have signed the present Declara-
tion believe that the necessity for measures toward the
easing first of all of military tension in Europe has
become ripe. A radical way to achieve this would be the
simultaneous dissolution of the existing military alliances,
and the present situation makes this possible. The govern-
ments of our states have pointed out more than once that
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should the North Atlantic alliance halt its activities the
Warsaw Treaty will become invalid, and that the two would
be replaced by a system of European security. They now
formally reaffirm their readiness for the simultaneous
liquidation of the above-mentioned alliances.
If, however, the members of the North Atlantic alli-
ance are not yet ready for the simultaneous dissolution of
the two groupings, the states that have signed the present
Declaration consider it feasible even now to reach agree-
ment on the liquidation of the military organizations of
both the North Atlantic pact and the Warsaw Treaty. At
the same time they declare that as long as the North Atlan-
tic bloc exists and the aggressive Imperialist circles
jeopardize peace throughout the world, the socialist
countries represented at the conference, maintaining high
vigilance, are fully resolved to strengthen their might
and defense capability. At the same time we consider it
necessary that all the member-states of the North Atlantic
pact and the Warsaw Treaty, as well as countries that do
not participate in any military alliance, undertake bilateral
and multilateral efforts to advance the cause of European
security.
Third
. At present it is also very important to
adopt such partial measures toward a military detente on
the European continent as:
the liquidation of foreign military bases;
the withdrawal of all foreign troops from other
countries* territories to within their national frontiers;
a reduction, in agreed-upon numbers and according
to agreed-upon schedules, of the armed forces of the two
German states;
measures aimed at eliminating the danger of a nuclear
conflict: the creation of denuclearized zones, a pledge
by all powers possessing nuclear weapons not to use these
weapons against states belonging to these zones, etc.;
the cessation of flights by foreign aircraft carrying
atomic and hydrogen bombs over the territories of European
states and of the entry into these states 1 ports of sub-
marines and surface vessels with nuclear x^eapons on board.
Fourth
. In view of the danger to the cause of peace
in Europe of the F.R.G ! s nuclear claims, states must direct
their efforts to precluding the possibility of the F.R.G.'s
access to nuclear arms in any form whatever—directly or
indirectly through groupings of states, of its exclusive
command or its participation in any form in command over
such arms. The way in which this question is solved will
to a large extent decide the future of the European, and
not only the European, peoples. And half-hearted solutions
to this question are impermissible.
Fifth. The inviolability of frontiers is the
foundation of a durable peace in Europe. The interests of
a normalization of the situation in Europe demand that
all states, both those in Europe and those outside the
European continent, base their foreign-policy actions on
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the recognition of the actually existing frontiers between
European states that were established after the most deva-
stating war in the history of mankind, including the Polish
frontier along the Oder-Melsse and the frontiers between
the two German states.
Sixth
. A German peace settlement accords with the
interests of peace in Europe. The socialist states repre-
sented at the conference are willing to continue searches
for the solution to this problem. This solution must take
into account the interests of the security of all the coun-
tries concerned, the security of Europe as a whole.
A constructive approach to this question, as to
other aspects of security in Europe, is possible only pro-
ceeding from reality, in the first place the existence of
the two German states—the German Democratic Republic and
the Federal Republic of Germany. At the same time such a
settlement calls for recognition of the existing frontiers
and for the renunciation by both German states of the pos-
session of nuclear weapons.
The equal participation of the two German states
in efforts aimed at the development and strengthening of




cultural—will enable their working class, peasantry and
intelligentsia, their entire population, to make their
contribution, to the measure of their possibilities and
creative abilities, to progress and peace jointly with
the other European peoples.
As for the unification of the two German states,
the road to this goal lies through a relaxation of tension,
a gradual rapprochement of the two sovereign German states
and agreement between them, through agreements on disarma-
ment in Germany and Europe and on the basis of the principle
that once the unification of Germany is achieved, the united
German state will be genuinely peace-loving and democratic
and will never again pose a threat to its neighbors or to
peace in Europe.
Seventn
. It is of great positive importance to
convene an all-European conference to discuss questions
of ensuring security in Europe and establishing all-European
cooperation. The accord reached at the conference could
be expressed, for example, in the form of an all-European
declaration on cooperation for the maintenance and strength-
ening of European security. This declaration could provide
for pledges on the part of the signatory states to be
guided in their relations with one another by the interests
of peace, to settle disputed questions only by peaceful
means, to hold consultations and exchange information on
questions of mutual interest and to assist in the compre-
hensive development of economic, scientific-technical and
cultural ties with one another. The declaration should
be' open for all interested states to join.
The convocation of a conference on questions of
European security and cooperation could promote the creation
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of a system of collective security In Europe and would be
najor landmark In contemporary European history. Our
countries are ready to participate in such a conference
at any time convenient for the other interested states,
both Xorth Atlantic and Treaty members and neutrals. The
neutral European countries could also play a positive role
in the convocation of such a conference.
burally, the agenda and other questions relating
to the preparation of such a meeting or conference should
be established jointly by all the participating states,
keeping in mind the proposals submitted by each one of
them.
The countries represented at the present conference
are also prepared to employ other possible methods for
discussing problems of European security: negotiations
through diplomatic channels, meetings of Foreign Ministers
or special representatives on a bilateral or multilateral
basis, and contacts at the highest level. They believe
that the considerations presented above cover the chief
and most important aspects of ensuring European security.
They are also prepared to discuss other proposals for the
solution of this problem that have been or may be advanced
by any states.
As for the participants in such a discussion, the
Warsaw Treaty states make no exceptions. It is for each
state to decide whether or not to participate in the dis-
cussion and solution of European problems.
The peoples, of course, are not indifferent to the
political course this or that state may choose—one cor-
responding to the interests of peace and security or one
running counter to these interests.
The participants in this conference are convinced
that the countries of other continents as well cannot be
indifferent to the direction in which affairs in Europe
develop. The flames of two world wars broke out on Euro-
pean soil, but they scorched almost the whole planet.
Devastation and death was visited on many countries,
including some on continents far from Europe. Therefore
any government that is concerned for the destiny of the
world cannot but welcome each step that leads to a detente
and to an improvement of the situation in Europe, cannot
but support such efforts.
In expressing this concern for the strengthening
of European security and their willingness to participate
in the implementation of appropriate steps directed toward
this goal, our countries are convinced that it is the duty
of all European states to contribute to the solution of
problems of worldwide significance, the adjustment of x\Thich
will unquestionably have a beneficial effect on the situation
in Europe as well. These include the problems of ensuring
noninterference in the internal affairs of states, the pro-
hibition of the use of force or the threat of force in
international relations, disarmament, the prohibition of
the use of nuclear x^eapons and other major measures aimed
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at eliminating the danger of a nuclear conflict, the final
liquidation of colonialism in all its forms and manife.7!. -
tions, the dismantling of foreign military bases on other
countries' territory and the development of international
economic cooperation on equal terras. For their part, the
states represented at this conference will continue to do
everything in their power to promote the earliest possible
solution of these world problems. They attach great im-
portance to the strengthening of the United Nations on the
basis of strict observance of its Charter, ensuring the
universality of the U.N. and bringing its activity in line
with the changes that have taken place in the world, and
will help in every way to raise the effectiveness of the
organization with a view to the preservation of universal
peace and security and to the development of friendly
relations among peoples.
The states that have signed the present Declaration
express a readiness to seek jointly with other states for
mutually acceptable ways to strengthen peace in Europe.
They are fully resolved to defend in the international
arena the line of peace, the international cooperation of
states and the rallying of all freedom-loving and progres-
sive forces, to fight against imperialist aggression and
a policy of diktat and violence, to support the cause of
freedom, national independence and social progress.
The participants in the conference appeal to all
European governments and nations, to all the forces of
peace and progress on our continent, regardless of their
ideological, political or religious persuasion, to join
forces in making Europe—one of the most important centers
of world civilization—a continent of all-round and fruit-
ful cooperation between equal nations, a mighty factor for
the stability of peace and of mutual understanding through-
out the world.
—
(Signed) For the People's Republic of
Bulgaria ; Todor ZHIVKOV, First Secretary of the Central
Committee of the Bulgarian Communist Party and Chairman
of the Council of Ministers of the People's Republic of
Bulgaria; for the Hungarian People's Republic ; Janos KADAR,
First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Hungarian
Socialist Workers' Party; Gyula KALLAI , Chairman of the
Hungarian Revolutionary Workers' and Peasants' Government;
for the German Democratic Republic ; Walter ULBRICHT,
First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Socialist
Unity Party of Germany and Chairman of the German Democratic
Republic State Council; Willi STOPH, Chairman of the Council
of Ministers of the German Democratic Republic; for the
Polish People's Republic ; Wladyslaw GOMULKA, First Secre-
tary of the Central Committee of the Polish United Workers'
Party; Jozef CYRANKIEWICZ, Chairman of the Council of Minis-
ters of the Polish People's Republic; for the Socialist
Republic of Rumania ; Nicolae CEAUSESCU, General Secretary
of 'the Central Committee of the Rumanian Communist Party;
Ion Gheorghe MAURER, Chairman of the Council of Ministers
of the Socialist Republic of Rumania; for the Union of
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Soviet Socialist Republics : L. I. BREZHNEV, General Secre-
tary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of
the Soviet Union; A. N. KOSYGIN, Chairman of the Council
of Ministers of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics;
for the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic ; Antonin NOVOTNY,
First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist
•ty of Czechoslovakia and President of the Czechoslovak
Socialist Republic; Jozef LENART, Chairman of the Govern-
ment of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic.
Bucharest, July 5» 1966.
STATEMENT ON VIETNAM
STATEMENT IN CONNECTION WITH U.S. AGGRESSION IN VIETNAM.
(Pravda and Izvestia, July 8, p. 1. Complete test:)
The Warsaw Treaty member-states represented at the Bucha-
rest meeting of the Political Consultative Committee— the
Peopled Republic of Bulgaria, the Hungarian People's
Republic, the German Democratic Republic, the Polish People's
Republic, the Socialist Republic of Rumania, the Union of
Soviet Socialist Republics and the Czechoslovak Socialist
Republic—have discussed the situation created as a result
of the aggression of the United States of America in Vietnam,
especially in light of the new criminal actions of the
American armed forces aimed at expanding the war against
the Vietnamese people.
The participants in the conference consider the
bombings of the suburbs of Hanoi and the port of Haiphong
—
the largest population centers of North Vietnam—to be
a new and even more dangerous stage in the American policy
of "escalating" the war in Vietnam. As a consequence,
the war in Vietnam, which seriously complicates the inter-
national atmosphere, is taking on a new character still
more dangerous for peace and general security.
The participants in the conference angrily condemn
these criminal actions and declare their full support for
the courageous struggle of the fraternal people of Vietnam
in defense of freedom and independence, for the unity and
integrity of their homeland.
I.
The U.S. war in Vietnam is the most cynical mani-
festation of the aggressive policy of American imperialism.
It is an outrage against international law, against inter-
national agreements, a flagrant trampling of the United
Nations Charter. It was the U.S.A. that frustrated the
implementation of the 195^ Geneva Agreements, which pro-
vided for the holding of all-Vietnamese elections and the
unification of Vietnam without any foreign interference.
The American troops arrived in Vietnam as invaders,
as stranglers of the freedom and independence of the Viet-
namese people. In the war of plunder that it is waging
against Vietnam, the U.S.A. is increasingly resorting to •
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brutal and inhuman means, destroying the peaceful popula-
tion, not hesitating to use napalm and poisonous substances.
Those who are committing these atrocities are following the
path of the Hitlerite war criminals. The actions committed
by American troops and their satellites in Vietnam are a
crime against peace and humanity that entails the gravest
international responsibility. The aggressors should con-
sider the lessons of history and not forget that they will
not escape responsibility for their atrocities.
The American aggressors will not escape retribution
for the vast material devastation and losses caused to the
Vietnamese people, for the destroyed cities and villages, for
the burned hospitals and schools, for the destroyed communi-
cations routes, for all the barbarity visited on the peaceful
population.
The U.S. government should know that the more crimes
are committed against the Vietnamese people, the heavier
will be the burden of guilt, the harsher the retribution
for it will be.
The U.S. government is attempting by force of arms
to impose its system on the population of South Vietnam,
to preserve there a corrupt regime of military dictatorship
that is deeply hated by the people and that is holding on
only because of American bayonets. No one has the right
to dictate his will to the Vietnamese people or the people
of any other country. Only the people of Vietnam can
decide what system to establish in their country, and this
is their inalienable right.
The United States of America would also like to
enslave other countries of the Indo-Chinese Peninsula.
It is intensifying its gross interference in the internal
affairs of Laos, subjecting its territory to bombardment,
and is continuing provocations against independent Cambodia.
All of this bears witness that American imperialism
is trying to suppress the national-liberation movement of
the peoples, to deprive them of their sacred right to
decide their own destinies, to choose a path of develop-
ment in accordance with their own aspirations.
The danger arising from the aggressive actions of
the U.S. government is Increasing even more in connection
with the fact that it is striving to drag its allies into
the war. Australia and New Zealand, Thailand and the
Philippines, as well as the South Korean puppet regime,
have already sent or are sending military contingents to
participate in the war against the Vietnamese people. The
Federal Republic of Germany is giving political and material
support to the United States of America in Vietnam. Those
countries that are helping the aggressors with deliveries
of arms or by permitting the U.S.A. to use their territory
for the transfer and supply of American troops in Vietnam
are accomplices in the aggression. Sooner or later the
governments of all such countries will have to answer to
the peoples for these actions.
No one will be taken in by the American government's
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assertions of its readiness to hold talks on a settlement
of the Vietnam problem. These statements on "peaceful
intentions" and "peaceful negotiations" are false through
and through, since they are accompanied not only by the
continuation but by the expansion of military actions.
There is a glaring inconsistency between the con-
tinuation of the war in Vietnam and the U.S. assertions
of its desire to take steps along the path of disarmament.
The parties, governments and peoples of our countries
express admiration for the courage, staunchness and dotei
—
initiation of the heroic Vietnamese people to achieve victory
In the struggle against the Invaders. No matter how the
.ressors persist, no matter what new atrocities they
commit, they will be unable to break the will of the Viet-
namese people for freedom and independence. The partici-
pants in the conference believe that by their struggle
against American imperialism, the Vietnamese people are
not only defending their own national rights but are also
making an important contribution to the struggle of the
countries of the world socialist system, of all peoples
for peace, independence, democracy and socialism. The
just cause of the Vietnamese people enjoys the deep sympathy
and complete solidarity of the socialist countries, of the
international x-rorking class and the Communist and workers 1
parties, of the national-liberation movement, of all forces
of peace and progress.
II.
The Warsaw Treaty member-states that have signed
the present statement most resolutely confirm their posi-
tion on the Vietnam question.
The American government must immediately halt the
aggressive war in Vietnam and respect the basic national
rights of the Vietnamese people to peace, national inde-
pendence, territorial unity and integrity provided for by
the 195^ Geneva Agreements on Vietnam.
Proceeding from the premise that the right to decide
their affairs belongs exclusively to the Vietnamese people,
the states participating in the present conference fully
support the four-point program of the government of the
Democratic Republic of Vietnam and the five-point program
advanced by the National Liberation Front of South Vietnam,
which are a just basis for a political settlement of the
Vietnamese question. They fully conform to the 195^ Geneva
Agreements and meet the interests of peace in Southeast
Asia and throughout the world.
The United States of America must take a course
toward strict fulfillment of the Geneva Agreements on
Vietnam, stop the aggression against the Democratic Republic
of Vietnam by putting an immediate, final and unconditional
end , to the bombing raids over its territory, halt the armed
intervention in South Vietnam, withdraw its troops and those
of its satellites from South Vietnam, liquidate all American
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military bases in that country, recognize the National
Liberation Front as the only true representative of the
population of South Vietnam and recognize the right of
the people of Vietnam to determine their own destiny with-
out outside interference, to decide for themselves the
question of the peaceful unification of the country.
III.
Having discussed the situation created in Vietnam as a
result of the expansion of military actions by the United
States of America, the Warsaw Treaty member-states:
}(1.) Most vigorously warn the U.S. government of
the responsibility it assumes before all mankind by con-
tinuing and expanding this war, for all the unforeseeable
consequences that might result from it, including for the
United States of America itself.
(2.) Are giving and will continue to give the
Democratic Republic of Vietnam ever-increasing moral and
political support and diversified aid, including economic
aid and the means of defense, materials, equipment and
specialists needed for victoriously repelling the American
aggression, taking into account the requirements arising
out of the new phase of the war in Vietnam.
(3.) Declare their readiness, should the government
of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam so request, to send
volunteers to Vietnam to help the Vietnamese people in
their struggle against the American aggressors.
(^. ) Vigorously condemn the U. S. actions aimed
at spreading the war to Laos and Cambodia; express their
solidarity with the peoples of these countries, demand
strict observance by the United States of America of the
195^ and 1962 Geneva Agreements concerning these states
and respect for their sovereignty, independence, neutrality
and territorial integrity.
IV.
The parties and governments of our countries con-
sider that united actions on the part of the socialist
states are necessary to achieve victory for the Vietnamese
people. Each of our countries is fully resolved to spare
no efforts in the future as well, to take all the necessary
steps to help the Vietnamese people put an end to the
American aggression.
The countries participating in the present conference
appeal to all states that cherish the cause of peace, to
all progressive and peace-loving forces, to the world
public, to the international workers* movement, to the
Communist and workers' parties to consolidate the front of
struggle against the American aggression, to come out
vigorously against the barbaric war in Vietnam and in
support of the courageous struggle of the Vietnamese people.
The countries participating in the Warsaw Treaty
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appeal to the governments of all states to do everythl:-
they can to put an end to the U.S. aggression in Vietnam,
to eliminate the breeding ground of war in Southeast Asia,
to strive for a relaxation of tension and the normalization
of international relations. Not one state, not one govern-
ment concerned with the fate of the world can or should
be indifferent to the U.S. actions in Vietnam. These
actions not only are a threat to the independence and free-
dom of the Vietnamese people but also create an ever more
serious threat to universal peace.
Our countries express their conviction that the
forces of peace, by supporting the struggle of the Viet-
namese people, will make the American imperialists stop
the aggression in Vietnam and thereby make a great contri-
bution to the cause of ensuring peace throughout the world.
The just cause for which the Vietnamese people are
fighting will triumph! The people of Vietnam will win!
—
(Signed) For the People's Republic of Bulgaria : Todor
ZHIVKOV, First Secretary of the Central Committee of the
Bulgarian Communist Party and Chairman of the Council of
Ministers of the People* s Republic of Bulgaria; for the
Hungarian People's Republic ; Janos KADAR, First Secretary
of the Central Committee of the Hungarian Socialist Workers'
Party; Byula KALLAI, Chairman of the Hungarian Revolutionary
Workers' and Peasants* Government; for the German Democratic
Republic: Walter ULBRICHT, First Secretary of the Central
Committee of the Socialist Unity Party of Germany and Chair-
man of the German Democratic Republic State Council; Willi
STOPH, Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the German
Democratic Republic; for the Polish People's Republic :
Wladyslaw GOMULKA, First Secretary of the Central Committee
of the Polish United Workers 1 Party; Jozef CYRANKIEWICZ,
Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Polish People's
Republic; for the Socialist Republic of Rumania : Nicolae
CEAUSESCU, General Secretary of the Central Committee of
the Rumanian Communist Party; Ion Gheorghe MAURER, Chairman
of the Council of Ministers of the Socialist Republic of
Rumania; for the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics :
L. I. BREZHNEV, General Secretary of the Central Committee
of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union; A. N. KOSYGIN,
Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics; for the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic ;
Antonin NOVOTNY, First Secretary of the Central Committee
of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia and President of
the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic; Jozef LENART, Chairman
of txhe Government of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic.
Bucharest, July 6, 19.66.
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IX. Communique and Statement of the Ninth Meeting; of the
Political Consultative Committee
(from The Current Digest of the Soviet Press
, Vol. XX,
No . 1 0, pp. 5-6)
WARSAW TREATY CONFERENCE
COMMUNIQUE OF THE CONFERENCE OF TIE POLITICAL CONSULTATIVE
COMMITTEE OF THE WARSAW PACT STATES. (Pravda, March 9,
p. lj Izvestia, March 10, p. 1. Complete text:) Sofia,
.rcn ?—A regular conference of the Political Consultative
Committee of the member-states of the Warsaw Treaty on
Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Aid took place on
March 6 and 7, 1968, in Sofia.
The following took part in the conference:
from the People's Republic of Bulgaria—Todor Zhivkov,
First Secretary of the Bulgarian Communist Party Central
Committee, Chairman of the P.R.B. Council of Ministers and
head of the delegation; Stanko Todorov, member of the Polit-
buro of the B.C. P. Central Committee and Secretary of the
Central Committee; Zhivko Zhivkov, member of the Politburo
of the B.C. P. Central Committee and First Vice-Chairman of
the Council of Ministers; Ivan Bashev, Minister of Foreign
Affairs; General of the Army Dobri Dzhurov, Minister of
National Defense;
from the Hungarian People's Republic—Janos Kadar,
First Secretary of the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party
Central Committee and head of the delegation; Jenoe Fock,
Chairman of the Revolutionary Workers' and Peasants'
Government; Janos Peter, Minister of Foreign Affairs;
Lieut. Gen, Lajos Czinege, Minister of Defense;
from the German Democratic Republic—Walter Ulbricht,
First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Socialist
Unity Party of Germany, Chairman of the G.D R. State Council
and head of the delegation; Willi Stoph, Chairman of the
G.D.R. Council of Ministers; Erich Honecker, member of the
Politburo of the S.U.P.G. Central Committee and Secretary
of the Central Committee; General of the Army Heinz Hoffmann,
Minister of National Defense; Gunter Kort, State Secretary
and First Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs;
from the Polish People's Republic--Wladyslaw Gomulka,
First Secretary of the Polish United Workers' Party Central
Committee and head of the delegation; Jozef Cyrankiewicz
,
Chairman of the P.P.R. Council of Ministers; Zenon Kliszko,
member of the Politburo of the P.U.W.P. Central Committee
and Secretary of the Central Committee; Adam Rapacki, Min-
ister of Foreign Affairs; Marshal of Poland Marian Spychal-
ski, Minister of National Defense; Marian Naszkowski , Deputy
Minister of Foreign Affairs; Lieut. Gen, Wojcech Jaruzelski,
Deputy Minister of National Defense; Ryszard Neszporek,
P.P.R. Ambassador to the People's Republic of Bulgaria;
from the Socialist Republic of Rumania—Nicolae
Ceausescu
,
General Secretary of the Rumanian Communist
Party Central Committee, Chairman of the S.R.R. State
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Council and head of the delegation; Ion Georghc Maurer,
ilrman of the 3.H.R. Council of Ministers; Cornel lu
Manescu, Minister of Foreign Affairs; Lieut. Gen. Ion Ionita,
Minister of the Armed Forces; Nicolae Blejan, 3.H.R. Ambas-
sador to the People's Republic of Bulgaria;
from the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics--!,. I.
Brezhnev, General Secretary of the Central Committee of the
Communist Party of the Soviet Union and head of the delega-
tion; A. N. Kosygin, Chairman of the U.S.S.R. Council of
Ministers; A. A. Gromyko , U.S.S.R. Minister of Foreign
Affairs; Marshal of the Soviet Union A. A. Grechko, U.S.S.R.
Minister of Defense; K. V. Rusakov, First Deputy Director
of a C.P.S.U. Central Committee department; A. M. Puzanov,
U.S.S.R. Ambassador to the People's Republic of Bulgaria;
from the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic—Alexander
Dubcek, First Secretary of the Central Committee of the
Communist Party of Czechoslovakia and head of the delega-
tion; Jozef Lenart, Chairman of the C.S.R. government;
General of the Army Bohumir Lomsky, Minister of National
Defense; Vaclav David, Minister of Foreign Affairs; Pavol
Ma j ling, C.S.R. Ambassador to the People's Republic of
Bulgaria.
Marshal of the Soviet Union I. I. Yakubovsky,
Commander-in-Chief of the Joint Armed Forces of tile .Warsaw
Pact states, also took part in the work of the conference.
The participants in the conference examined all
aspects of the situation that has taken shape as a result
of further intensification of U.S. aggression against the
Vietnamese people and its influence on the overall inter-
national situation. They noted that the U.S. government
is continuing its adventurist policy of expanding the scale
of the war and refuses to halt the bombing and other
aggressive actions against the D.R.V. , thereby obstructing
the creation of conditions for talks aimed at a political
settlement of the Vietnam problem.
In this connection the participants in the conference
expressed unanimous condemnation of the criminal actions
of the American imperialists, itfho are trying by force of
arms to suppress the national-liberation struggle in South
Vietnam and to hinder the construction of socialism in the
Democratic Republic of Vietnam.
The participants in the conference adopted a Declara-
tion on the Threat to Peace Created as a Result of Expansion
of American Aggression in Vietnam. The text of the declara-
tion has been published separately.
A thorough exchange of opinions on the problem of
the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons took place at the
conference.
The participants in the conference, proceeding on
the basis of the position collectively elaborated by the
Warsaw and Bucharest Conferences of the Political Consulta-
tive Committee, confirmed the special significance of
preventing the spread of nuclear weapons and the importance
of solving this problem. They examined the draft treaty
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on nonprollferatlon of nuclear weapons that wan drawn up
in the course of talks and discussion in the 18-Natlon
Disarmament Committee, and expressed their respective
positions on this question.
The conference proceeded in a candid, comradely
atmosphere.
STATEMENT. (Pravda, March 9, p. 3 j Izvestia, March 10,
p. 1. Complete text:) Sofia, March 7—The People's Republic
of Bulgaria, the Hungarian People's Republic, the German
Democratic Republic, the Polish People's Republic, the Union
of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Czechoslovak Socialist
Republic, in a spirit of full unanimity, set forth their
position on the question of nonproliferation of nuclear
weapons as follows.
Proceeding on the basis of the socialist states'
policy in the struggle to strengthen international peace
and security, the said countries believe that the task of
preventing the further proliferation of nuclear weapons is
an urgent one and is of pressing importance for the cause
of strengthening peace. They are convinced that settlement
of the question of nonproliferation of nuclear weapons and
conclusion of a corresponding international treaty \tfill
create more favorable conditions for the further struggle
to halt the arms race, especially the nuclear arms race,
and to implement effective measures for banning and
destroying nuclear weapons They express their resolve
to continue the struggle to achieve these goals.
The above-named states believe this task is fulfilled
by the draft treaty on nonproliferation of nuclear weapons
that was submitted by the Soviet Union on Jan. 18, 1968,
for the consideration of the 18-Nation Disarmament Committee
and that was, at various stages of the talks, the subject
of intensified consultations among many states. They
declare their support for this draft and favor terminating
the talks in the Committee of 18 by the established deadline
(March 15. 1968), gaining the approval of the elaborated
draft by the United Nations General Assembly and signing
and putting into effect the treaty on nonproliferation of
nuclear weapons.
The above-named states express the hope that all
countries will make their contribution to the solution of
the important problem of nonproliferation of nuclear weapons




I. Text of Soviet-Polish Agreement on the Stationing of
Troops, December 17» 1956.
(from Mew York Times
, December 18, 1956, p. 18)
TEXT OP SOVIET-POLISH AGREEMENT ON THE STATIONING OF TROOPS
The Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Re-
publics and the Government of the Polish People's Republic,
in conformity with the point statement signed in Moscow on
Nov. 18, 1956, have decided to conclude the present treaty
and have appointed for this purpose as their plenipoten-
tiaries:
The Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Re-
publics—Do T. Shepilov, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics; G. K. Zhukov, Minister
of Defense of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.
The Government of the Polish People's Republic
—
A. Rapacki, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Polish
People's Republic; M. Spychalski, Minister of National
Defense of the Polish People's Republic.
Having presented their full powers, found in good
and due form, have agreed as follows:
Article 1
The temporary stay of Soviet troops in Poland can
in no way affect the sovereignty of the Polish state and
canot lead to their Interference in the domestic affairs
of the Polish People's Republic.
Article 2
The strength of the Soviet troops stationed tem-
porarily in the territory of the Polish People's Republic
and the places of their dislocation shall be determined on
the basis of special agreements between the Government of
the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Government
of the Polish People's Republic.
The movement of Soviet troops in the territory of
the Polish People's Republic outside the places of their
dislocation shall in each case require the consent of the
Government of the Polish People's Republic or Polish
authorities empowered by it.
Training and exercises of Soviet troops outside of
the places of thir dislocation shall be held on the basis
either of plans agreed with the Polish authorities or in
each case with the consent of the Government of the Polish
People's Republic or Polish authorities empowered by it.
Article 3
Soviet troops stationed in the territory of the
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Polish People's Republic, persons serving with these troops,
and members of the families of these persons must respect
and observe the provisions of Polish law.
Article b
Servicemen of Soviet troops stationed in the terri-
tory of the Polish Republic wear their respective uniforms,
have and carry weapons in conformity with the procedure
established' in the Soviet Army.
Motor vehicles and motorcycles of Soviet military
units must have a license number and a distinct identifi-
cation mark. The license numbers and marks shall be estab-
lished by the command of the Soviet troops and communicated
to the competent Polish agencies.
Competent Polish agencies recognize as valid, without
any tests or fee, drivers' licenses issued by the competent
Soviet agencies to persons serving with the Soviet troops
stationed in the territory of the Polish People's Republic.
Article 5
The procedure for entry into Poland and exit from
Poland of Soviet military units, as well as of persons
serving with the Soviet troops and members of the families
of these persons, questions connected with their stay in
the territory of the Polish People's Republic and the
types of appropriate documents shall be determined by
special agreement of the contracting parties.
Article 6
The procedure for and terms of use by Soviet troops
of barrack settlements, airdromes, drill grounds, firing
grounds with equipment and installations, buildings, trans-
port and communication facilities, electric power, public
utilities and trade services, including also the terms of
payment for them, shall be determined by special agreements
of the competent agencies of the contracting parties.
Article 7
Construction in places of dislocation of Soviet
troops of buildings, airdromes, roads, bridges, permanent
radio communication installations, including the determi-
nation of their frequencies and capacities, requires the
consent of the competent Polish authorities. Such consent
is also required for setting up, outside of the places of
dislocation of Soviet troops, regular service establishments
for persons serving with the Soviet troops.
Article 8
In case barrack settlements, airdromes, drill grounds
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and flrins grounds with stationary equipment and installa-
tions are vacated by Soviet troops, the aforementioned
establishments shall be returned to the Polish authorities
in good condition.
Questions related to the handing over to the Polish
authorities of establishments vacated by Soviet troops in
the territory of the Polish People's Republic, including
those built by Soviet troops, shall be settled through
special agreements.
Article 9
Matters of jurisdiction, related to the stay of
Soviet troops in the territory of the Polish People's Re-
public, shall be governed as follows:
1. As a general rule, in cases of crimes and mis-
demeanors committed by persons serving with the Soviet
troops or members of their families in the territory of
the Polish People's Republic, Polish laws shall apply and
Polish courts, the prosecutor's office and other Polish
agencies competent in prosecuting crimes and misdemeanors
shall operate
o
Cases of crimes committed by Soviet servicemen
shall be investigated by the military prosecutor's office
and tried by military justice agencies of the Polish People's
Republic.
2. The provisions of the first paragraph of the
present article shall not apply:
(A) In case of persons, serving with the Soviet
troops or members of their families, committing crimes or
misdemeanors only against the Soviet Union and also against
persons serving with the Soviet troops or members of their
families;
(B) In case of persons, serving with the Soviet
troops, committing crimes or misdemeanors while discharging
their duties.
In cases indicated in sub-paragraphs (A) and (B)
the competent Soviet court and other agencies shall act on
the basis of Soviet law.
3. The competent Soviet and Polish agencies may
ask each other to transfer or accept jurisdiction with
reference to some cases stipulated in the present article.
Such requests shall be given favorable consideration.
Article 10
In case of crimes committed against Soviet troops
stationed in the territory of the Polish People's Republic
as well as against their servicemen, the persons committing
such crimes shall bear the same responsibility as for
crimes against the Polish armed forces and Polish servicemen.
Article 11
1. The Competent Soviet and Polish agencies shall
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render each other assistance of all kinds, including legal
assistance, in prosecuting crimes and misdemeanors referred
to in Articles 9 and 10 of the present treaty.
2. A special agreement of the contracting parties
shall lay down the principles and procedures for rendering
the assistance mentioned in Paragraph 1 of the present
article.
Article 12
At the request of the competent Polish authorities
a person serving with the Soviet troops, guilty of violating
Polish law and order shall be recalled from the territory
of the Polish People 's Republic.
The Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics agrees to compensate the Government of the Polish
Peoples 1 Republic for material damage which may be caused
to the Polish state by actions or neglect of Soviet mili-
tary units or persons serving with them, as well as damage
which may be caused by Soviet military units or thir ser-
vicemen while discharging their duties to Polish institu-
tions and citizens or citizens of third countries in the
territory of the Polish Peoples' Republic, In both cases
in amounts to be fixed, on the basis of the claims presented
and with due regard for the provision of Polish law by a
mixed commission formed in compliance with Article 19 of
the present treaty.
Disputes which may arise from obligations of Soviet
military units shall also be subject to examination by the
mixed commission on the same basis.
The Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics also agrees to compensate the Government of the
Polish People's Republic for damage caused to Polish insti-
tutions or citizens or citizens of third countries in the
territory of the Polish People's Republic as a result of
actions or neglect of persons serving with the Soviet
troops which took place not during the discharge of their
duties and also as a result of actions or neglect of members
of the families of such persons, in both cases in amounts
to be fixed by the competent Polish court on the basis of
claims presented to persons which caused the damage.
The compensations of damage shall be made by the
Soviet side within three months after the decision of the
mixed commission or the entry into force of the court
sentence.
Payments of amounts by decisions of the mixed com-
mission or a court to the persons or institutions which
suffered the damage shall be made by the appropriate Polish
agencies.
Claims for compensation of damage, not satisfied
prior to the entry of the present treaty into force, shall




The Government of the Polish People's Republic agrees
to compensate the Government of the Union of Soviet Social-
ist Republics for damage to property of Soviet military
units stationed in the territory of the Polish Peoples''
Republic and persons serving with the Soviet troops which
may be caused by actions or neglect of Polish state insti-
tutions, in amounts to be fixed by the mixed commission
formed in compliance with Article 19 of the present treaty
on the basis of the claims presented and with account of
the provisions of Polish law.
Disputes i^hich may arise from obligations of Polish
state institutions to Soviet military units shall also be
subject to consideration by the mixed commission on the
same basis.
The Government of the Polish People's Republic also
agrees to compensate the Government of the Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics for the damage caused to Soviet mili-
tary units stationed In the territory of the Polish People's
Republic, to persons serving with the Soviet troops and
members of the families of these persons as a result of
actions or neglect of Polish citizens, in amounts to be
fixed by a Polish court on the basis of claims presented to
persons who caused the damage.
Article 15
The communication lines, dates, procedure and terms
of payment for the transit of Soviet troops and military
property through the territory of the Polish People's
Republic as well as military shipments in the territory
of the Polish People's Republic shall be governed by
special agreements.
The provisions of the present treaty and, specifi-
cally, the provisions pertaining to jurisdiction and respon-
sibility for damage caused, shall apply correspondingly
to Soviet troops in transit through the territory of the
Polish Peoples' Republic.
Article 16
The application of tax, custom and foreign exchange
regulations operating in Poland as well as the import and
export provisions with regard to Soviet troops stationed
, in the territory of the Polish People's Republic, persons
serving with these troops and members of their families,
shall be governed, by special agreements.
Article 1?
With the object of adequately adjusting current
problems pertaining to the stay of Soviet troops in Poland,
the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
and the Government of the Polish Peoples' Republic shall
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appoint their plenipotentiaries to deal with matters related
to the stay of Soviet troops in Poland.
Article 18
In interpreting the present treaty:
"A person serving with the Soviet troops" is:
(a) A serviceman of the Soviet Army;
(b) A civilian who is a Soviet citizen and is employed
in units of the Soviet troops In the Polish Peoples 1 Republic;
"A place of dislocation" is the territory placed at
the disposal of Soviet troops, including the places of
quartering the military units with drill grounds, shooting
ranges, firing grounds and other establishments used by these
units.
Article 19
To settle questions pertaining to the interpretation
or application of the present treaty and the agreements
envisaged by this treaty a Soviet-Polish Mixed Commission
shall be set up, to which each of the contracting parties
shall appoint three representatives.
The Mixed Commission shall be governed by the rules
it shall adopt.
The Mixed Commission shall have its headquarters in
Warsaw.
In case the Mixed Commission is unable to settle
a question submitted to it, that question shall be settled
through diplomatic channels as soon as possible.
Article 20
The present treaty is subject to ratification and
shall come into effect on the day of the exchange of
ratification instruments which shall be done in Moscow.
Article 21
The present treaty shall remain in force for the
duration of the stay of the Soviet troops in the territory
of the Polish People's Republic and may be changed with the
consent of the contracting parties.
Done in Warsaw on the 17th of December 1956; two
copies, each in the Russian and Polish languages, both
texts being equally authentic.
In witness whereof the aforementioned plenipoten-
tiaries have signed the present treaty and affixed their
seals thereto.
For the Government of the Union of the Soviet
Socialist Republics: D. Shepilov.
G. Zhukov.





II. Text of Communique of Meeting of First Secretaries of
Communist Parties of Warsaw Pact Nations, August 3-5,
1961
(from New York Times
,
August 6, 1.961, p. 3)
COMMUNIQUE OF WARSAW PACT SESSION
A meeting of the First Secretaries of the Central
Committees of the Communist and Workers 1 parties of the
Warsaw Treaty countries was held in Moscow on Aug. 3 to 5
to discuss questions connected with the preparations for
the conclusion of a German peace treaty.
The meeting was attended by representatives of the
Communist and Workers' parties of the Warsaw Treaty coun-
tries and also by representatives of the fraternal parties
of the Socialist countries of Asia.
Threat to Peace Cited
The participants in the meeting had a broad exchange
of opinions on foreign policy and economic questions con-
cerning preparations for the conclusion of a German peace
treaty.
All the participants agreed unanimously that the
question of the conclusion of a German peace treaty and
the normalization through it of the situation in West Berlin
is long ripe for solution and brooks no delay.
It was emphasized that to delay the conclusion of
the German peace treaty for an indefinite period is de-
liberately to contribute to an intensification of the
threat of a new war in Europe and not only in Europe.
The meeting's participants expressed readiness to
contribute by every means to the attainment of a peaceful
settlement with the two German states, coordinated with the
Western powers. The German peace treaty should record
the situation which has developed in Europe after the war,
record in legal form the immutability of the present German
frontiers, normalize the situation in West Berlin, create
better requisites for rapprochement and cooperation between
the two German states, secure conditions for the peaceful
development of both Germany herself and all the countries
of Europe.
The meeting's participants proceed from the fact
that such a peaceful settlement would not prejudice any
country and would conform to the interests of all those




The participants in the meeting unanimously reaf-
firmed that West Berlin, as a free, demilitarized city,
would be able to maintain its unhindered communications
with the outside world in case of the conclusion of a
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peace treaty with both German states. Not a single Social-
ist country presses for a change in the social order exist-
ing in West Berlin. Reliable and effective guarantees will
be furnished by the peace treaty to insure strict noninter-
vention in the affairs of West Berlin and access to it.
The meeting expressed the Inflexible determination
of all its participants to achieve a peace settlement with
Germany before the end of this year. At the same time it
was unanimously resolved that, should the Western powers
continue to evade the conclusion of a German peace treaty,
the states concerned will be impelled to conclude a peace
treaty with the German Democratic Republic (East Germany)
which will draw a line beneath the last war and safeguard
conditions for stabilization of the situation in that part
of Europe.
Protection of Rights
A peace treaty will also resolutely protect the
sovereign right of the German Democratic Republic, including
her rights on land, water and in the air.
The situation in West Berlin will also be settled
on the basis of the above mentioned peace treaty. As a
free city, it must lead its independent life and enjoy,
in conformity with agreements which will be concluded
with the German Democratic Republic, the rights to unhin-
dered communications with the outside world.
The meeting instructed the appropriate competent
bodies to prepare all necessary foreign political and
economic measures ensuring the conclusion of a German
peace treaty and observance of its provisions, including
those provisions which refer to West Berlin as a free city.
The meeting took place in an atmosphere of a complete
unanimity and demonstrated the unshaken determination of
the Socialist countries to liquidate the vestiges of
World War II.
III. Texts of Warsaw Pact Communique on Berlin and East
German Decree on Berlin, August 13, 1961
(from New York Times , August l4, 1961, p. 6)
WARSAW PACT COMMUNIQUE
The Governments of the Warsaw Treaty member states
have been striving for a peaceful settlement with Germany
for a number of years. In so doing, they are guided by
the fact that this question has been ripe long since and
brooks no further delays.
It is generally known that the Government of the
U.S.S.R., with the full agreement and support of all member
states of the Warsaw Treaty organization, approached the
Governments of the countries which had participated in the
war against Hitler Germany with a proposal to conclude a
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peace treaty with two German states and to settle on this
basis the question of West Berlin by granting it the status
of a demilitarized, free city.
This proposal took into account the situation
obtaining practically in Germany and Europe in the post-
war period. This proposal is not directed against anybody's
interests, and its only aim is to do away with the left-
overs of World War II and to consolidate world peace.
The governments of the Western Powers have not so
far shown willingness to achieve an agreed solution of this
question through negotiations between all sides concerned.
Moreover, to the peaceful proposals of the Socialist
countries, the Western pox^ers reply by stepping up their
military preparations, fanning up war hysteria and by
threatening to use armed forces.
NATO Build-Up Deplored
Official spokesmen of a number of the NATO (North
Atlantic Treaty Organization) countries have announced an
increase in the numerical strength of their armed forces,
and plans for partial military mobilization. Even plans
for a military invasion of the G.D.R. (East German) terri-
tory have been made public in some of the NATO countries.
Availing themselves of the absence of a peace treaty,
the aggressive forces are increasing the pace of Western
Germany's militarization and are creating the Bundeswehr
(West German Army) at a high pace, equipping it with the
latest types of armaments. The West German revanchlsts
openly demand that nuclear and rocket weapons be placed
at their disposal.
The Governments of the Western powers, in every way
encouraging the arming of Western Germany, grossly violate
the most important international agreements envisaging
eradication of German militarism and prevention of its
revival in any form.
The Western powers, far from having made any efforts
to normalize the situation in West Berlin, on the contrary
continue using it intensively as a center of subversive
activities against the G.D.R. and all other countries of
the Socialist commonwealth.
In no other point of the world are so many espionage
and subversive centers of foreign states to be found as in
West Berlin, where they can act with such impunity. These
numerous subversive centers are smuggling their agents
to the G.D.R. for all sorts of subversion, recruiting spies
and inciting hostile elements to organize sabotage and
to provoke disturbances in the G.D.R.
The present situation regarding the traffic on the
borders of West Berlin, is being used by the P.R.G. (West
German) ruling quarters and intelligence agencies of the
NATO countries for undermining the G.D.R.'s economy.
The government bodies and military concerns of the
P.R.G. , through deceit, bribery, and blackmail, make some
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unstable elements in the G.D.R. leave for Western Germany.
These deceived people are compelled to serve with the
Bundeswehr, or recruited to the intelligence agencies of
different countries to be sent back to the G.D.R. as spies
and saboteurs.
A special fund has even been formed for such sub-
versive activities against the G.D.R. and other Socialist
countries. Recently West German Chancellor Adenauer asked
the NATO Governments to increase this fund.
It is highly indicative that the subversive activi-
ties directed from West Berlin have greatly increased of
late, right after the Soviet Union, the G.D.R. and other
Socialist countries have advanced proposals for Immediate
peaceful settlement with Germany. This subversive activity
inflicts damage not only on the German Democratic Republic
but also affects the interests of other countries of the
Socialist camp.
In the face of the aggressive aspirations of the
reactionary forces of the F.R.G. and its NATO allies, the
Warsaw Treaty member states cannot but take necessary
measures for insuring their security, and primarily the
security of the German Democratic Republic in the interests
of the German peoples themselves.
The Governments of the Warsaw Treaty member states
address the People's Chamber and the Government of the
G.D.R., and all working people of the German Democratic
Republic, with a proposal to establish such an order on
the borders of West Berlin which would securely block the
way for the subversive activity against the Socialist camp
countries, so, that reliable safeguards and effective con-
trol can be established around the whole territory of West
Berlin including its border with Democratic Berlin.
It goes without saying that these measures must not
affect the existing order of traffic and control on the
ways of communication between West Berlin and Western
Germany.
The Governments of the Warsaw Treaty member states
understand, of course, that protective measures along the
borders of West Berlin will somewhat inconvenience the
population. But the entire responsibility for the obtaining
situation rests exclusively with the Western powers, and
with the F.R.G. in the first place.
If so far the borders of West Berlin have remained
opened, this was done in the hope that the Western powers
would not abuse the goodwill of the Government of the
German Democratic Republic, But they, disregarding the
interests of the German people and Berlin population,
used the order now operating on the border of West Berlin
for their own perfidious, subversive aims.
Stronger protection and control on the border with
West Berlin must put an end to the present abnormal situa-
tlqn«,
At the same time, the Governments of the Warsaw
Treaty member states find it necessary to emphasize that
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this necessity will disappear when a peaceful settlement
with Germany is achieved, and the questions awaiting their
solution will be settled on this basis.
EAST GERMAN DECREE
On the basis of the statement by the Warsaw Treaty
member countries and the decision of the People's Chamber,
the Council of Ministers of the German Democratic Republic
adopted the following decree:
The interests of preserving peace demand that an
end be put to the machinations of the West German revanchlsts
and militarists and that the way be opened, through conclu-
sion of a German peace treaty, to the preservation of peace
and the revival of Germany as a peaceful, anti-imperialist,
neutral state.
The viewpoint of the Bonn Government that World
War II is not yet formally ended is tantamount to demanding
freedom for militarist provocations and civil war measures.
This imperialist policy, which is being carried out
under the signboard of ant i-communism, constitutes continua-
tion of the aggressive aims of the Fascist German imperialism
of the time of the Third Reich.
Piratical Policy Charged
Prom the defeat of Hitler Germany in World War II,
the Bonn Government has drawn the conclusion that the
piratical policy of the German monopoly capital and its
Hitler generals must be tried once more through rejection
of a German national state policy and conversion of
Western Germany into a NATO member state, into a satellite
country of the United States.
This fresh threat to the German and other European
peoples on the part of German militarism could become a
grave danger, because the provisions of principles of
the Potsdam agreement on eradication of militarism and
nazism were constantly violated in the West German Federal
Republic and the front-line city of West Berlin.
The revanchist policy, with its increasing terri-
torial claims to the German Democratic Repuolic (East
Germany) and Germany's neighbor states, has been intensi-
fied in Western Germany, which is closely connected with
speedy armament and atomic arming of the West German
Bundeswehr.
The Adenauer Government is systematically carrying
out, with regard to the German Democratic Republic, prepara-
tions for a civil war.
The citizens of the German Democratic Republic
visiting Western Germany are being increasingly subjected
to terroristic persecutions.
West German and West Berlin espionage organizations
are systematically luring citizens of the German Democratic
Republic and organizing regular slave traffic.
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Called Plot for NATO
As follows from official (West German) Government
documents and a principled statement by the Christian
Democratic Union-Christian Socialist Union, C.D.R.-C.3.U
party leadership, the aim of this aggressive policy and
sabotage is to include the whole of Germany into the
NATO Western military bloc and to extend the militarists
»
domination from the Federal Republic of Germany to the
German Democratic Republic as well.
The West German militarists want, with the help of
all sorts of fraudulent maneuvers, as, for instance, free
elections, at first to extend their military base to the
Oder (River) and then start another big war.
The West German revanchists and militarists are
abusing the peaceful policy of the U.S.S.R. and the Warsaw
Treaty states on the German question, in order to damage
not only the German Democratic Republic but also other
states of the Socialist camp by means of rampant, hostile
propaganda, by enticing people and by sabotage.
For all these reasons, the Council of Ministers of
the German Democratic Republic, in accordance with the
decision of the Political Consultative Committee of the
Warsaw Treaty member states, and with a view of insuring
peace in Europe, protecting the German Democratic Republic
and in the interests of the security of the Socialist
camp states, decided to take the following measures:
To put an end to the hostile activities of the
revanchist and militarist forces of Western Germany and
VJest Berlin, such control is to be introduced on the borders
of the German Democratic Republic, including the border -
with the Western sectors of Greater Berlin, which is
usually introduced along the borders of every sovereign
state.
Reliable safeguards and effective control must be
Insured on the West Berlin borders in order to block the
way to the subversive activities.
The citizens of the German Democratic Republic may
cross these borders only with special permission.
Until West Berlin is turned into a demilitarized
neutral free city, the citizens of the capital of the
German Democratic Republic will have to have a special
permit for crossing the border to West Berlin.
The West Berlin civilians may visit the capital of
the German Democratic Republic (Democratic Berlin) on
presenting West Berlin identity cards.
Revanchist politicians and agents of West German
militarism are not permitted to enter the territory of the
G.D.R. capital (Democratic Berlin).
As regards visits to Democratic Berlin by the
citizens of the West German Federal Republic, former
decisions on control remain valid.
These decisions do not affect the visits of the





As regards the traveling of West Berlin citizens
abroad along the communication lines in the German Demo-
cratic Republic, former decisions remain valid.
This decree in no way revises former decisions on
transit between West Berlin and West Germany via the German
Democratic Republic.
The Minister of Home Affairs, Minister of Transport
and Mayor of Greater Berlin are instructed to Issue appro-
priate instructions on the enactment of this decree.
This decree on the measures for insuring peace,
protecting the German Democratic Republic and its capital
of Berlin in particular, and for insuring the security of
other Socialist states, remains valid till the conclusion
of a German peace treaty.
IV. Text of Decision of Conference of First Secretaries
of Communist Parties of Warsaw Pact Nations, July25,
1963
(from Current Digest of the Soviet Press , Vol. XV, No. 30,
August 21, 1963, pp. 3-4)
DECISION OF CONFERENCE OF FIRST SECRETARIES OF CENTRAL
COMMITTEES OF COMMUNIST AND WORKERS 1 PARTIES AND HEADS OF
GOVERNMENT OF WARSAW TREATY STATES. (Pravda, July 27,
p. 1; Izvestia, July 28. Complete text:) Having heard a
report by Comrade Gromyko , U.S.S.R. Minister of Foreign
Affairs, on the discussions between the government of the
U.S.S.R. and the governments of the U.S.A. and Britain on
the question of the cessation of nuclear weapons tests,
the conference of First Secretaries of the Central Commit-
tees of the Communist and Workers 1 Parties and heads of
government of the Warsaw Treaty states approves the results
of these talks, which have led to an agreement on a treaty
banning nuclear explosions in three areas: in space, in
the atmosphere and under water.
The reaching of an agreement on the question of the
cessation of nuclear tests is the result of the consistent
peace-loving course of the foreign policy of the Soviet
Union and all the socialist countries, a success of the
Leninist policy of the peaceful coexistence of states with
different social systems.
The conference feels that this treaty villi further
the relaxation of international tension and will be a
positive factor in the struggle of the peoples for peace






1959 Strength of Soviet Union Armed Forces
(Information taken from The Soviet Union and The NATO
Powers; The Military Balance by The Institute for
Strategic Studies, London, 1959)
Army Navy Air Force Total








I96I Strength of the Armed Forces
of the Warsaw Pact Countries
(Information taken from The Communist Bloc and The Western
Alliances; The Military Balance, 1961-1962 by The Institute






Rumania 222 , 000
Soviet Union 3>800,000





1 962 Strength by Country and Military Branch
of the Armed Forces of the Warsaw Pact Countries
( Information taken from The Communist Bloc and The Western
Alliances: The Military Balance, 1962--1963 by The In:stitute
for Strategic Studiiss, London)
Country Array Navy Air Force Total
Bulgaria 100,000 5,000 15,000 120,000
Czechoslovakia 150,000 35.000 185,000
East Germany 65,000 11 ,000 9,000 85,000
Hungary 75,000 5,500 80,500
Poland 200,000 12,000 ^5,000 257.000
Rumania 200,000 7,000 15,000 222,000
Soviet Union 2 ,500,000 500,000 600,000 3 ,600,000
Totals 3 ,290,000 535,000 72^,500 4- .5^9,500




1963 Strength by Country and Military Branch
of the Armed Forces of the Warsaw Pact Countries
(Information taken from The Military Balance, 1963-1964 by
The Institute for Strategic Studies, London)
Country Army Navy Air Force Total
Bulgaria 110,000 5,000 20,000 135,000
Czechoslovakia 150,000 35,000 185,000
East Germany 90,000 11,000 15,000 11.6,000
Hungary 90,000 9,000 99,000
Poland 200,000 12,000 4-5,000 257,000
Rumania 200,000 7,000 20,000 227,000
Soviet Union 2,300,000 500,000 500,000 3.300,000
Totals 3,^40,000 535,000 644,000 4,319,000




1964 Strength by Country and Military Branch
of the Armed Forces of the Warsaw Pact Countries
(Information taken from The Military Balance, 1964-65 by
The Institute for Strategic Studies, London)
Country Army Navy Air Force Total
Bulgaria 125,000 5,000 20,000 150,000
Czechoslovakia 200,000 35.000 235,000
East Germany 80,000 15.000 15,000 11.0,000
Hungary 95,000 9,000 104,000
Poland 21 5,000 1.2,000 45,000 272,000
Rumania 200,000 7,000 15.000 222,000
Soviet Union 2,200,000 460,000 620,000 3 ,280,000
Totals 3J15.000 499,000 759,000 4 ,373,000




1965 Strength by Country and Military Branch
of the Armed Forces of the Warsaw Pact Countries
( Information taken from The Military Balance, 1965-I966 by
The Institute for Strategic Studies, London)
Country Army Navy Air Force Total
Bulgaria 125,000 7,000 20,000 152,000
Czechoslovakia 200,000 35.000 2.35,000
East Germany 80,000 17,000 15,000 1.12,000
Hungary 100,000 9,000 109,000
Poland 215,000 17,000 4-5,000 277,000
Rumania 175,000 8,000 15,000 198,000
Soviet Union 2,000,000 4-50,000 690,000 3,14-0,000
Totals 2,895,000 4-99,000 829,000 4-, 223, 000




I966 Strength by Country and Military Branch
of the Armed Forces of the Warsaw Pact Countries
(Information taken from The Military Balance, 1966-1967 by
The Institute for Strategic Studies, London)
Country Army Navy Air Force Total
Bulgaria 125,000 7,000 24,000 156,000
Czechoslovakia 175,000 45,000 220,000
East Germany 85,000 17,000 20,000 122,000
Hungary 100,000 9,000 109,000
Poland 185,000 15,000 60,000 260,000
Rumania 175,000 8,000 18,000 201 ,000
Soviet Union 2 ,000,000 465,000 700,000 3 ,165,000
Totals 2 ,845,000 512,000 876,000 4 .233,000




1967 Strength by Country and Military Branch
of the Armed Forces of the Warsaw Pact Countries
( Information taken from The Military Balance, I967-I968 by
The Institute for Strategic Studies, London)
Country Army Navy Air Force Total
Bulgaria 125,000 7,000 22,000 154,000
Czechoslovakia 175,000 50,000 225,000
East Germany 85,000 17,000 25,000 127,000
Hungary 95,000 7,000 102,000
Poland 185,000 15,000 70,000 270,000
Rumania 150,000 8,000 15,000 173,000
Soviet Union 2,000,000 465,000 755,000 3 ,220,000
Totals 2,815,000 512,000 9^4,000 4 ,271,000




1968 Strength by Country and Military Branch
of the Armed Forces of the Warsaw Pact Countries
(Information taken from The Military Balance, 1968-1969 by
The Institute for Strategic Studies, London)
Country Army Navy Air Force Total
Bulgaria 125,000 6,000 22,000 153,000
Czechoslovakia 175,000 50,000 225,000
East Germany 85,000 16,000 25,000 126,000
Hungary 95.000 7,000 102,000
Poland 185,000 19,000 70,000 274,000
Rumania 150,000 8,000 15,000 173,000
Soviet Union 2,000,000 465,000 755,000 3,220,000
Totals 2,815,000 5*^,000 944,000 4,273.000
Albania 30,000 3.000 5.000 38,000







University of Washington
Department of Printing
Seattle, Washington 98105

